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ABSTRACT 
 I 
ABSTRACT 
Railway safety is very important, as it concerns human lives. Therefore identifying 
risks from possible failures is vital to maintain the safety of railways. Currently, many 
mature tools, such as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis, are applied to 
investigate possible risks to railway safety. However, in many circumstances, the 
applications of these tools are unable to provide satisfactory results when the risk data 
is incomplete or there is a high level of uncertainty involved in the risk dataThus it is 
essential to develop new methods to overcome the weakness of current assessment 
tools. This thesis introduces an improved intelligent system for risk analysis usingfuzzy 
reasoning approach (FRA) and improved fuzzy analytical hierarchy decision making 
process (Fuzzy-AHP), which is specially designed and developed for the railways, and 
able to deal with the uncertainty in risk assessment. The system builds upon work 
carried out by Dr Huang Shen who developed a safety risk model using FRA and 
Fuzzy-AHP. In his model, the risk level (RL) is assessed in terms of failure frequency 
(FF) and consequence severity (CS). This research introduced consequence probability 
(CP), which allows risk to be assessed correctly.  In this system, FRA is employed to 
estimate the risk level (RL) in terms of FF, CS and CP. This allows imprecise or 
approximate information to be used in the risk analysis process. Improved Fuzzy-AHP 
technique is then integrated to determine the relative importance of risk contributors, so 
that the risk assessment can be progressed from hazardous event level to hazard group 
levels and finally to railway system level. Additionally, in order to select cost-effective 
measures to minimise the risk, a risk-based maintenance decision making model is 
developed by using the technique for preference by similarity to the ideal solution 
(TOPSIS) method which synthesises the proposed risk and cost models to produce the 
preference degree of each maintenance option. Both the risks associated with a railway 
asset and the costs incurred in each maintenance option are mapped onto a utility space 
and assessed in accordance with the respective constraints. The proposed decision 
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making model could be an effective tool to get a better understanding of risks 
associated with railway assets and make better maintenance decisions at the right time 
for managing the risks under various conditions. Two case studies are conducted to 
demonstrate the potential benefits of the methodology.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Risk, in the railway sector, can be defined in relation to accidents and incidents 
leading to fatalities or injuries of passengers and employees (Profillidis, 2006). Recent 
structured hazard identification work within the industry has confirmed high-risk 
scenarios of the types of accidents such as collision, derailment and fire (Peter et al., 
2006). The statistics of accidents and incidents include not only workers, but also a 
significant number of people not employed in the industry, including children and 
members of the public. In the UK railway industry, many people have been injured 
and there even have been fatalities in past years (LUL, 2001). This shows the 
dangerous nature of the railway industry and demonstrates the need for increased 
awareness and better safety management (Muttram, 2002). To achieve how that can 
be assessed effectively, knowledge of the nature and causes of these accidents are 
fundamental. Therefore, risk analysis plays a central role in the railway safety 
management framework. The most common hazards in railway system identified by 
the railway industry over the years (LUL, 2001; Railway Safety, 2002; Metronet, 
2005) provide very useful information for risk analysis, for example, derailment 
hazards, collision hazards, fire hazards, electrocution hazards, fall hazards, train strike 
hazards, slip/trip hazards, and platform/train interface hazards. The requirement of 
risk analysis is to demonstrate that: if risks associated with a railway system are high, 
risk reduction measures must be applied or operation and maintenance have to be 
reconsidered to reduce the occurrence probabilities or control the possible 
consequences; if risks are negligible, no actions are required but the information 
produced needs to be recorded for audit purposes (An et al, 2008; HSE, 2000). 
Therefore railway engineers, managers and safety analysts need to develop and 
employ risk assessment approaches for safety management and set safety standards. 
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Many risk assessment techniques currently used in the railway industry are 
comparatively mature tools, which have been developed on the basis of probabilistic 
risk analysis (PRA), for example, fault tree analysis, event tree analysis, Monte–Carlo 
simulation, consequence analysis and equivalent fatality analysis (EFA) (LUL, 2001; 
Railway Safety, 2002; Metronet, 2005; An et al., 2011). The results of using these 
tools heavily rely on the availability and accuracy of the risk data (LUL, 2001; 
Railway Safety, 2002; Metronet, 2005). However, in many circumstances, these 
methods often do not cope well with uncertainty of information. Furthermore, the 
statistic data does not exist and it must be estimated on the basis of expert knowledge 
and experience or engineering judgement. Therefore railway risk analysts often face 
circumstances where the risk data are incomplete or there is a high level of 
uncertainty involved in the risk data (An et al., 2011). Additionally, railways are a 
traditional industry, whose history extends for at least two centuries. Much of the 
safety record of the railways depends upon the concepts developed many years ago 
and established practices over the whole of its history. The existing databases contain 
a lot of data and information, however, the information may be both an excess of 
other information that cannot be used in risk analysis or a shortage of key information 
of major failure events. There are numerous variables interacting in a complex manner 
which cannot be explicitly described by an algorithm, a set of equations or a set of 
rules. In many circumstances, it may be extremely difficult to conduct PRA to assess 
the failure frequency of hazards, the probability and the magnitude of their possible 
consequences, because of the uncertainty in the risk data. Although some work has 
been conducted in this field, no formal risk analysis tools have been developed and 
applied to a stable environment in the railway industry (Chen et al., 2007). Therefore 
it is essential to develop new risk analysis methods to identify major hazards and 
assess the associated risks in an acceptable way in various environments where those 
mature tools cannot be effectively or efficiently applied. The railway safety problem 
is appropriate for examination by FRA and fuzzy-AHP. 
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Usually, the magnitude of a risk can be assessed by considering two fundamental risk 
parameters: failure frequency (FF) and consequence severity (CS) (An et al, 2006). 
The FF defines the number of times that an event occurs over a specified period, e.g. 
number events/year. The CS represents the number of fatalities, major injuries and 
minor injuries resulting from the occurrence of a particular hazardous event. However, 
it should be noted that the magnitude of a particular risk also highly depends on the 
probability that the effects will happen given by the occurrence of the failure. 
Therefore the probability of a current consequence caused by a particular failure 
should be taken into consideration in the risk assessment process to obtain a reliable 
result. In order to assess the risks associated with a railway depot efficiently and 
effectively, a new risk parameter, consequence probability (CP) is introduced in the 
proposed risk analysis model to determine the risk level (RL) of a hazardous event. 
The use of FRA allows imprecision or approximate information involved in the risk 
assessment process (Bojadziev et al., 1997; An et al., 2006). In this method, a 
membership function (MF) is regarded as a possibility distribution based on a 
proposed theory; an apparent possibility distribution expressed by fuzzy set theory is 
transferred into a possibility measure distribution. The FRA method provides a useful 
tool for modelling risks and other risk parameters for risk analysis involving risks 
with incomplete or redundant safety information. Because the contribution of each 
hazardous event to the safety of a railway system is different, the weight of the 
contribution of each hazardous event should be taken into consideration in order to 
represent its relative contribution to the RL of the railway system. Therefore the 
weight factor (WF) is introduced, which indicates the magnitude of the relevant 
importance of a hazardous event or hazard group to its belongings in a risk tree. 
Modified fuzzy-AHP has been developed and then employed to calculate the WFs 
(Chen et al, 2011). This has been proved to facilitate the use of fuzzy-AHP and 
provide relevant reliable results. This thesis presents a development of a railway risk 
assessment system using FRA and modified fuzzy-AHP. The outcomes of risk 
assessment are represented as risk degrees, defined risk categories of RLs with a 
belief of percentage, and risk contributions. They provide safety analysts, managers, 
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engineers and decision makers with useful information to improve safety management 
and set safety standards.  
 
As stated earlier in this Chapter, if risks are high, risk reduction measures must be 
applied or maintenance work must be considered to reduce the occurrence probabilities 
or control the possible consequences. If risks are negligible, no actions are required， 
but the information produced needs to be recorded for audit purposes. However, the 
acceptable and unacceptable regions are usually divided by a transition region. Risks 
that fall in this transition region need to be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable 
(ALARP). In other words, “cost-effective” measures should be applied. In this case, 
selecting the optimal maintenance strategy among many alternatives based on cost and 
safety analysis is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) problem, which can 
usually be solved by optimisation techniques. The literature search indicates that 
traditional cost-benefit analysis based on simple comparisons cannot be applied to this 
process. This study also presents a risk-based maintenance decision making model by 
using the TOPSIS technique which synthesises the risk and cost models to produce the 
preference degree of each maintenance option. Once preference degrees of all 
maintenance options in hand are produced, the best option can be chosen. In this model, 
both the risk associated with a railway asset system and the costs incurred in each 
maintenance option are mapped onto a utility space and assessed in accordance with the 
respective constraints. The proposed decision making model could be an effective tool 
to get a better understanding of risks associated with railway asset systems and make 
better maintenance decisions at the right time for managing the risks under various 
conditions. 
  
1.2 Aims 
The primary aim of this study is to develop and improve railway safety risk models 
further in order to meet the needs of industry and to apply the safety risk prediction 
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system in a real environment with industry partners. In particular, this system could be 
applied to define risks and the numerical levels of expectation. This will support the 
industry‟s efforts to run the rail network with normal service while keeping risks 
ALARP. This project also sets out to facilitate effective maintenance planning for 
railway vehicle and infrastructure operators, engineers and health & safety advisors. 
The secondary aim is to investigate how intelligent safety analysis techniques can 
provide insights into the ways that risks contribute to accidents, for example, collisions, 
derailments and fires, via case studies and the determination of the most appropriate 
maintenance for various conditions. Therefore, The study is  
 To: enable improved safety through design, diagnosis and maintenance of 
railway systems. 
 For: rail vehicles, infrastructure operators, track & civil engineering designers 
and maintainers, as well as health & safety advisors. 
 By: developing safety risk models and tools using FRA and AHP techniques to 
railway safety risk assessment and decision making processes. 
 
1.3 Objectives 
The specific objectives of this research project are:  
1 To investigate further railway safety risk assessment tools as used in practice and in 
research literature worldwide. 
2 To develop further railway safety risk models and tools to facilitate railway safety 
risk analysis. Safety risk models based on FRA combined with AHP techniques will 
be established for processing safety risk assessment efficiently and effectively. 
3 To validate the proposed railway safety risk system via case studies with industrial 
partners. 
4 To develop a risk-cost model to assist railway maintenance decision making.  
5 To apply the proposed methodology and tool to a railway  maintenance strategy 
study. 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
The metrologies during the research life-cycle are presented in Figure 1-1. The research 
will start with the selection of the subject, aim, objectives and research methodologies 
in general. And then a comprehensive literature review will be carried out on risk 
assessment methods, decision-making approaches and current applications in practice. 
After that, an improved railway safety risk model and risk-based decision making will 
be developed, reviewed and improved through literature review, interviews and 
publications. In the meantime, a prototype of software tool will be developed as well. 
Finally, the application of above approaches will be placed at the end of each 
developing cycle. The following stages are summarized as the followings: 
 
1 Review of relevant literature on railway safety risk assessment techniques and 
decision-making approaches. The major parameters (rail & vehicles) that influence 
the decisions concerning which maintenance option is selected will be studied in 
detail. The techniques used to select a maintenance option based on cost and safety 
risk analysis will be reviewed. All the selection processes will be studied in detail, 
together with the level of confidence associated with decision making. 
2 Development of safety risk assessment approaches for facilitating railway safety 
risk analysis. The safety risk assessment model will be developed based on FRA 
Fuzzy-AHP techniques to facilitate risk analysis where there is a high level of 
uncertainty or data incomplete. 
3 Prototype software tool. A prototype software tool will be developed which will be 
compatible with a PC platform in C++. Case study materials will be obtained from 
industrial partners to test the developed system in order to enable the system can be 
used in practice efficiently and effectively; which can also be developed further by 
a partner into commercial software. 
4 Development of advanced maintenance procedures to minimise risks. 
Multi-objective decision-making techniques will be investigated in order to select 
the best solution for railway maintenance decision making.  
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5 Application of the above approaches to a railway safety case. The developed safety 
risk analysis models and software system will be applied to a railway operation and 
maintenance study. 
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1.5 Research outcomes 
The research outcomes are:  
 Literature survey and benchmark reports of current best practice for safety risk 
assessment in the railway industry. Flow charts showing comparative safety risk 
assessment processes for railway by conventional (statistical and probabilistic) 
techniques, fuzzy reasoning techniques and expert inputs. 
 Safety risk assessment models for the issues where prediction is currently 
weakened by inadequate or inconsistent data. 
 A robust safety risk analysis framework that will provide a platform where risks 
associated with the railway system can be assessed effectively and efficiently, so 
that railway maintenance decisions can be made. 
 A supporting prototype software to facilitate the application of the anticipated 
approaches. 
 A risk based decision making system that will provide decision makers very useful 
information for their decisions on maintenance options or strategies.    
In addition, five research papers have been published at international conferences and 
in academic journals. They are: 
1. M. An, Y. Chen and C. J. Baker, 2011. A fuzzy reasoning and fuzzy-analytical 
hierarchy process based approach to the process of railway risk information: A 
railway risk management system. Information Sciences, 181(18), 3946-3966. 
(Please see Appendix) 
2. Y. Chen, M. An, 2011. Application of a modified Fuzzy-AHP methodology to 
railway risk decision making process. Proceedings of the International Railway 
Engineering Conference (REC 2011), CD format, London, UK, ISBN 
0-947644-69-5. 
3. M. An, Y. Chen, C. J. Baker, 2008. Development of an intelligent system for 
railway risk analysis. Proceeding of 3rd International Conference on System 
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Safety, ISBN 0-479622-23-13, pp.1-6. 
4. S. Huang, M. An, Y. Chen, C. J. Baker, 2007. Railway safety risk assessment 
using FRA and fuzzy AHP approaches – a case study on risk analysis of 
shunting at Waterloo depot. Proceedings of the 2nd IET International 
Conference on System Safety, London, UK., pp. 35-38 
5. Y. Chen, M. An, S. Huang, C. J. Baker, 2007. Application of FRA and FAHP 
approaches to railway maintenance safety risk assessment process. Proceedings 
of the 9th International Railway Engineering, CD format, ISBN 
0-947644-61–10. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into nine chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction to this study 
including aim and objectives of the research project and research methodologies 
adopted in the study.  
 
Chapter 2 then reviews railway safety issues, top-down and bottom-up risk assessment 
approaches, and current railway safety risk assessment methods including qualitative, 
semi-qualitative and quantitative approaches.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the concept of fuzzy expression covering fuzzy set and fuzzy 
number. The fundamentals of FRA and Fuzzy-AHP in terms of fuzzy expression are 
outlined. Finally, a modified Fuzzy AHP is introduced in this chapter.   
 
Chapter 4 presents the development of an improved railway safety risk model by using 
the modified Fuzzy-AHP approach. The process of such a railway safety risk 
assessment model at each phase is described and a third parameter, CP, is introduced.  
 
Chapter 5 describes the software development based on the proposed railway safety 
risk model including detailed design of logic layers, features and application of this 
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software in railway safety risk assessment. 
 
Chapter 6 presents the development of a new risk-based decision making approach. It 
involves a safety risk model, a cost model and a risk-cost model. The TOPSIS approach 
is applied to optimise the selection of maintenance options in terms of risk and cost.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 present two case studies collected from railway industry: risk 
assessment of shunting at Hammersmith depot and risk assessment of a track system, 
by applying the proposed safety risk model and risk based decision making approach. 
The results indicate that the railway safety risk can be assessed more efficiently and 
effectively by using the proposed methodologies.  
 
Finally, Chapter 9 concludes the main benefits of using the developed railway safety 
risk model. Many interesting findings lead to some recommendations for further works 
which are suggested at the end. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews and discusses potential problems related to railway safety and 
major types of railway accidents. The definitions of risk and risk assessment are also 
discussed. And top-down and bottom-up risk assessment approaches are described. 
The qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative risk assessments are discussed as 
well, which will form the basis of the development of new risk assessment techniques.    
2.2 Railway Safety 
While the safety level of rail transport is far higher than other transport modes, there 
exist possibilities to further enhance railway safety. According to the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), safety can be defined as the release from 
unacceptable risks, a risk being a combination of probability and of gravity of harm. In 
the railway sector, the risk can be defined in relation to the events that damage safety 
(fatalities or injuries of passengers or employees) or transportation stability (delay) 
(Profillidis, 2006). 
2.2.1 Potential safety problems 
In order to avoid accidents, appropriate railway maintenance and safety measures 
should be put in place after suitable investigations to provide safe and economical train 
transportation (Rasaiah, 2002). However, railway science is a complicated subject, 
which is interdisciplinary and requires competences of civil engineers, economists, 
electrical and mechanical engineers and managers. Thus, following railway network 
reorganisation, it has become customary to distinguish railway science into three topic 
areas (Profillidis, 2006): 
(1) Track topics: subjects concerning railway infrastructure are dealt with, in order to 
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ensure the safe operation of the rolling stock at the scheduled speed. The 
superstructure (e.g. rails, sleepers, fastenings, ballast or concrete slab) and the 
subgrade are central subjects of track topics. Track topics also include layout, 
stations, switches and crossing, maintenance and safety issues. 
(2) Traction topics: subjects concerning rolling stock are elaborated on. Traction topics 
also include electric traction, telecommunications and signaling; however, a certain 
railway includes these in the area of track topics, since they are parts of the 
permanent railway infrastructure.  
(3) Operation topics: including commercial operations in which commercial and 
pricing policies are analysed and technical operations where issues concerning 
schedule organisation and optimum use of rolling stock and traffic safety are 
examined. 
 
To the above should be added the topic of metropolitan railways (metros and tramways), 
which constitute a specific railway class of their own great importance to mass transit in 
large urban centres. However, after separation from operation, track topics, 
electrification, telecommunication, signalling, and technical operations belong to the 
responsibilities of infrastructure controllers, whereas rolling stock operation and 
maintenance and commercial operation belong to the responsibilities of railway 
operators. Railway stations may be studied either in infrastructure or operation, 
depending on where the station best belongs. 
 
Railway science is, therefore, a complicated subject which is interdisciplinary and 
requires competences from the sectors of civil engineering, economics, electrical and 
mechanical engineering and management. The hazard checklist for railways could list 
the potential hazards in such areas. It has to include mechanical hazards, electrical 
hazards, thermal hazards, thermodynamic hazards, hazards generated by noise, hazards 
generated by vibration, hazards generated by materials/substances, and environmental 
hazards (Profillidis, 2006). For example, electrical hazards include persons contact live 
parts (direct contact), contact between a person and parts which have become live under 
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faulty conditions (indirect contact), approaching live parts under high voltage, and 
thermal radiation or other phenomena such as the projection of molden particles and 
chemical effects from short circuits, overloads, etc. Thermal hazards include burns, 
scalds and other injuries by a possible contact between a person and objects or materials 
with an extremely high or low temperature, by flames or explosions and also by 
radiation of heat sources, and damage to health from a hot or cold working environment 
etc. 
2.2.2 Major types of railway accidents 
Accidents are the results of complicated combinations of various factors such as the 
number of trains, the number of passengers and freight, safety equipment (signalling 
and speed control), the surrounding environment and human factors. Usual forms of 
rail accidents are: collision, derailment, fire, accidents during maintenance works, with 
pedestrians at platforms, and etc. There are five major types of structurally significant 
accidents in the United Kingdom (Rasaiah, 2002) which are end-on collisions, side-on 
collisions, buffer stop collisions, level crossing collisions and derailments (including 
those caused by obstacle strikes, broken rails and running gear). 
 
For example, in a topical railway depot, accidents and incidents  can be categorised 
into ten groups as(Metronet, 2005): 
(1) The derailment hazard group, which consists of a number of hazardous events such 
as: track related faults including mechanical failure of track, e.g. broken rail and 
fishplates; signalling related faults including mechanical failure of signals and points; 
rolling stock faults including mechanical failure of rolling stock, e.g. brakes, axles and 
bogies; structure failure including collapsed drain or civil structure beneath track 
leading to derailment; object from a train including object falling from a train (e.g. 
motor) leading to derailment (such as the Chancery Lane incident); human error 
including human error causing derailment, e.g. speeding, incorrect routing, etc.  
(2) The collision hazard group, which includes collision between trains and collision 
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hazards. Collision hazards include events such as: a collision with an object on a track; 
collision with a terminal, e.g. overrunning at the end of any of the depot roads; collision 
with platforms involving both the track and/or the train being out of gauge without 
anybody noticing it; collision with other civil structures involving track/train being out 
of gauge and nobody noticing. 
(3) The train fire hazard group includes events of arcing from the conductor rail causing 
train fire, and electrical, oil or hydraulic failure leading to train fire. 
(4) The electrocution hazard group covers a number of hazardous events, for example: 
contact with the conductor rail while entering/leaving cab; contact with the conductor 
rail while walking to the train; plugging in gap jumper leads if the train is 
stalled/gapped; flooding, e.g. sumps or pumps leading to surface water; and conducting 
electricity from conductor rails, etc. 
(5) The slips/trips hazard group includes, for example, instances when the shunter is 
required to leave train and risks to other persons involved in the move and instances 
when a person is required to approach the train when it is stalled/gapped. 
(6) The falls from height hazard group covers falls from a height, such as when a 
shunter leaves the train cab. 
(7) The train strikes person hazard group covers events where a train strikes an 
authorized person including other depot workers (e.g. ground shunter) or track side 
staff and where the train strikes an unauthorized person, e.g. trespassers, etc. 
(8) The platform train interface hazard group, which covers the train hitting a person on 
the platform. For example, train moves will not take place with passengers present 
(either outside of passenger hours or when the platform is closed for a move). Persons 
are considered at risk including station staff and contractors. 
(9) The structural failure hazard group, in which the hazardous events cover scenarios 
of partial or catastrophic collapse of structures the hitting train, e.g. wall collapse, train 
wash collapse, ceiling collapse and cables/pipes becoming loose, etc. 
(10) The health hazard group includes hazardous events such as the failure of pumps 
and sumps leading to flooding and health hazards posed by mercury and arsenic in 
ballast that would be washed to surface. 
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In order to minimise risk, railway safety risk assessments need to be carried out. If a 
risk event falls into a high risk band, risk reduction measures must be applied or 
maintenance work has to be considered to reduce the occurrence probabilities of the 
risk event, or to control its possible consequences. If a risk event falls into a negligible 
risk band, no actions are required but the information produced from risk assessment 
needs to be recorded for audit purposes (An et al., 2006 & 2007).  
2.3 Overview of Railway Safety Risk Assessment 
2.3.1 Definitions 
Risk is defined as:  
 “Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences,” 
(ISO, 1999); 
 “Risk is the likelihood that a hazard will actually cause its adverse effects, 
together with a measure of the effect,” (HSE, 2005). 
It can be seen that a risk is a certain hazard occurring and its adverse consequences. 
Risk management is defined as the culture, process and structures that are directed 
towards the effective management of potential opportunities and adverse effects 
(Rausand et al., 2004). Figure 2-1 shows a risk management system. The risk 
management process is the systematic application of management policies, procedures 
and practices to the tasks of establishing the context, identifying, analysing, evaluating, 
treating, monitoring and communicating the risk.  
 
Risk assessment is an essential part within risk management system. It includes an 
overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk analysis is the systematic use 
of available information to identify hazards and to estimate the risks of a railway 
system. Risk evaluation is a process to determine risk management priorities by 
comparing the level of a risk against predetermined standards, target risk levels or other 
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criteria, e.g. HSE safety risk regulations.  
 
With railways, especially for railway safety management and railway safety case 
preparation, risk is assessed in the context of safety. Railway safety risk assessment is 
based on an assessment of the risk resulting from hazardous events which can occur as 
a result of the duty holder‟s operations which have the potential to lead to fatalities, 
major or minor injuries to passengers, staff or members of the public. It is an important 
tool to aid decision-making, thus it is an important part of successful railway safety risk 
management. 
 
Figure 2-1 Risk management (Rausand et al., 2004) 
   
2.3.2 Current risk assessment 
The Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1974 require employers to 
assess the health and safety risks involved in all work activities. Nowadays, risk 
assessment is a common requirement of all health and safety legislation. The emphasis 
is now on preventing accidents and work-related ill health, rather than just reacting to 
incidents and making improvements after the event. Currently, a typical risk assessment 
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is usually divided into three phases: hazard identification, risk estimation and risk 
response.  
 
The hazard identification phase seeks to identify the risks to be managed. 
Comprehensive identification using a well-structured systematic process is critical 
because a risk that has not been identified cannot be managed risk is assessed in the 
context of safety. The aim of hazard identification is to generate a comprehensive list of 
sources of risks and events that might have an impact on the achievement of each 
objective identified in the context. The most popular techniques used to identify 
hazards include checklists, expert and engineering judgements, brainstorming approach, 
system analysis, scenario analysis etc. (AS/NZS, 1999). The application of these 
techniques will depend on the nature of the activities under review, types of risks, the 
organisational context and the purpose of the risk management (Rausand et al., 2004). 
 
In the risk estimation phase, risk is estimated and evaluated on the basis of likelihoods 
and consequences of hazardous events identified in the hazard identification phase. A 
qualitative, or semi-quantitative, or quantitative risk assessment or a combination of 
these three may be applied to evaluate risk level of each hazard event depending on the 
circumstances. Various risk analysis techniques might be used, such as fault tree 
analysis (FTA) (Vesely et al., 1981), event tree analysis (ETA) (Crawley and Tyler, 
2003), FMEA (Stamats, 1995), HAZOP (Crawley and Tyler, 2000), fuzzy reasoning 
approach (FRA) and fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) (An et al., 2006 & 2007). 
The application of these techniques will also depend on the availability of information 
required during risk analysis. For example, if there is a great uncertainty involved in the 
risk data, FTA and ETA may not be suitable to use, whereas FRA and fuzzy AHP will be 
appropriate, which will be discussed later in this thesis.          
 
The purpose of the risk response phase is to make decisions, based on the outcomes of 
the risk estimation, about which risks need a treatment and treatment priorities. The risk 
response phase involves comparing the level of risk found during the analysis process 
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with risk criteria established when the context was considered. The objectives of the 
organisation and the extent of opportunity that could result should be considered. 
Where a choice is to be made between options, higher potential losses may be 
associated with higher potential gains and the appropriate choice will depend on an 
organisation‟s context. If risks are high, risk reduction measures must be applied or 
maintenance work has to be considered to reduce the occurrence probabilities or to 
control the possible consequences. If risks are negligible, no actions are required but the 
information produced needs to be recorded for audit purposes. These two 
circumstances are categorised respectively into the unacceptable region and the 
acceptable region. There is usually a transition region between these two regions. A risk 
that falls within this transition region needs to be reduced to ALARP. All railway duty 
holders are required to manage and reduce risks to ALARP to ensure the safety of staff, 
passengers and the publics.  
 
2.3.3 Top-down and bottom-up risk assessment approaches 
Railway safety risk analysis is a complex subject. Efficient use of risk analysis methods 
in the risk assessment process involves the study of the characteristics of each risk 
analysis method and assessment process in terms of the way in which risk analysis is 
carried out. A safety risk assessment method may be classified as either a top-down 
approach or a bottom-up approach by studying the way in which risks associated with a 
railway system are identified (An et al, 2000, 2006 and 2007; Wang et al, 1998). 
 
Railway safety risk analysis may be summarised to answer the following four questions 
(An et al., 2000a; Hashemi et al., 1995; Wang, 1998): 
1. What can go wrong? 
2. What are the effects and consequences? 
3. How often will they happen? 
4. What measures need to be undertaken to reduce the risks and how this be achieved? 
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To answer the above questions, an actual railway system must be examined to identify 
and assess potential hazardous situations and associated risks in order to provide a 
rational basis for determining where risk reduction measures are required. 
 
Either a top-down or a bottom-up safety risk analysis approach can be used to identify 
accident scenarios. The decision as to which kind of analysis is more appropriate is 
dependent on the availability of the safety risk data and information of the railway 
system being studied, the indenture level of analysis required, the degree of complexity 
of the inter-relationships of the components and sub-systems, and the level of 
innovation. 
 
2.3.3.1. Top-down risk assessment approach 
A top-down safety risk assessment process, as shown in Figure 2-2, starts with the study 
of previous accident and incident reports. After the top events which must be studied 
further have been determined, the causes leading to them are then identified 
deductively in increasing detail until all of the causes are identified at the required level 
of resolution. In a top-down safety risk assessment approach, both qualitative analysis 
and quantitative analysis can be carried out to estimate and evaluate risks regarding the 
demand for safety. A risk response can then be undertaken by making use of the 
information produced from the safety risk assessment, to close the loop of the risk 
assessment process. 
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Figure 2-2 A top-down safety risk assessment process (An et al, 2000a and b) 
 
For simple systems, a top-down risk assessment approach may prove convenience and 
time-saving, because it only deals with failure paths leading to particularly serious 
system failure events by studying the relationships of the subsystems and components, 
and the risk data from previous accidents and incident reports of similar systems. 
Obviously, experience, good judgement and understanding of the system are very 
important for an efficient and effective use of this approach. 
However, for large systems such as a railway system, there will often be a lack of 
knowledge or experience regarding the determined system solutions and their possible 
effects on safety. In such a case, the top-down approach may have the following 
problems (Wang, 1997; An et al., 2000a and b): 
 data and information may not be available from previous accident and incident 
reports of similar systems;  
 there may be a lack of confidence that all failure causes associated with the top 
events are completely identified;   
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 deductive characteristics in a top-down safety risk assessment process may not 
address the complex interactions present in a complex system in a rigorous 
way. 
Therefore, a bottom-up risk assessment approach is required. 
 
2.3.3.2. Bottom-up risk assessment approach 
In a bottom-up safety risk assessment process, a system to be analysed can be broken 
down into subsystems which can be further broken down to components in order to 
identify all possible hazards. The hazard identification can be initially carried out at the 
component level, and then progressed firstly up to the subsystem level and finally to the 
system level. All combinations of possible failure events at both of the component and 
the subsystem levels may be studied to identify all the possible system failure events. 
The analysis at subsystem level may make use of the information produced at the 
component level. Finally, risk evaluation and review can be conducted. 
 
A bottom-up risk assessment process is shown in Figure 2-3. In this approach, risk 
assessment can be initially carried out at the component level, and then progressed up to 
the subsystem level and finally to the system level. Risk estimation can also be 
conducted in a similar manner. The information produced from the risk estimation 
phase can be evaluated together with a risk review. 
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Figure 2-3 A bottom-up assessment approach (An et al, 2000a and b) 
The use of a bottom-up risk assessment process yields a higher level of confidence that 
all of the failure events of a railway system and their respective causes are identified. 
Therefore, compared with the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach has the 
following characteristics (Wang 1997, An et al. 2000a and b): 
 omission of system failure events and their respective causes are less likely; 
 it may be more convenient to incorporate into a computer package; 
 it may be more suitable to apply to safety risk analysis of a large railway 
 system with a high level of uncertainty. 
In railway safety risk analysis, the risk assessment of a railway system is often a 
hierarchical process where risk assessments at higher levels (i.e. system) are 
determined by the safety risk assessment at lower levels (i.e. component/subsystem). 
Therefore, a hierarchical procedure is required to synthesise the information produced 
at lower levels to obtain the safety risk assessment at a high level of the system. A 
bottom-up safety risk assessment approach may be more appropriate to be employed in 
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Hazard identification from 
component level to system level
Risk estimation from component 
level to system level 
Analytical results
Risk evaluation and review
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the development of a safety risk assessment model. The use of a bottom-up safety risk 
assessment approach can obtain a higher level of confidence that all of the failure 
events of a railway system and their respective causes are identified. Therefore, the 
development of a railway safety risk model adopts a bottom-up safety risk assessment 
process. Details of the developed railway safety risk model are described in Chapter 4. 
2.3.4 Quantitative and qualitative railway safety risk assessments 
Risk assessment may be undertaken to varying degrees of detail depending upon the 
risk, the purpose of the analysis, and the information, data and resources available 
(AS/NZS, 1999). Thus, assessment may be quantitative, qualitative, or semi- 
quantitative. Literature review indicates that such types of risk assessment approaches 
are widely used in the railway safety risk management (Railway Safety, 2002; Muttram, 
2002; MR 2005).  
2.3.4.1. Quantitative risk assessments 
Quantitative risk assessment uses numerical values for both consequences and 
likelihood by reviewing risk data and information from a variety of sources, such as 
past accidental records, statistics and databases. The quality of the analysis depends on 
the accuracy and completeness of the numerical values and the validity of the models 
used. The aim of quantitative risk assessment is to provide design engineers and safety 
managers with the quantified occurrence probability of each serious failure condition 
and the possible consequences, so that potential risks associated with a railway system 
can be understood (AS/NZS, 1999). 
 
FTA and ETA are two commonly used quantitative assessment techniques to study risks 
associated with a railway system. A SRM (Muttram, 2002) was developed on the basis 
of these two techniques by Railway Safety and is used to assess the risk of major 
hazards in railways. It can provide a structured representation of the causes and 
consequences of potential accidents arising from railway operations and maintenance 
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on the mainline railway. 
 
FTAis a top-down approach to failure analysis, starting with a potential undesirable 
event (accident) called as a TOP event, and then determining all the ways in which it 
can happen. The analysis proceeds by determining how the TOP event can be caused by 
individual or combined lower level failures or events. The causes of the TOP event are 
“connected” through logic gates, i.e. AND-gates and OR-gates. An example of a fault 
tree is shown in Figure 2-4. (Muttram, 2002) 
 
Figure 2-4 An example of a fault tree (Muttram, 2002) 
The top event of the fault tree in Figure 2-4 is identified as “Passenger train derailment”. 
It is linked by an OR gate with four basic events at level 1 i.e. “Derailment due to 
rolling stock faults”, “Derailment due to track faults”, “Derailment due to running into 
obstructions” and “Derailment due to over-speeding”. This means that the top event 
happens if any one of these basic occurs at level 1. Another three events at level 2 can 
also be identified as “Broken rail leading to derailment”, “Buckled rail leading to 
derailment”, and “Track twist leading to derailment” which are also connected with 
“Derailment due to track faults” through an OR gate. In other words, the failure 
likelihood of “Derailment due to track faults” is the sum of these three events. The 
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failure likelihood of the top event is the sum of the four events at level 1.  
 
FTA can identify all the possible causes of a specified undesired event (TOP event), and 
lead to improve understanding of system characteristics. Design flaws and insufficient 
operational and maintenance procedures may be revealed and corrected during the fault 
tree construction. However, FTA is not suitable for modelling when the available data 
are of poor quality (AS/NZS 4360, 2004).  
 
ETA is often the partner of fault tree analysis. It is an inductive procedure that shows all 
possible outcomes resulting from an accidental (initiating) event, taking into account 
whether installed safety barriers are functioning or not, and additional events and 
factors (AS/NZS, 1999). By studying all relevant accidental events, the ETA can be 
used to identify all potential accident scenarios and sequences in a complex system. 
Design and procedural weaknesses can be identified, and probabilities of the various 
outcomes from an accidental event can be determined. An example of an event tree is 
shown Figure 2-5: 
 
 
Figure 2-5 An example of event tree (Muttram, 2002) 
 The example demonstrates how an event tree is used to evaluate the consequences of 
train derailment. Suppose that train miles travelled are 257E+06 miles per year. There 
are two branches (i.e. “Yes (Y), derailment” and “No (N), non-derailment”) for each 
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decision junction for the probability of derailment. FTA is often applied to estimate the 
likelihood of the initiating event. In this case, 4.3E-08 is the likelihood of a derailment. 
Thus, the likelihood of non-derailment is “1-4.3E-08” and no accident train miles 
travelled is nearly 257E+06 miles per year. Then, according to probability of each 
branch, the fault sequence frequency through each branch can be calculated. For 
example, if a derailment occurs and there are no effects on other lines or trains, the fault 
sequence frequency is 8.25 events per year, which is the product of the number of train 
miles i.e. 257E+06, the likelihood of derailment i.e. 4.3E-08 and the probability of the 
branch i.e. 0.75. The consequence of this scenario is 0.5 equivalent fatalities per event, 
so that the risk of this scenario is 0.69 equivalent fatalities per year, which is the product 
of frequency and consequences. Then, risk of derailment is calculated as the sum of risk 
under each scenario, which is 3 equivalent fatalities per year in this case example. 
 
As ETA can visualise event chains following an accidental event, barriers and 
sequences of activation, it is a good basis for evaluating the need for new/improved 
procedures and safety functions. However, there is no standard for the graphical 
representation of the event tree, and only one initiating event can be studied in each 
analysis. In addition, the analyst must be well trained and experienced to ensure an 
effective study of a railway system. Furthermore, requirement of data quality is 
relatively high (HSE 2001).  
 
By using quantitative risk assessment, the potential causes and consequences of a 
hazard event and characteristics of a system can be identified, assessed and understood. 
But the quality and validity of the assessment highly rely on the availability, accuracy 
and completeness of risk data. A full quantitative risk assessment would be extremely 
time consuming and expensive. (AS/NZS, 1999; AS/NZS 4360, 2004).  
2.3.4.2. Qualitative risk assessments 
Qualitative risk assessment is a straightforward process. It identifies risk based on the 
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knowledge and judgement of the person who carries out the assessment.  Safety risk 
analysts can use words to describe the magnitude of potential consequences and the 
likelihood that those consequences will occur. These scales can be adapted or adjusted 
to suit the circumstances. For example, failure likelihood is usually expressed in a 
linguistic manner such as “Rare”, “Occasional”, and “Regular”; consequence severity 
is identified as “Negligible”, “Moderate”, and “Severe”; and risk can be expressed as 
“Low”, “Medium”, and “High”. Qualitative risk assessment can be fulfilled by various 
techniques such as interviews, checklists and brainstorming techniques (Thompson and 
Perry eds., 1992). On the basis of risk assessment results, measures can be taken to 
eliminate or control hazards.  
 
In practice, Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) (MIL-STD-882D, 1983) and Hazard 
& Operability (HAZOP) (Kyriakdis, 2003) studies are typical qualitative risk 
assessment techniques. The HSE has identified a “5-step approach to Risk Assessment” 
(HSE, 1998) based on PHA to easily conduct qualitative assessment. The five steps are 
summarised as follows: 
1. Identify the hazard. 
2. Decide who might be harmed and how. 
3. Evaluate the risks and decide on precautions. 
4. Record findings and implement them. 
5. Review risk assessment and update if necessary. 
A risk ranking matrix is normally adopted to evaluate the risks in the assessment, which 
is also one of the most important qualitative methods and has been widely used in 
railways, where the failure likelihood (FL) and consequence severity (CS) can be 
combined in a two-dimensional matrix for risk level allocation based on expert 
judgements. For example, FL is described as “Rare”, “Occasional” and “Frequent” as 
shown in Table 2-1. CS is described as “Negligible”, “Moderate”, and “Frequent” as 
shown in Table 2-2. By combining FL and CS, a risk ranking matrix can be developed 
as shown in Table 2-3, in which a risk level is described as “Low”, “Medium”, and 
“High”. Based on Table 2-1 and Table 2-2, the magnitude of the risk of a hazard event 
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can be   determined by using the risk ranking matrix. For example, when a hazard 
event has “Frequent” of FL and “Severe” of CS, the risk level of this event is “High” 
which can be determined according to the risk ranking matrix. 
 
Index FL Meaning 
1 Rare Occurrence is unlikely 
2 Occasional Few occurrences 
3 Frequent Repeated occurrence 
Table 2-1 FL categories for qualitative risk ranking matrix 
 
Index CS Meaning 
1 Negligible Slight injury no absence from work 
2 Moderate An injury with the potential of absence from work for few days 
3 Severe Serious injury, even single/ multiple fatality 
Table 2-2 CS categories for qualitative risk ranking matrix 
 CS 
Negligible Moderate Severe 
 
FL 
Rare Low Low Medium 
Occasional Low Medium High 
Frequent Medium High High 
Table 2-3 Qualitative ranking matrix of FL and CS 
Qualitative risk assessment may be used where the numerical data or resources are 
inadequate for a quantitative analysis. It relies on subjective judgements to assess the 
risk level of a hazard event, which therefore cannot provide precise results. A 
semi-quantitative assessment may provide a better understanding of the risks associated 
with a railway system which is described in the next section. 
2.3.4.3. Semi-quantitative risk assessments 
In a semi-quantitative risk assessment, qualitative scales such as those described in 
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section 2.3.4.2 are given. The objective is to produce a more expanded ranking scale 
than is usually achieved in qualitative assessment, not to suggest realistic values for risk 
such as is attempted in quantitative assessment (AS/NZS, 1999). The value allocated to 
each description may not be an accurate relationship to the actual magnitude of 
consequences or likelihood, and those numbers can only be combined using a formula 
that recognises the limitations of the kinds of scales used (AS/NZS 4360:2004).  
 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) (SEMATECH, 1992) is a typical 
semi-quantitative risk assessment technique. The application of this technique aims to 
identify and analyse all potential failure modes of various parts of a system as well as 
the effects that these failures may have on the system. The guidance from Railway 
Safety (2002) describes a method based on FMEA to conduct a semi-quantitative risk 
assessment within the railway safety case. As described earlier in this thesis, FL and CS 
are assigned numerical values in accordance with the corresponding categories based 
on professional judgement as shown in Table 2-4 and Table 2-5. For example, a hazard 
event with an occurrence of around 31.25 per year is defined as a frequent event. If the 
hazard event causes around 3.125 equivalent fatalities, the consequence is defined as a 
severe consequence.   
 
On the basis of the newly defined FL and CS categories, either a numerical risk or risk 
score of a hazard event can be obtained from the product of its FL and CS numerical 
values or the summation of its FL and CS ranking indices:  
 
Numerical risk= FL numerical value   CS numerical value 
Risk score= FL ranking index + CS ranking index 
 
For example, a hazard event has a FL of “Frequent”, which is assigned 31.25 failures 
per year and CS is “Severe” with 3.125 equivalent fatalities with every failure. The 
numerical risk is 97.66 equivalent fatalities per year, and the risk score is 6. By 
comparing with the values in the numerical risk matrix of Table 2-6 and risk score 
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matrix of Table 2-7, it can be concluded that the risk level of such a hazard event has a 
“high” risk level. 
 
Ranking 
index 
FL Meaning Approximate numerical value 
(events/year) 
1 Rare Occurrence is unlikely 0.05 
2 Occasional Few occurrences 1.25 
3 Frequent Repeated occurrence 31.25  
Table 2-4 FL categories for semi-quantitative risk assessment 
 
Ranking 
index 
CS Meaning Approximate numerical value 
(equivalent fatalities/event) 
1 Negligible Slight injury no absence from work 0.005 
2 Moderate An injury with the potential of absence 
from work for few days 
0.125 
3 Severe Serious injury, even single/ multiple 
fatality 
3.125 
Table 2-5 CS categories for semi-quantitative risk assessment 
 
 CS 
0.005 0.125 3.125 
 
FL 
0.05 2.5E-4 6.25E-3 0.16 
1.25 6.25E-2 0.16 3.91 
31.25 0.16 3.91 97.66 
Table 2-6 Numerical risk matrix 
 
 CS 
1 2 3 
 
FL 
1 2 3 4 
2 3 4 5 
3 4 5 6 
Table 2-7 Risk score matrix 
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A semi-quantitative assessment can produce more accurate results of risk rankings than 
those produced by a qualitative assessment. This approach is widely used in railway 
risk assessment. Metronet Rail has developed a risk model based on this approach to 
assess train operations and staff risks (Metronet Rail, 2005). However, care must be 
taken with the use of semi-quantitative assessment, because the numbers chosen may 
not properly reflect relativities and this can lead to inconsistent, anomalous or 
inappropriate outcomes ((AS/NZS 4360:2004).  
2.3.4.4. Software developments for railway safety risk assessments 
On the basis of risk assessment techniques as described in the above sections, many 
commercial software have been developed which are summarised in Table 2-8. 
However, most of software has been developed mainly based on FTA and ETA, also 
including FMEA and Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
Software Applied area Techniques Website 
AgenaRisk 
Aerospace, Banking, Defence, 
Energy, Technology, Telecoms, 
Transportation 
FTA www.agenarisk.com/ 
RiskSpectrum Nuclear power plants FTA&ETA, FMEA www.riskspectrum.com/ 
QRAS 
Aerospace, Defence, Health 
Care, and other industries 
FMEA, FTA&ETA www.itemsoft.com/ 
SAFETI-PHAST Onshore, Finance 
HAZOP, What if, checklist, 
PHA, FMEA 
www.dnv.com 
NEPTUNE Offshore ETA , what-if analysis www.dnv.com 
SAFETI-Frequen
cy 
Offshore 
FTA, ETA, Monte Carlo 
simulation 
www.dnv.com 
ASAP 
leaks, fires and explosions on oil 
and gas installations 
QRA www.lilleaker.com/ASAP.asp 
LEAK Calculate leak frequency QRA www.dnv.com 
FaultTree+ Raliways FTA, ETA www.isograph-software.com 
LOGAN No specific area 
FTA, ETA, Monte Carlo 
simulation 
www.rmclogan.co.uk 
PHA-Pro 6 No specific area 
HAZOP, what-if analysis, 
checklist, PHA, FMEA 
www.dyadem.com 
Table 2-8 Lists of commercial risk assessment software 
 
The SRM (Safety Risk Model) mentioned in Section 2.3.4.1 is developed on the basis 
of the FaultTree+ software by Isograph Ltd. It provides improved analysis of the results 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 33 
from FaultTree+ in terms of the overall collective risk from individual or groups of fault 
tree and event tree analysis models, the risk profiles, and the risk contributions from 
individual or groups of precursors. Isograph also develops a RiskVu package that 
interfaces directly link with FaultTree+, which facilitates the use of the software.  
 
The SRM represents a comprehensive system-wide computer based model of the UK 
mainline railway network. The model allows for (Muttram, 2002): 
- risk profiles for all groups of hazardous events to be represented graphically; 
- determination of the risk contribution and risk profile, from individual or groups of 
causes and consequence precursors; 
- determination of the frequency and average consequences per event for each 
hazardous event; 
- determination of the relationship between the frequency of occurrence and the 
number of fatalities for all groups of or individual hazardous events; 
- provides the basis for assessing the risk for a particular line or route, or for a 
particular train operating company. 
 
However, it should be noted that in order to assess the risk for a particular line or route, 
or for a particular train operating company, each model, each assumption and each data 
input to the SRM must be examined for relevance to the particular line or route, or for a 
particular train operating company. Therefore, SRM may have the following pitfalls 
(Railway safety, 2003):  
- time consuming; 
- analysis could be diverted into endless discussions of details; 
- experts‟ judgement is represented by a single number; 
- no standard for the graphical representation of the event tree; 
- only one initiating event can be studied in each analysis; 
- not well suited for handling common cause failures in the quantitative analyses. 
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2.3.5 Discussions  
A risk assessment can be undertaken on a quantitative or a qualitative, or a 
semi-quantitative basis depending on the complexity of the problem, the objectives of 
the assessment, and availability of information, data and resources. When detailed risk 
analysis is required, a quantitative risk assessment approach may be the best choice, but 
it is complicated and time consuming. If data is of poor quality, it becomes impossible 
to carry out a quantitative risk assessment. Applications of qualitative risk assessment 
would then be necessary. However, the results from qualitative risk assessments are 
quite general, and may be only suitable for initial risk screening activities. A 
semi-quantitative assessment can produce a more expanded raking scale than those in a 
qualitative assessment, but it only delivers limited information due to the limitation of 
input data (Chen et al., 2007 &2011). 
 
In railways, risk assessment is a very complicated subject as the overall system is very 
complex, and its risk is determined by numerous factors. Quantitative risk assessment 
approaches such as FTA and ETA are currently used in railway safety risk analysis. 
They can provide relevant detailed results, but they are often not effective to handle 
with the uncertainty of information as they rely heavily on supporting statistical 
information which may not be available. In the safety risk assessment, collecting 
sufficient data based on statistical probability of failure is a costly and difficult 
undertaking, and the relevance of data to any particular system, as well as its validity, is 
often questionable. Furthermore, in many situations, the item of the probability of 
failure is needed but it does not exist, therefore it must be estimated based on 
engineering judgement or experience from similar items. Quantitative risk assessment 
may not be suitable for such a situation, while qualitative or semi-quantitative 
assessment may not solve the problem efficiently, as a single number or word may not 
include all the necessary information (Chen et al., 2007 &2011).  
 
A fuzzy reasoning approach may be more appropriate in the situations where there is a 
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high level of uncertainty within the risk data. It allows imprecision or approximated 
information in its analysis process, which helps to restore integrity to safety risk 
analysis. It also possesses the ability to mimic the human mind to effectively employ 
approximate reasoning that enables risk analysts to specify mapping rules in terms of 
words rather than numbers, and approximate function rather than exact reasoning. It 
has been shown that fuzzy reasoning can model non-linear functions of arbitrary 
complexity to a desired degree of accuracy (An et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2007 & 2011). 
The proposed railway safety risk model in this study will address these issues. 
 
2.4 Summary 
The chapter reviews the potential problems related to railway safety and common 
types of railway accidents. In order to eliminate risks and improve railway safety, 
railway safety risk assessment must be undertaken. This chapter then also reviews 
current railway safety risk assessment approaches including the top-down approach, 
the bottom-up approach and quantitative, qualitative and semi-quantitative risk 
analysis techniques. Most of commercial software currently used in railway safety 
risk analysis have also been reviewed. The benefits and pitfalls are addressed. The 
review ends with a conclusion that current railway safety risk assessment techniques 
may not suitable for circumstances where a high level of uncertainty is involved in the 
safety risk data or the required information is not available. A fuzzy reasoning 
approach may be more appropriate to solve such problems.        
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CHAPTER 3: FUNDAMENTALS OF FRA 
AND MODIFIED FUZZY-AHP 
3.1 Introduction 
The proposed safety risk model is developed by using fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) 
combined with a Modified fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (Fuzzy-AHP). This 
chapter introduces the concepts of fuzzy set and fuzzy number and describes the 
fundamentals of FRA and modified Fuzzy-AHP.  
3.2 Fuzzy Expression 
Fuzzy theory and the possibility theory were firstly introduced by Zadeh (1965 & 
1978), which have been widely used to deal with uncertainties in the measurement of 
risks in the fields of such as finance, business, system control, risk assessment and the 
environment. In these applications, the concepts of fuzzy set and fuzzy number have 
been frequently applied. A fuzzy set is an extension of a classical set (Zadeh 1965; 
Bojadziev and Bojacziev 1997). Instead of using a binary membership function in a 
classical set, which only tells whether an object belongs to the set or not, fuzzy set 
applies a continuous graded membership function which also indicates how much the 
object is close to the set. A fuzzy number is a parametric representation of a convex 
and normalized fuzzy set.  
3.2.1 Fuzzy set 
A fuzzy set A  on a universe of discourse U  characterised by a membership 
function (MF)  
A
x is defined as (Zadeh, 1965): 
       , , 0,1A AA x x x U x    .          Eq. 3-1 
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If   max 1A x  , the fuzzy set A  is called normalized; otherwise the set is called 
nonnormalized. If the number of solutions to equation  
A
x 
 
is less than three 
for all   in the interval  0,1 , the fuzzy set A  is called convex; otherwise is called 
nonconvex.  
 
The basic operations on fuzzy sets are equality, inclusion, proper subset, 
complementation, intersection, and union, in which, intersection, and union are most 
commonly used fuzzy set operators in safety risk analysis, and they are also called 
AND and OR operations respectively. Consider two fuzzy sets B  and C , 
 
       , , 0,1B BB x x x U x    , 
       , , 0,1C CC x x x U x    . 
 
The operations with B  and C  are introduced via operations on their membership 
function  B x  and  C x (Bojadziev and Bojacziev 1997). The operation 
intersection of B  and C  is denoted as B C , whose MF is defined as: 
 
      min ,BB C Cx x x              Eq. 3-2 
 
The operation union of B  and C  is denoted as B C , whose MF is defined as:  
 
      max ,BB C Cx x x              Eq. 3-3 
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3.2.2 Fuzzy number 
A fuzzy number is defined in the universe R  as a convex and normalized fuzzy set 
(Bojadziev and Bojacziev 1997), and it is a parametric representation of the fuzzy set. 
There are various fuzzy numbers available such as triangular fuzzy number, 
trapezoidal fuzzy number, bell-shaped fuzzy number, and etc. However, triangular and 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are the most widely used in the engineering risk analysis 
because of their intuitive appeal and perceived computational efficacy (Giachetti et al. 
1997). 
 
A trapezoidal fuzzy number can be defined as  , , ,A a b c d , and the MF of its 
corresponding fuzzy set A  is defined as: 
 
( ) /( ), [ , ],
1 [ , ]
( )
( ) /( ), [ , ],
0, .
A
x a b a x a b
x b c
x
x d c d x c d
otherwise

    
  
  
   
 
         Eq. 3-4 
 
where four real numbers (a, b, c, and d are also vertex values of a trapezoidal 
membership function) with satisfaction of the relationship a b c d   determine the 
x coordinates of the four corners of a trapezoidal membership function as shown in Fig. 
3-1(A) . If b c , the fuzzy number becomes a triangular fuzzy number as shown in 
Fig. 3-1(B), which could be deemed to be special format of a trapezoidal fuzzy number. 
A non-fuzzy number A  can then be expressed as  , , ,a a a a . By the extension 
principle of fuzzy set (Dubois and Prade 1980; Chen 1998; Chen et al 2006; Gu and 
Zhu, 2006), the fuzzy operations for trapezoidal fuzzy numbers have been developed 
and applied. The fuzzy addition   of any two trapezoidal fuzzy numbers are also 
trapezoidal fuzzy numbers while fuzzy multiplication  , fuzzy division   and 
fuzzy exponent of any two trapezoidal fuzzy numbers may be either trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers or other types of fuzzy numbers. For example, given any two positive 
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trapezoidal fuzzy numbers, ( , , , )B B B BB a b c d and  , , ,C C C CC a b c d , some 
commonly used operations of these fuzzy numbers can be expressed as follows: 
 
( , , , )
B C B C B C B C
B C a a b b c c d d               Eq. 3-5 
( , , , )
B C B C B C B C
B C a a b b c c d d               Eq. 3-6 
( / , / , / , / )
B C B C B C B C
B C a d b c c b d a            Eq. 3-7 
(( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) )k k k k kB B B BB a b c d , 0k  .         Eq. 3-8 
 
 
Fig. 3-1 Trapezoidal and triangular fuzzy numbers and corresponding MFs  
3.3 Fundamental of FRA 
Fuzzy reasoning approach (FRA) has been developed based on the concept of fuzzy 
sets and inference mechanism, which generalises an ordinary mapping of a function to 
a mapping between fuzzy sets (Lee, 2005, An et al., 2000a and b). The inference 
mechanism is based on the compositional rule of inference and the result is derived 
from a set of fuzzy rules and given inputs. It indicates that FRA possesses the ability to 
model a complex non-linear function to a desired degree of accuracy. Therefore, FRA 
has been widely applied to risk assessment, data classification and system control. In 
this section, basic terms of linguistic variables, fuzzy rulebase and fuzzy inference 
process are presented, which are essential knowledge for developing a FRA safety risk 
model.  
a b(c) d
1
0

xa b c
1
0

xd
(B)(A)
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3.3.1 Linguistic variables 
Linguistic variables are the generalisation of ordinary variables, whose values are 
words or sentences in natural or artificial languages rather than real numbers. They 
are defined by the following quintuple (Lee, 2005): 
 
Linguistic variable =   , , ,x T x U M
 
 
where 
x : name of variable 
  T x : set of linguistic terms which can be a value of the variable 
 U : set of universe of discourse which defines the characteristics of the variable 
 M : semantic rules which map terms in  T x
 
to fuzzy sets in U  
 
For example, consider a linguistic variable X  to describe age approximately, whose 
name is “AGE” as shown in Fig. 3-2. Where  
 ( , ( ), , )X AGE T AGE U M  
 AGE : name of the variable X  
  T AGE : {very young, young, middle age, old} set of linguistic terms in the 
discussion of age. 
 U :  0,100
 
universe of discourse 
 
By using Eq 3-1, 
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   
 
   
 
 
 
( ) ,
5 15 5, 20 ,
20,30 ,1
45 15 30, 45 ,
0 .
young
young
M young x x x U
x x
x
x
x x
otherwise


 
  


 
 

  
 
 
Fig. 3-2 Linguistic terms of the linguistic variable AGE 
 
3.3.2 Fuzzy rulebase 
A major component of a FRA model is fuzzy rulebase, which consists of a set of fuzzy 
rules, and these rules are expressed in the form of IF-THEN statements. For example, 
the following is a fuzzy IF-THEN rule: 
 
IF  is  AND  is ,  THEN  is x A y B z C  
 
Where ,  and A B C  are linguistic terms, “ IF  is  AND  is x A y B ” is called the 
“antecedent (IF part)” of the rule and “ THEN  is z C ” is called “consequent (THEN 
part)”. If there are more than one arguments in the IF part, then AND or OR operation 
needs to be applied. 
 
Because a multi-output system can always be decomposed into a collection of a 
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single-output system, therefore, only the multi-input-single-output system is presented  
(Lee, 2005, An et al, 2000a &b; Yao et al, 2006). For example, the ith fuzzy IF-THEN 
rule in the fuzzy rule base is defined as: 
 
1 1 : IF is  and  and is  , THEN  is  
i i i
i n nR X A X A Y B        Eq. 3-9 
 
where 1 2, ,..., nX X X  
and Y  are linguistic variables, and 1 2,
i i i
nA A A  
and iB  are 
linguistic terms in the ith rule, and they belong to the above linguistic variables, 
respectively. In order to build a robust fuzzy rulebase, three major properties of fuzzy 
rules must be taken into consideration, which are outlined as follows (Wang, 1997; Sii 
et al., 2001; An et al., 2000a & b; An et al., 2006 & 2007): 
 
(1) Completeness: a set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules is complete if for any input values, 
there is at least one rule in the fuzzy rule base. In other words, the completeness of 
a set of rules means that at any point in the input space there is at least one rule that 
„fires‟, which means the membership value of the IF part of the rule at this point is 
non-zero. 
(2) Consistency: a set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules is consistent if there are no rules with 
the same IF part, but different THEN parts. 
(3) Continuity: a set of fuzzy IF-THEN rules is continuous if there do not exist such 
neighbouring rules whose THEN part fuzzy sets have empty intersection, i.e. they 
do not intersect. 
3.3.3 Fuzzy inference process 
A fuzzy IF-THEN rulebase is the core of the fuzzy inference process for formulating 
the mapping from given input fuzzy sets to an output fuzzy set. Once the rulebase is 
established, fuzzy inference process can be carried out as shown in Fig. 3-3. Fuzzy set 
inputs are directly input into the fuzzy inference system to determine which rules are 
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relevant to the current situation, and the results from inference of individual rules are 
then aggregated to the output result from inference with current inputs. The overall 
process is developed on the basis of the Mamdani method (Lee, 2005; An et al., 2006 & 
2007). 
 
 
Fig. 3-3 Fuzzy inference process 
 
Supposing there are m rules in the rulebase, and the ith rule is defined as: 
 
1 1 : IF is  and and is  and  and is  , THEN  is 
i i i i
i j j n nR X A X A X A Y B .     Eq. 3-10 
 
where there are n arguments in the IF part connected with the AND operation, and 
1 2, , , nX X X  
and Y are linguistic variables in their corresponding universe 
discourse, and 1 2,
i i i
nA A A  
and iB  are linguistic terms of linguistic variables 
1 2, , , nX X X  
and Y . The calculation of the fire strength i  of rule iR  with input 
fuzzy sets
1 2, , , nX X X  using fuzzy intersection operation is given by:  
 
              1 21 21 1 2 2min max ,max , ,maxi i in ni X X X n nA A Ax x x x x x            
                  Eq. 3-11 
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Where      
1 21 2
, , ,
nX X X n
x x x  
 
are the MFs of fuzzy sets 
1 2, , , nX X X , 
respectively, and      
1 21 2
, , ,
nA A A n
x x x  
 
are the MFs of fuzzy sets of linguistic 
terms 1 2, , ,
i i i
nA A A  in rule iR . After the fuzzy implication, the truncated MF iB  
of 
the inferred conclusion fuzzy set of rule iR  can be obtained by: 
 
   i iiB By y                 Eq. 3-12 
 
Where i  is the fire strength of rule iR , and  iB y  is the MF of linguistic term 
iB  
and y is an input variable in the universe of discourse. 
 
The firing strength is implicated with the value of the conclusion MF and the output is a 
truncated MF. The truncated MF's corresponding fuzzy sets that represent the 
implication output fuzzy sets of rules are aggregated into a single fuzzy set. The MF 
 B y  of output fuzzy set after aggregation using fuzzy union (maximum) operation 
is denoted by: 
 
   
1
V i
n
B Bi
y y 

               Eq. 3-13 
 
where iB is the MF of conclusion fuzzy set of rule iR and n is the total number of rules 
in the rule base. 
 
As the output from the fuzzy inference system is a fuzzy set, defuzzification needs to be 
applied to convert the fuzzy result into a matching numerical value. The centre of area 
method (Lee, 2005; An et al., 2006 & 2007) is employed for defuzzification. Assume 
the output fuzzy set obtained from the fuzzy inference system is 
       , | , 0,1B BB y y y Y y      , the matching crisp value c  from the MF of 
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 B y  of the conclusion fuzzy set can be calculated by: 
 
 
 
1
1
m
B j j
j
m
B j
j
y y
c
y




 




             Eq. 3-14 
 
 where m is the number of quantisation levels of the conclusion fuzzy set. 
 
Fig. 3-4 demonstrates the fuzzy inference process with three input fuzzy sets: 
trapezoidal fuzzy set 1X  , triangular fuzzy set 2X   and crisp set 3X  . These inputs 
are fired with Rules  and i jR R , where Rule jR  
is fired twice as fuzzy sets 1X   
and 
1
jA  have two intersection points. The fuzzy sets , ,  and i j kY Y Y    derived from 
implication are determined by Minimum operation, and then they are aggregated 
together by Maximum operation. Finally, the output from the defuzzification is 
calculated by the centre of area method as described above. 
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Fig. 3-4 Fuzzy inference process with three input fuzzy sets 
 
FRA is capable to deal with qualitative information so that imprecision or 
approximate information can be taken into consideration in the risk assessment. It also 
provides a framework that transforms a human knowledge base into a non-linear 
mapping. Because the risk contributions of components and subsystems to a system 
are different, the weight factor (WF) of each component or subsystem within the 
system should be considered in order to calculate their relative contributions to the RL 
of the system. Thus, an improved fuzzy analytical hierarchy process technique has 
been developed and incorporated into the proposed risk model in this study to use its 
advantages in determining the relative importance of components and subsystems. 
Therefore, the risk assessment can be progressed from component level to the 
subsystem level and finally to the system level. Such a technique will be introduced in 
the following section.  
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3.4 Fundamental of Fuzzy-AHP 
Many methods can be used to determine the weight factors, such as the Weight Sum 
Model (WSM) (Fishburn, 1967), Weighted Product Model (WPM) (Miller and Starr 
1969), Simple Multiattribue Rating Technique (SMART) (Winterfeldt and Edwards, 
1986) and Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Satty, 1980). However, compared 
with other methods, AHP has its advantages in determining weight factors both in 
single and multi-dimensional decision making, and has been integrated with  risk 
assessment techniques (Satty, 1980; Vaidya and Kumar, 2006).  
 
AHP is introduced by Satty in 1980. Since then, it has been widely used in multiple 
criteria decision-making. It decomposes a complex problem into a hierarchy, in which 
each level is composed of specific elements. Pairwise comparisons for each level in 
the hierarchy need to be carried out in order to obtain the weight factor (WF) of each 
element at that level with respect to one element at a higher level. AHP enables 
decision makers to analyse a complex problem in a hierarchy with quantitative and 
qualitative data and information in a systematic manner. It also attempts to resolve 
conflicts and analyse judgments whilst determining the relative importance of a set of 
certain criteria. Many outstanding works have been published based on AHP,  
including the applications of AHP in different fields such as planning, selecting a best 
alternative, resource allocations, resolving conflict, optimisation, and etc. (Zahedi, 
1986; Vargas, 1990; Vaidya and Kumar, 2006). However, some deficiencies have been 
found when applying AHP in practice (Laarhoven and Pedrycz, 1983; Buckley, 1985; 
Yu 2002; Mikhailov 2004). For example, because the AHP only provides a crisp scale 
set, participating decision makers have to determine a definite number within the 
scale set. Therefore, it is difficult to handle the uncertainty in converting experts‟ 
imprecise subjective judgments to crisp numbers. Thus, sometimes, it is difficult for 
experts to express their judgments if they are not confident in relative importance 
between two alternatives. The applications of Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process 
(Fuzzy-AHP) may therefore solve such a problem, which is described in section 3.4.1. 
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3.4.1 Fuzzy-AHP process 
As stated earlier in section 3.4, the AHP cannot deal with the fuzziness during 
decision making. Laarhoven and Pedrycz (1983) have extended Saaty‟s AHP into 
Fuzzy-AHP by introducing a triangular fuzzy number into the pairwise comparison 
matrix of AHP. After that, Buckley(1985) introduced the trapezoidal fuzzy number 
into Fuzzy-AHP. The purpose of these developments is to solve vague problems 
during the decision making process. Thus, the application of Fuzzy-AHP not only 
inherits the advantages of the traditional AHP but also possesses the ability to deal 
with uncertainty. It is more flexible for experts to express their judgments in either 
linguistic terms or exact numbers when determining the relevant importance of 
alternatives (Cheng et al., 1999; Bozdag, 2003; Wu et al., 2004; Kahraman, 2004), 
especially in risk assessment (Murtaza, 2003; Huang et al., 2006; An et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2007). 
 
A Fuzzy-AHP approach can be simplified as a process of calculating weight factors of 
alternatives at a level in a hierarchy or of a certain criterion.  The process is 
described as follows: 
 
Step 1: Establishment of a Fuzzy-AHP estimation scheme 
Fuzzy-AHP determines weight factors (WFs) by conducting a pairwise comparison. 
The comparison is based on an estimation scheme of intensity of importance using 
linguistic terms. Each linguistic term has a corresponding fuzzy number as shown in 
Table 3-1. Linguistic terms 1 to 9 describe the intensities of preference varying from 
equal importance to absolute importance, and linguistic terms 2, 4, 6 and 8 are the 
intermediate descriptors between them. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: FUNDAMENTALS OF FRA AND MODIFIED FUZZY-AHP 
 49 
Index Linguistic terms Fuzzy numbers 
1 Equal importance (1,1,1,2) 
2 Between equal and weak importance (1,2,2,3) 
3 Weak importance (2,3,3,4) 
4 Between weak and strong importance (3,4,4,5) 
5 Strong importance (4,5,5,6) 
6 Between strong and very strong importance   (5,6,6,7) 
7 Very strong importance (6,7,7,8) 
8 Between very strong and absolute importance  (7,8,8,9) 
9 Absolute importance  (8,9,9,9) 
Table 3-1 Comparison scheme 
 
Step 2: Construction of fuzzy comparison matrix M  
The pairwise comparison matrix M can be developed on the basis of Table 3-1 as 
described in Step 1. Each element of matrix M presents the preference intensity of one 
event over another. The fuzzy comparison matrix M is defined as: 
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          Eq. 3-15 
}/1,/1,/1,/1{/1 ,,,,,, jijijijijiij dcbamm          Eq. 3-16  
 
where jijijiji dcba ,,,, ,,, >1 stands for the ith event is relatively more important than 
the jth event, jijijiji dcba ,,,, ,,, =1 stands for the ith and jth events are equally 
important and jijijiji dcba ,,,, ,,, <1 stands for the ith event is relatively less important 
than the jth event. 
 
Step 3: Calculation of Fuzzy weights 
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The fuzzy WF of each event can be calculated (Buckley, 1985) based on Eqs. 3-5 and 
3-8: 
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where jim ,  is the fuzzy preference value of the ith event over the jth event, and iu  
is the geometric mean of the fuzzy preference value of the ith event over each other 
event, and iw  is the fuzzy WF of the ith event. 
 
Step 4: Defuzzification and normalisation 
As the fuzzy WFs are presented in terms of fuzzy numbers, it is necessary to convert 
fuzzy numbers into crisp values (Bojadziev and Bojacziev 1997). The fuzzy WF iw  
of the ith event is defined 
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           Eq. 3-18  
 
Then, normalised WF 

iw of the ith event can be calculated by 
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            Eq. 3-19  
 
It can be seen that   21nn  judgements in a traditional fuzzy-AHP process are 
needed in order to establish a comparison matrix with n  events. However, there is a 
lack of consistency test in such a process. Moreover, with the numbers of events 
increasing, the numbers of comparisons are increased rapidly. Therefore, the fuzzy 
multiplicative consistency method may be needed.  
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3.4.2 Modified Fuzzy-AHP process 
The application of Fuzzy-AHP in a risk analysis is to determine the fuzzy priorities by 
conducting a pairwise comparison from a group of risk analysts. However, the risk 
analysts often face the circumstances where huge pairwise comparison matrices have to 
be completed. Even if it is a single pairwise comparison matrix, it still requires 
 1 2n n   judgements at a level with n  alternatives. Therefore, with the numbers of 
alternatives increasing, the numbers of comparisons are increased rapidly. As a result, 
the judgements will mostly become inconsistent. Thus, consistency tests are required to 
avoid misleading solutions. If a comparison matrix fails the consistency test, the risk 
analysts must re-do the judgements until a reliable matrix can be obtained. Because the 
judgements are crisp values and the judgements in Fuzzy-AHP method are given by 
fuzzy numbers, the likelihood of having inconsistent crisp numbers within the given 
fuzzy numbers is therefore far greater. Furthermore, because risk analysts are required 
to provide the comparison judgements using fuzzy numbers, this also involves huge 
work and the comparison may be highly unrealistic. Therefore, methods have been 
developed in the literature to use consistency tests to avoid inconsistency in risk 
analysis (Leung and Cao, 2000; Huang et al., 2005&2006; An et al., 2007; Chen et al., 
2007). These methods of determination of the consistency of a fuzzy positive 
reciprocal matrix can be used in risk analysis; however, these proposed methods will 
become very complex with the numbers of alternatives increasing. 
 
Preference relation method is a useful method that the most common representation of 
information used for solving decision making problems due to their effectiveness in 
modelling decision processes (Wang and Chen, 2008). In the process of decision 
making, risk analysts generally need to compare a set of decision alternatives with 
respect to a single criterion, and construct preference relations. In general, the 
preference relation takes the form of multiplicative preference relations or fuzzy 
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preference relations, whose elements estimate the dominance of one alternative over 
another  by using linguistic variables rather than numerical ones (Satty, 1980; 
Herrera et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2006; Wang and Fan, 2007; Berredo, 2005; Ekel, 2006; 
Xu, 2004). 
 
In a preference relation, a risk analyst associates to every pair of alternatives a value 
which presents the degree of preference of the front alternative over the one behind 
(Satty, 1980; Berredo, 2005; Ekel, 2006; Herrera et al., 2001; Fan et al., 2006; Wang 
and Fan, 2007). For example, by studying the properties of consistent preference 
relations, Herrera-Viedma et al (2004) proposed a new concept of consistency based 
on additive transitivity property of fuzzy preference relations to avoid misleading 
conclusions. Based on this characterisation, this study proposed a method for 
constructing consistent comparison matrices from a set of -1n  preference data, 
which allows a large amount of required judgements taken from the risk analysts to be 
reduced, and the consistency of comparison matrices based on the preferences 
transformed from the judgements can be guaranteed.  
 
Wang and Chen (2008) proposed a method using triangular fuzzy numbers to 
construct a fuzzy comparison matrix based on consistent fuzzy preference relations in 
order to enhance the consistency of the fuzzy-AHP method and also to reduce the 
amount of risk analysts judgements. In this method, the comparison matrix is 
established by using the additive transitivity property and consistency so that only 
-1n  comparison judgements are required at a level with n  alternatives. However, 
this method cannot be directly used for construction of the comparison matrices on 
the basis of multiplicative preference relations without transforming multiplicative 
preference relations into fuzzy preference relations. The applications of fuzzy-AHP in 
risk information analysis have proved that the use of multiplicative preference 
relations is more effective and efficient (Huang et al. 2005; Huang et al. 2006; An et al. 
2007; Chen et al. 2007). The following section presents a new method of application 
of fuzzy multiplicative consistency method to improve the consistency of fuzzy-AHP 
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on the basis of multiplicative preference relations (Buckley, 1985) with trapezoidal 
fuzzy numbers in the risk assessment process. The principle and algorithm of the 
proposed method are also discussed. The new method can improve the consistency of 
the comparison matrices to avoid misleading conclusions. It will ensure the 
consistency of judgements and provide more reliable results.  
 
3.4.2.1. Multiplicative preference relations 
For a set of alternatives at a particular level of a hierarchical structure, multiplicative 
preference relations provide risk analysts with values presenting varying degrees of 
preference for the front alternative over the one behind. Suppose that a set of events is 
},,{ ,21 nAAAA   and 2n  , for which a pairwise comparison needs to be 
conducted. Preference relation is expressed in multiplicative preference relation 
format M. The definition and proposition (Herrera-Viedma et al. 2004) are 
summarised as follows. 
 
A multiplicative preference relation M  in a set of events A  is presented by a 
matrix )(, , jimMAAM  , where jim ,  is interpreted as the preference intensity 
of two events iA  and jA , i.e., iA  is jim ,  times as important as jA . The 
measurement of jim ,  uses a ratio scale defined between 1 and 9 (Satty, 1980), where 
1, jim  indicates the absence of a difference between iA  and jA , and jim , =9 
represents that iA  is absolutely more important than jA . In this case, the preference 
relation matrix M  is usually assumed to be a multiplicative reciprocal, i.e.
1,,  ijji mm , },...,2,1{, nji  . 
 
Definition: A reciprocal multiplicative preference relation )( , jimM   is consistent 
if kikjji mmm ,,,  , },...,2,1{,, nkji   and kji  . 
 
In other words, if a comparison matrix M is consistency, it has to satisfy
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kikjji mmm ,,,  . Thereby, Herrera-Viedma et al (2004) proposed a method to 
construct consistent multiplicative preference relations from a set of 1n  preference 
intensities, and developed important propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: A multiplicative preference relation )( , jimM   is consistent if and 
only if kjimmm kikjji  ,,,, . 
 
Proposition 2: For a reciprocal multiplicative preference relation )( , jimM  , the 
following statements are equivalent: 
 kjimmm kikjji  ,,,,           Eq. 3-20   
jimmmm jjiiiiji   ,... ,12,11,,        Eq.3-21 
 
Proposition 2 indicates that a consistent multiplicative preference relation can be 
constructed from the set of 1n  values },...,,{ ,13,22,1 nnmmm  . A pairwise 
comparison matrix with entries in the interval ],/1[ vv , 0v  can be established. 
Then, the entries can be transformed into the interval  1/ 9,9  using a transformation 
function 
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As described earlier in this section, risk analysts may have vague knowledge about the 
preference degree of one event over another, and cannot estimate their preferences 
with exact numerical values. It is more suitable to provide their preferences by means 
of linguistic variables rather than numerical ones. The disadvantage of this method is 
that the values in consistent multiplicative preference relation matrix are crisp, which 
cannot capture risk analysts imprecise judgements. Therefore, trapezoidal fuzzy 
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numbers should be used as described in Section 3.2.2. The proposed fuzzy 
multiplicative consistency method is introduced in terms of trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers.  
 
3.4.2.2. Fuzzy multiplicative consistency method 
A fuzzy multiplicative consistency method is proposed in this study in order to deal 
with inconsistencies in the risk decision making process. In this method, the 
multiplicative preference relation matrix ),,,()( ,,,,, jijijijiji dcbamM   is 
constructed based on consistent multiplicative preference relations as described earlier 
in section 3.4.2.1.  
 
According to Buckley (1985), the consistency of a fuzzy reciprocal matrix is defined 
as 
Definition 2: A fuzzy matrix )( , jimM   
is reciprocal if and only if 
1
,,
 ijji mm . 
 
Definition 3: A fuzzy matrix )( , jimM   
is consistent if and only if 
kikjji mmm ,,,  . 
 
Proposition 3: Suppose a set of events, ),,,( 21 nAAAA   associated with a fuzzy 
reciprocal multiplicative preference matrix ),,,()( ,,,,, jijijijiji dcbamM   with 
]9,9/1[,,, ,,,, jijijiji dcba , the following statements are equivalent: 
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Proof. By Definition 2, )( , jimM   is a reciprocal fuzzy multiplicative preference 
matrix, 
1
, , ,1i j j i j im m m
   , ),,2,1(, nji  . 
 
By using Eq. 3-7 
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Proposition 4: For a reciprocal fuzzy multiplicative preference relation 
),,,()( ,,,,, jijijijiji dcbamM   to be consistent, the following statements are 
equivalent 
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Proof. By Definition 3, )( , jimM   is consistent then kikjji mmm ,,,  .  
By using Eq. 3-6 
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The above expressions (1-4) are obtained and verified.  
CHAPTER 3: FUNDAMENTALS OF FRA AND MODIFIED FUZZY-AHP 
 57 
If i j  and k j i  , the expression (5) can be rewritten as 
)(),1()2(),1()1(,, kikiiiiiji aaaa     
Mathematical induction is applied to prove expression (5) and assumptions are made 
as 
If 1k  , then )1(,,  iiji aa  
If k n , by expression (1), then 
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If k n +1, by using expression (1), then 
jinii
nininii
ninininiiiiiji
aa
aa
aaaaa
,)1(,
)1(),()(,
)1(),()(),1()3(),2()2(,,





 
 
The hypothesis is proved to be true when 1,  and 1k n n  , which completes the proof 
of the expression (5). Similarly, expressions (6-8) can be verified. 
 
Proposition 4 shows that a comparison matrix can be established with 1n  
preference trapezoidal fuzzy numbers in the interval   1/ , 0v v v  . Therefore, a 
transformation function    : 1/ , 1/ 9,9f v v   is needed to transfer trapezoidal fuzzy 
numbers in to the interval  1/ ,v v  to  1/ 9,9 : 
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It is well-known that the general solution verifying expressions (1) and (2) has the 
form 
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According to Eq. 3-8, the above expressions (1) and (2) can be rewritten as 
9 9 9 91/ log 1/ log 1/ log 1/ log( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( )
v v v v
a a b b c c d df x x f x x f x x f x x     
when 1a dx y  , 1b cx y  , 1c bx y  , 1d ax y   the above expressions (3) to (6) can 
be verified 
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When a a ax y z  , b b bx y z  , c c cx y z  , d d dx y z  , the above expressions (7) to (10) 
will be 
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The following steps can be used to construct a consistent fuzzy multiplicative 
preference relation M  for a set of events ),,,( 21 nAAAA   and 2n  on the 
basis of 1n  trapezoidal fuzzy numbers },,,{ ),1(3,22,1 nnmmm  . 
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3.5 Summary 
FRA and modified Fuzzy-AHP are discussed in this chapter. The fundamentals of FRA 
are described in terms of the concepts of fuzzy set, fuzzy number, linguistic variables, 
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fuzzy rulebase and fuzzy inference process. The background of Fuzzy-AHP and the 
process of how modified Fuzzy-AHP is improved are proved and addressed. On the 
basis of these techniques, the developed railway safety risk model will be presented in 
the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4:  DEVELOPMENT OF 
RAILWAY SAFETY RISK MODEL 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the developed railway safety risk model. Section 4.2 presents a 
proposed framework of safety risk model which includes the preliminary phase, design 
phase, FRA risk estimation phase, Fuzzy-AHP risk estimation phase and risk response 
phase. Four input parameters, failure frequency (FF), consequence severity (CS), 
consequence probability (CP), and weighting factor (WF) are discussed in section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 introduces an uncertainty expression. Section 4.4 introduces a important 
parameter of consequence probability CP, which is not currently taken into account in 
the risk assessment. At the end of the chapter, some features of the proposed railway 
risk model are summarised. 
      
4.2 Improvement of Railway Safety Risk Model 
A risk is the result of the error frequency combined with or multiplied by the severity of 
the consequence resulting from its occurrence (Peters et al, 2006). According to this 
definition, Risk Level (RL) can usually be assessed by considering two fundamental 
risk parameters, Failure frequency (FF) and Consequence severity (CS) (An et al, 2006 
& 2007). However, it should be noted that the magnitude of a particular risk is also 
highly dependent on the probability that the effects will happen given by the occurrence 
of the failure. For example, small components such as shoe and brake gear detaching 
from train bogies is a highly frequent risk event (TLL, 2004). It could cause a 
derailment if the fallen shoes wedge in the points in conjunction with a serious failure 
of the signalling system. However, the probability that such a risk event causes a 
derailment is very low, as there is only a small chance that a fallen shoe would wedge in 
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a point. So the risk event should be classified in the low risk category when taking into 
account the consequence probability, whereas without considering the consequence 
probability, such risk event will be classified in the high risk category, which would 
affect the risk ranking and disturb decision making. Therefore, the possibility of a 
current consequence from a particular failure should be taken into consideration in the 
risk assessment process in order to obtain a reliable result. In order to assess the risks 
associated with a railway system efficiently and effectively, a new risk parameter, 
consequence probability (CP) is proposed. The CP indicates the probability that a 
current consequence will happen given by the occurrence of the failure, which together 
with FF and CS are integrated into a fuzzy inference system (FIS) of fuzzy reasoning 
approach (FRA) to determine the RL of each hazardous event. The use of FRA allows 
imprecision or approximate information to be involved in the risk assessment process. 
In this method, a membership function (MF) is regarded as a possibility distribution 
based on a proposed theory; an apparent possibility distribution expressed by fuzzy set 
theory is transferred into a possibility measure distribution. The FRA method provides 
a useful tool for modelling risks and other risk parameters for risk analysis involving 
the risks with incomplete or redundant safety information (An et al, 2006 & 2007). 
Because the contribution of each hazardous event to the safety of a railway system is 
different, the weight of the contribution of each hazardous event should be taken into 
consideration in order to represent its relative contribution to the risk level (RL) of the 
railway system. Therefore, the weight factor (WF) is introduced, which indicates the 
magnitude of the relevant importance of a hazardous event or hazard group to its 
belongings in a risk tree. Fuzzy-AHP is employed to calculate the WFs during the 
process as described in Section 3.4. The application of Fuzzy-AHP may solve the 
problems of risk information loss in the hierarchical process so that risk assessment can 
be carried out from hazardous event level to a railway system level. Both of these 
processes result in a set of probability distributions, which can be used not only to 
predict RLs but also design safety maintenance intervals. The use of these techniques is 
especially appropriate in the railway environment because of the volume of experience, 
which is still available from long-term employees. 
CHAPTER 4:  DEVELOPMENT OF RAILWAY SAFETY RISK MODEL 
 63 
 
A risk assessment is a process that can be divided into five phases: the problem 
definition phase; data and information collection and analysis phase; hazard 
identification phase; risk estimation phase and risk response phase (An et al, 2007). 
This process provides a systematic approach to the identification and control of 
high-risk areas. According to this effective process, a risk assessment model based on 
FRA and Fuzzy-AHP approach for a railway system is proposed, as shown in Figure 
4-1, where EI stands for Expert Index and UFN stands for Uniform Format Number, 
which are described in Section 4.2.3. The algorithm of the risk model consists of five 
phases: preliminary phase, FRA risk estimation phase, Fuzzy-AHP risk estimation 
phase and risk response phase.  
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Figure 4-1 Risk assessment model 
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4.2.1 Preliminary phase 
Risk assessment begins with problem definition which involves identifying the need for 
safety, i.e. specific safety requirements. The requirements regarding railway safety at 
different levels, e.g. hazardous event level, hazard group level and the railway system 
level, should be specified and made, which may include sets of rules and regulations 
made by national authorities and classification societies, deterministic requirements for 
safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, and criteria referring to probability of 
occurrence of serious hazardous events and the possible consequences (An et al., 2007; 
Chen et al., 2007). 
 
Once the need for safety is established, the risk assessment moves from problem 
identification to data and information collection and analysis. The aim of data and 
information collection and analysis is to develop a good understanding of what serious 
accidents and incidents have occurred in a particular railway system over the years and 
generate a body of information. If the statistic data does not exist, expert and 
engineering judgements should be applied. The information gained from data and 
information collection will then be used to define the standards of qualitative 
descriptors and associated MFs of risk parameters, i.e. FF, CS, CP and RL. The design 
of risk parameters and the associated rule base are described in Section 4.2.2.2. 
 
The purpose of hazard identification is to systematically identify all potential hazardous 
events associated with a railway system at each required level, e.g. hazardous event 
level, hazard group level, with a view to assessing their effects on railway system safety. 
Various hazard identification methods such as a brainstorming approach, check-list, 
„what if?‟, HAZOP (Hazard and Operability), and failure mode and effect analysis 
(FMEA), may be used individually or in combination to identify the potential 
hazardous events for a railway  system (HSE, 2001; Chen et al, 2007). The hazard 
identification can be initially carried out to identify hazardous events, and then 
progressed up to hazard group level and finally to the system level. The information 
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from hazard identification will then be used to establish a risk tree, as described in 
Section 4.2.2.1. 
4.2.2 Design phase 
Once the risk information of a railway system is obtained in the preliminary phase, 
the risk assessment moves from the preliminary phase to the design phase. On the 
basis of information collection, the tasks in the design phase are to develop a risk tree 
and MFs of FF, CS, CP and RL and a fuzzy rule base. 
4.2.2.1. Development of risk tree 
There are many possible causes of risks that impact on railway system safety. The 
purpose of the development of a risk tree is to decompose these risk contributors into 
adequate details in which risks associated with a railway system can be efficiently 
assessed (Chen et al, 2007; An et al, 2008). A bottom-up approach is employed for the 
development of a risk tree. Figure 4-2 shows a typical risk tree that can be broken 
down into hazardous event level, hazard group level and system level. For example, 
hazardous events of E1, E2, …, En at hazardous event level affect the RL of S-HG1 at 
sub-hazard group level, the RLs of S-HG1, S-HG2, …, S-HGn contribute to the RL of 
HG2 at hazard group level and RLs of HG1, HG2, …, HGn contribute to the overall RL 
of a railway system at system level. 
 
 
Figure 4-2 An example of a risk tree 
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4.2.2.2. Establishment of fuzzy rulebase 
Fuzzy rule bases are basically built through the study of engineering knowledge, 
historical incident, and accident information. Human experts have a good intuitive 
knowledge of the system behaviour and the risks involved in various types of failures. 
A fuzzy rulebase is established in terms of qualitative descriptors of input parameters: 
FF, CS, CP and the output RL. The qualitative descriptors are characterised by fuzzy 
sets which are derived from experimental data or past information or characteristics of 
input or output variables, such as FF, CS, CP and RL. The fuzzy sets are defined in the 
universe of discourse and described by MFs. Currently, there are several geometric 
mapping functions widely adopted, such as triangular, trapezoidal and S-shaped MFs. 
However, triangular and trapezoidal MFs are the most frequently used in railway risk 
analysis practice (An et al., 2006 & 2007). For example, in the railway safety risk 
assessment, input parameters FF, CP, CS and output RL are constructed by trapezoidal 
MFs, which are determined according to characteristics of inputs or output variables as 
described in Section 4.3, where the input parameter FF is defined as “Remote”, “Rare”, 
“Infrequent”, “Occasional”, “Frequent”, “Regular”, and “Common”; CS is defined as 
“Negligible ”, “Marginal”, “Moderate”, “Critical”, and “Catastrophic”; CP is defined as 
“Highly unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Reasonably unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably likely”, 
“Highly likely” and “Definite”; the output RL is defined as “Low”, “Possible”, 
“Substantial”, and “High”. Rules using defined variables in the fuzzy rulebase are in 
IF-THEN format. For example, rule one is “IF FF is „Remote‟ and CS is „Negligible‟ 
and CP is „Highly unlikely‟, THEN RL is „Low‟”. 
4.2.2.3. Allocation of EIs to experts 
In practice, risk assessment usually involves a number of experts from different 
backgrounds or disciplines with essential experience regarding railway safety. Thus, 
these experts may have different impacts on the final decision. Expert Index (EI) is 
therefore introduced into the risk model to distinguish experts‟ competence. The EI of 
i-th experts in n experts can be obtained by (Huang et al., 2007): 
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where iRI  is relevant importance of i-th expert according to experience, knowledge 
and expertise, which takes a value in the universe of [1, 9]. RI is defined in a manner 
that “1” means less importance, whereas “9” means most importance. Obviously, it is 
necessary to review EIs when the topic or the circumstance has changed. 
4.2.3 FRA analysis 
In the FRA risk estimation phase, each risk is assessed at hazardous event level based 
on FF, CS and CP to calculate its RL. However, railway risk analysts often face the 
circumstances where the risk data are incomplete or there is a high level of 
uncertainty involved in the risk data. A flexible method for expressing expert and 
engineering judgements is proposed (An et al., 2006 & 2008; Chen et al., 2007). The 
uniform format number (UFN) is introduced to capture and convert expert and 
engineering subjective judgements. As described earlier in this thesis, this allows 
imprecision or approximate information to be used in the risk analysis process. There 
are six steps to calculate the RLs of hazardous events that are described below. 
 
Step 1: Input FFs, CSs, and CPs. 
The input data can usually be gathered from historical data, however, in many 
circumstances, the data may not exist or uncertainty may be involved in the risk data. 
Experts may provide their judgements on the basis of their knowledge and expertise 
for each hazardous event (Herrera et al., 2001 & 2009; Zeng et al., 2007). The input 
values can be a precise numerical value, a range of numerical values or a linguistic 
term. For example, if adequate information is obtained and the risk factor is 
quantitative measurable, an expert is likely to provide a precise numerical value. 
However, experts sometimes find that it is hard to give numerical values due to 
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uncertainties involved or the hazardous event is quantitative immeasurable, then a 
range of numerical values, a linguistic term or a fuzzy number can be used in the 
proposed model (An et al, 2006; Chen et al, 2007; Herrera et al, 2009), e.g. ‘CP is 60% 
to 70%’, ‘CS is around 3 to 7 and most likely to be 5 in the universe of [0, 10]’ and 
‘FF is average’. 
 
Step 2: Convert inputs into UFNs. 
As described at step 1, because the input values of hazardous events derived from 
experts‟ judgements are crisp, e.g. a numerical value, a range of numerical values, a 
fuzzy number, or a linguistic term, the UFN is employed to convert these experts‟ 
judgements into a uniform format for the composition of final decisions. UFN is 
developed based on a fuzzy trapezoidal number as it can represent most expert 
judgments. 
 
A UFN can be defined as { , , , }A a b c d , and its corresponding MF indicates the degree 
of preference and is defined as: 
 
( ) /( ), [ , ],
1 [ , ]
( )
( ) /( ), [ , ],
0, .
A
x a b a x a b
x b c
x
x d c d x c d
otherwise
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    
  
  
   
 
         E.q. 4-2 
 
where four real numbers (a, b, c, and d) with satisfaction of the relationship 
a b c d    determine the x coordinates of the four corners of a trapezoidal 
membership function. It should be noted that a numerical value, a range of numerical 
values, a fuzzy number and a linguistic term can be converted as simplified UFN. Table 
4-1 shows the possible expert judgements and their corresponding UFNs.  
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Expert Judgement Input Values Input type UFNs 
“…is a”  a  numerical value   , , ,a a a a  
“…is between a and b”  ,a b  a range number     , 2, 2,a a b a b a   
“…is between a and c 
and most likely to be b” 
 , ,a b c  triangular fuzzy 
number 
 , , ,a b b a  
“… is between a and d 
and most likely 
between b and c” 
 , , ,a b c d  trapezoidal fuzzy 
number  
 , , ,a b c d  
“… is RARE” RARE  linguistic term RARE MF  , , ,a b c d  
Table 4-1 Experts’ judgements and corresponding UFNs 
 
Each UFN at this stage represents an opinion to one of the risk parameters of a 
hazardous event, which is given by an expert in a risk assessment on the basis of 
available information and personal subjective judgement. 
 
Step 3: Aggregate UFNs. 
The aim of this step is to apply an appropriate operator to aggregate individual 
judgements made by individual experts into a group judgement of each hazardous event. 
On the basis of experts‟ EIs calculated in the design phase, their judgments can be 
aggregated according to a weighted trapezoidal average formula (Bojadziev et al, 1997). 
Assume m experts involved in the assessment and n experts providing non-zero 
judgments for a hazardous event i, the aggregated UNF iA can be determined by: 
 
  1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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 , , ,i i i i ik k k k kA a b c d               E.q. 4-3 
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where , , ,i i ik k ka b c and 
i
kd  are the numbers of UFNs 
i
kA  
that represent the judgement of 
the k-th expert for hazardous event i. kEI stands for k-th expert‟s EI. 
 
Step 4: Transfer UFNs into fuzzy sets. 
The FRA allows imprecision or approximate information, for example, expert and 
engineering judgements in the risk assessment process, which provides a useful tool for 
modelling risks and other parameters for risk analysis where the risk data are 
incomplete or include redundant information (Chen et al, 2007) . FRA here is employed 
to deal with UFNs of each hazardous event. In FRA, the aggregated UFNs of FF, CS, 
and CP are converted into matching fuzzy sets before being inputted into a fuzzy 
inference system. Assume , ,and i i iFF CS CPA A A are three UFN of FF, CS and CP of 
hazardous event i, respectively. Their corresponding fuzzy sets , ,and i i iFF CS CPA A A are 
defined as: 
 
       , | 0, , [0,1]i i
FF FF
i
FF nA A
A u u u U u u           E.q. 4-4 
       , | 0, , [0,1]i i
CS CS
i
CS nA A
A v v v V v v            E.q. 4-5 
       , | 0, , [0,1]i i
CP CP
i
CP nA A
A w w w W w w           E.q. 4-6 
 
 where , ,i i
FF CSA A
  and i
CPA
 are trapezoidal MF of ,  i iFF CSA A , and 
i
CPA  respectively, 
and , , and u v w are input variables in the universe of discourse , ,U V and W  of FF, CS 
and CP, respectively.  
 
Step 5: Fuzzy inference process 
During the fuzzy inference process, these fuzzy sets of aggregated UFNs are then input 
to the fuzzy inference system to decide which rules are relevant to the current situation, 
and then calculate the fuzzy output of RL. The overall process is developed on the basis 
of the Mamdani method (Lee, 2005). The rules are stored in the rulebase which 
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contains expert judgements and historical information. Relations between input 
parameters FF, CS, CP and output RL are presented in a form of if-then rules as 
described in Section 4.2.2.2. Supposing the ith rule in the rulebase is defined as: 
 
: if  is  and  is  and  is , then  is ,  1,2,...,i i i ii FF CS CP RLR u B v B w B x B i n    E.q. 4-7 
 
where , , ,u v w  and x  are variables in the universe of discourse , , ,U V W  and X  of 
FF, CS, CP, and RL respectively, and , , ,i i iFF CS CPB B B  
and iRLB  are qualitative 
descriptors of FF, CS, CP, and RL respectively. The calculation of the fire strength i  of 
rule iR  with inputting fuzzy sets , ,and 
i i i
FF CS CPA A A using fuzzy intersection operation is 
given by: 
 
              min max ,max ,maxi i iFF CS CPFF CS CPi A A AB B Bu u v v w w              
                  E.q. 4-8 
 
where      , ,and 
FF CS CPA A A
u v w     are the MFs of fuzzy sets , ,and 
i i i
FF CS CPA A A , 
respectively, and      , ,and i i i
FF CS CPB B B
u v w   are the MFs of fuzzy sets
, ,and i i iFF CS CPB B B of qualitative descriptors in rule iR . After the fuzzy implication, the 
truncated MF i
RLB
 of the inferred conclusion fuzzy set of rule iR  is obtained by: 
 
   i i
RL RL
iB B
x x                  E.q. 4-9 
 
where i  is the fire strength of rule iR , and  i
RLB
x  is the MF of qualitative descriptor
i
RLB and x is an input variable in the universe of discourse X . 
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The firing strength is implicated with the value of the conclusion MF and the output is a 
truncated MF. The truncated MF's corresponding fuzzy sets which represent the 
implication output fuzzy sets of rules are aggregated into a single fuzzy set. The MF
 
RLB
x of output fuzzy set after aggregation using fuzzy union (maximum) operation is 
denoted by: 
 
   
1
V i
RL RL
n
B Bi
x x 

                  E.q. 4-10 
 
where i
RLB
 is the MF of conclusion fuzzy set of rule iR  
and n is the total number of 
rules in the rule base. 
 
Step 6: Defuzzification. 
As the output from the fuzzy inference system is a fuzzy set, defuzzification is used to 
convert the fuzzy result into a matching numerical value that can adequately represent 
RL. The Centre of area method (Lee, 2005) is employed for defuzzification. Assume 
the output fuzzy set obtained from the fuzzy inference system is
       , | , 0,1
RL RLRL B B
B x x x X x      , the matching crisp value RL. iRL  of 
hazardous event i can be calculated by: 
 
 
 
1
1
RL
RL
m
B j j
ji
m
B j
j
x x
RL
x




 




           E.q. 4-11   
 
where m is the number of quantization levels of the output fuzzy set.   
4.2.4 Fuzzy-AHP analysis 
As stated earlier in Section 4.2, because the contribution of each hazardous event to 
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the overall RL is different, the weight of the contribution of each hazardous event 
should be taken into consideration in order to represent its relative contribution to the 
RL of a railway system. The application of fuzzy-AHP may also solve the problems of 
risk information loss in the hierarchical process in determining the relative importance 
of the hazardous events in the decision making process, so that risk assessment can be 
progressed from hazardous event level to hazard group level, and finally to a railway 
system level. A fuzzy-AHP is an important extension of the traditional AHP method, 
which uses a similar framework to AHP to conduct risk analysis but fuzzy ratios of 
relative importance replace crisp ratios to the existence of uncertainty in the risk 
assessment. An advantage of fuzzy-AHP is its flexibility to be integrated with 
different techniques, for example, FRA techniques in risk analysis. In Section 3.4.2, 
an improved Fuzzy-AHP has been introduced, which will facilitate the use of typical 
Fuzzy-AHP. Therefore, an improved fuzzy-AHP analysis leads to the generation of 
WFs for representing the primary hazardous events within each category. There are 
six steps to calculate WFs as described below. 
 
Step 1:Eestablish estimation scheme. 
Fuzzy-AHP determines WFs by conducting pairwise comparison. The comparison is 
based on an estimation scheme, which lists intensity of importance using qualitative 
descriptors. Each qualitative descriptor has a corresponding triangular MF that is 
employed to transfer expert judgments into a comparison matrix (An et al, 2007).  
Table 4-2 describes qualitative descriptors and their corresponding triangular fuzzy 
numbers for risk analysis at railway depots. Each grade is described by an important 
expression and a general intensity number. When two risk contributors are of equal 
importance, it is considered (1,1,2). Fuzzy number (8,9,9) describes that one risk 
contributor is absolutely more important than the other. Figure 4-3 shows triangular 
MFs (solid lines) with “equal importance”–(1,1,2), “weak importance”–(2,3,4), 
“strong importance”–(4,5,6), “very strong importance”–(6,7,8) and “absolute 
importance”–(8,9,9), respectively. The other triangular MFs (dash lines) describe the 
corresponding intermediate descriptors between them.   
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Qualitative descriptors Description Parameters of MFs 
(triangular) 
Equal importance (EQ) Two risk contributors contribute equally to the 
shunting event 
(1,1,2) 
Between equal and weak 
importance (BEW) 
When compromise is needed (1,2,3) 
Weak importance (WI) Experience and judgment slightly favour one risk 
contributor over another 
(2,3,4) 
Between weak and strong 
importance (BWS) 
When compromise is needed (3,4,5) 
Strong importance (SI) Experience and judgment strongly favour one 
risk contributor over another 
(4,5,6) 
Between strong and very 
strong importance (BSV)  
When compromise is needed (5,6,7) 
Very strong importance (VI) A risk contributor is favoured very strongly over 
the other 
(6,7,8) 
Between very strong and 
absolute importance (BVA) 
When compromise is needed (7,8,9) 
Absolute importance (AI)  The evidence favouring one risk contributor over 
another is of the highest possible order of 
affirmation 
(8,9,9) 
Table 4-2 Fuzzy-AHP estimation scheme 
 
Figure 4-3 MFs of qualitative descriptors in fuzzy-AHP estimation scheme 
 
Step 2: Pair-wise compare factors in risk tree 
“HG1”, “HG2”,..., and “HGn” as shown in Figure 4-2 are the risk contributors that 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1.0
Equal
importance 
Weak 
importance
Strong
importance
Very strong 
importance
Absolute 
importance
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contribute to the overall RL of a railway system. Assume two risk contributors HG1 and 
HG2, if HG1 is very strong importance more than HG2, a fuzzy number of (6,7,8) is then 
assigned to HG1 based on the estimation scheme as shown in Table 4-2. Obviously, risk 
contributor HG2 has a fuzzy number of (1/8,1/7,1/6). Suppose n risk contributors, there 
are a total of 1 nN  pairs which need to be compared due to the benefits of 
applying improved Fuzzy-AHP. The following classifications can be used in the 
comparison. 
 
-. A numerical value, e.g. “3” 
-. A linguistic term, e.g. “strong importance”. 
-. A range, e.g. (2, 4), the scale is likely to be between 2 and 4. 
-. A fuzzy number, e.g. (2, 3, 4), the scale is between 2 and 4, most likely 3 or (2, 3, 
4, 5), the scale is between 2 and 5, most likely between 4 and 5. 
-. 0, e.g. the two risk contributors cannot be compared at all. 
 
Step 3: Convert inputs into UFNs. 
As described at steps 1 and 2, because the values of risk contributors are crisps, e.g. a 
numerical value, a range of numerical values, a linguistic term or a fuzzy number, the 
FRA is employed again to convert these values into UFNs according to Table 4-1. A 
series of UFNs can be obtained to correspond to the scores and the scales of the defined 
risk contributors in the risk tree. 
 
Step 4: Aggregate UFNs. 
Usually, there are a number of experts in the risk assessment group and their 
judgments may be different. Therefore, UFNs produced at step 3 need to be 
aggregated into a group UFN for each risk contributor. The process is same as 
described in Section 4.2.3 at step 3. 
 
Step 5: Calculate fuzzy WFs from comparison matrix. 
The aggregated UFN are then used to construct a comparison matrix. Suppose 
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nCCC ,...,, 21  are risk factors in a hazard group p, ,i jA is the aggregated UFN 
representing the quantified judgement on iC  comparing to jC  and iC  is more 
important than jC . By applying the improved Fuzzy-AHP, there will be 1n  
aggregated UFN, i.e. 
nnjjji AAAAA ,11,,3,22,1 ,...,,,...,,  . Then, following steps 1 to 4 in 
Section 3.4.2.2, an entire comparison matrix for the hazard group p can be developed. 
The pairwise comparison between iC  and jC  in the hazard group p thus yields a 
nn  matrix defined as 
 
1,1 1,2 1,
2,1 2,2 2,
,
,1 ,2 ,
, , 1, 2, ,
n
n
i j
n n n n
A A A
A A A
M A i j n
A A A
 
 
       
 
 
     E.q. 4-12 
   , , , , , , , , , ,, , , , 1 ,1 ,1 ,1i j i j i j i j i j j i i j i j i j i jA a b c d A a b c d   
 
where 
, , , ,, , ,  and i j i j i j i ja b c d are the numbers of UFN ,i jA . 
 
Then, the WFs can be calculated by the geometric mean technique (Bojadziev et al, 
1997). The UFN geometric mean iA of the i-th row in the comparison matrix is defined 
as: 
 
  , , , ,
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
n n n n
n n n n
i i i i i i j i j i j i j
j j j j
A a b c d a b c d
   
  
   
  
        E.q. 4-13 
 
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,i i i ii i i i i n n n n
j j j j
j j j j
a b c d
W a b c d
d c b a
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
   
      E.q. 4-14 
 
Where iW is the fuzzy WF of Ci. 
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Step 6: Defuzzification and normalisation. 
Because the outputs of geometric mean methods are fuzzy WFs, a defuzzification is 
adopted to convert fuzzy WFs to matching crisp values in which the fuzzy AHP 
employs a defuzzification approach proposed (Bojadziev et al., 1997). The crisp value
iwof fuzzy WF can be calculated by: 
 
 2
6
i i i i
i
a b c d
w
  
              E.q. 4-15 
 
The final WF of Ci 
is obtained by: 
 
1
i
i n
j
j
w
WF
w




                   E.q. 4-16 
 
Step7: Calculate RLs of sub-hazard groups. 
Once the WFs of risk contributors are obtained, the overall RL at sub-hazard group can 
be calculated by the synthesising of WF and RL for each hazardous event produced in 
the FRA risk estimation phase. The RL of a sub-hazard group iHGS   is defined by 
 
iii C
n
i
CHGS WFRLRL 

 
1
 ni ,,2,1            E.q. 4-17 
 
where 
iC
RL and 
iC
WF are the RL and WF of iC . 
 
Similarly, 
iHGS
WF   of sub-hazard groups and iHGWF  of hazard groups can be 
obtained by repeating steps 1 to 7. The RLs of hazard groups and the overall RL of a 
railway system can be obtained by 
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


n
i
HGSHGSHG iii
WFRLRL
1
 ni ,,2,1          E.q. 4-18 
1
i i
n
System HG HG
i
RL RL WF

  ni ,,2,1           E.q. 4-19 
 
where 
iHG
RL  and 
iHG
WF  are the RL and WF of the ith hazard group iHG , iS HGRL   
and 
iS HG
WF   are the RL and WF of the ith sub-hazard group and SystemRL  is the overall 
RL of the railway system. 
 
4.2.5 Risk response phase 
The results produced from the risk estimation phases may be used through the risk 
response phase to assist risk analysts, engineers and managers in developing 
maintenance and operation policies. If risks are high, risk reduction measures must be 
applied or the depot operation has to be reconsidered to reduce the occurrence 
probabilities or to control the possible consequences. However, the acceptable and 
unacceptable regions are usually divided by a transition region. Risks that fall in this 
transition region need to be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) (LUL, 
2001; Muttram et al, 2002; Railway Safety, 2003). In this study, the RLs are 
characterised into four regions, i.e. „High‟, „Substantial‟, „Possible‟ and „Low‟.  
4.3 Introduction to Third Parameter CP 
Currently, there are many applications which use two parameters, such as failure 
likelihood and consequence severity, to evaluate the risk (Huang et al, 2005; An et al, 
2006). However, in many circumstances, these applications may not give satisfactory 
results because a hazard event may cause several consequence scenarios with various 
levels of severity, and there is high level of uncertainty involved in determining the 
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probability of a possible consequence scenario occurring. In those applications, as 
failure likelihood is defined as the number of times an event occurs over as a specified 
period of time, without considering the probability of causing a current scenario, the 
risk event with very high failure frequency and consequence severity but very low 
consequence probability will always be mistaken as the event with very high risk. 
Therefore, it is essential to further improve the proposed railway safety risk assessment 
model to identify major hazards and assess the associated risks more effectively and 
efficiently. 
 
The Australian standard for risk management (AS/NZS 4360:1999) suggests that it is 
appropriate to consider the likelihood to be composed of two elements, usually referred 
to as frequency of exposure and probability. Frequency of exposure is the extent to 
which a source of risk exists, and probability is the chance that when that source of risk 
exists, consequences will follow. That means the risk assessment could be carried out 
based on three parameters, including the severity of consequence. Currently, there are 
some existing applications which apply three parameters for risk assessment in many 
areas. Stephen Heller uses three parameters to manage industrial risk where hazard 
events are assessed in terms of exposure rating weight, probability, and consequence 
(Heller, 2006). Exposure rating weight is the frequency of occurrence of the hazard 
event. Probability is the likelihood accident sequence that will follow to completion. 
Consequence is the period of loss of operations. The risk score of each hazard event is 
the multiplication of these three parameters. In the offshore sector, the risk assessment 
is also carried out based on three parameters (An et al., 2000). In the application, the 
risk to each component failure is assessed by three parameters including failure severity 
which describes the magnitude of possible consequences, failure rate which defines the 
failure times in a certain period, and failure consequence probability which defines the 
probability that the effects will happen given by the occurrence of the failure. In the 
railway sector, these similar parameters are also considered in Fault tree and Event tree 
analysis (Muttram, 2002).  
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In a comparison with the applications using two parameters in the risk assessment, it is 
worth noting that by using three parameters could help risk analysts with likelihood 
analysis and risk control measures that are designed to reduce the likelihood aspect of 
risk, since the failure frequency and the consequence probability of a hazard event, 
which determine the likelihood of risk event, are considered independently in the risk 
assessment. A hazard event with very high occurrence frequency but very low 
consequence probability, or with very low occurrence frequency but very high 
consequence probability can be reasonably evaluated effectively. It is therefore 
appropriate to use three parameters in the proposed railway safety risk model to assess 
the risk of each hazard event.  
 
The proposed three parameters in the model are Failure Frequency (FF), Consequence 
Severity (CS), and Consequence Probability (CP). The Risk Level (RL) of a hazard 
event is derived from the combination of these three parameters. As the risk model is 
developed based on a FRA and Fuzzy-AHP combined approach, for each parameter, 
membership functions and linguistic terms are designed as follows: 
  
FF defines the number of times an event occurs over a specified period, e.g. number of 
events/year. Table 4-3 describes the range of frequencies of failure occurrence. To 
estimate the failure occurrence, one may often use such linguistic variables as “remote”, 
“rare”, “infrequent”, “occasional”, “frequent”, “regular” and “common” (Huang et al, 
2005; An et al, 2007). For example, linguistic variable infrequent is defined to cover the 
likelihood ranging from occurring once every 35 years to occurring approximately once 
every 7 years. As the linguistic variables are categorised according to a range of FF, the 
trapezoidal MFs are assigned to characterise these linguistic variables. Figure 4-4 
shows the fuzzy FF set definition. 
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Linguistic  
values 
Description Mid-point of the 
estimated 
frequency 
Approximate 
numerical 
value 
(event/yr) 
Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
Remote < 1 in 175 years 1 in 500 years 0.002 0, 0, 2E-3, 6E-3 
Rare 1 in 35 years to 1 
in 175 years 
1 in 100 years 0.01 2E-3, 6E-3, 1.5E-2, 
4E-2 
Infrequent 1 in 7 years to 1 
in 35 years 
1 in 20 years 0.05 1.5E-2, 4E-2, 8E-2, 
2E-1 
Occasional 1 in 1 ¼ years to 1 
in 7 years 
1 in 4 years 0.25 8E-2, 2E-1, 5E-1, 1.25 
Frequent 1 in 3 months to 1 
in 1 ¼ years 
1 in 9 months 1.25 5E-1, 1.25, 2.25, 5.25 
Regular 1 in 20 days to 1 
in 3 months 
1 in 2 months 6.25 2.25, 5.25, 10.25, 31.25 
Common 1 in 4 days to 1 in 
20 days 
1 in 12 days 31.25 10.25, 31.25, 100, 100 
Table 4-3 Failure frequency 
 
 
Figure 4-4 Failure frequency 
CS describes the magnitude of possible consequences. For example, in many cases, it   
can be represented as the number of fatalities, major injuries and minor injuries 
resulting from the occurrence of a particular hazardous scenario. One may often use 
such linguistic variables as “negligible”, “marginal”, “critical”, “moderate” and 
“catastrophic” to describe consequence severity (Huang et al, 2005; An et al, 2007). 
The definitions of linguistic variables about CS are listed in Table 4-4. For example, 
linguistic variable negligible is defined to describe a hazard event with negligible 
system damage and/or no injury and with a numerical value range from 0 to 0.1. The 
numerical values in Table 4-4 are the combination values of equivalent fatalities (EFs) 
in which a minor injury equals to 0.01 EF and a major injury equals to 0.1 EF. The 
trapezoidal MFs as shown in Figure 4-5 are employed to characterise CS, and their 
parameters are based on the numerical values listed in Table 4-4. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4:  DEVELOPMENT OF RAILWAY SAFETY RISK MODEL 
 83 
Linguistic  
values 
Description Numerical value 
(event/yr) 
Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
Negligible No injury and/or negligible damage to 
the system 
0–0.1 0, 0, 9E-2, 1E-1 
Marginal Minor system damage and/or minor 
injury 
0.1–2 9E-2, 1E-1, 1, 2 
Moderate Failure causes some operational 
dissatisfaction and/or major injury 
2–5 1, 2, 4, 5 
Critical Major system damage and/or severe 
injury 
5–10 4, 5, 9, 10 
Catastrophic System loss and/or fatality >10 9, 10, 60, 60 
Table 4-4 Consequence severity 
 
 
Figure 4-5 Consequence severity 
 
CP defines the probability that the effects will happen given by the occurrence of the 
failure. Such linguistic variables as “Highly unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Reasonably 
unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably likely”, “Highly likely” and “Definite” may be used 
(An et al, 2000). Table 4-5 shows the evaluation criteria of consequence probability for 
the rankings and the corresponding linguistic terms. Figure 4-6 below gives the fuzzy 
CP set definition, where the trapezoidal membership functions are used to characterise 
CP.  
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Linguistic  
values 
Description 
Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
Highly 
unlikely 
The occurrence likelihood of accident is highly 
unlikely. 
0.00, 0.00, 0.15, 0.20 
Unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is unlikely 
but possible given the occurrence of the failure 
event. 
0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30 
Reasonably 
unlikely 
The occurrence likelihood of accident is between 
likely and unlikely. 
0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.425 
Likely The occurrence likelihood of accident is likely. 0.35, 0.425, 0.575,0. 65 
Reasonably 
likely  
The occurrence likelihood of accident is between 
likely and highly likely. 
0.575, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75 
Highly likely  The occurrence likelihood of accident is very likely 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85 
Definite The accident occurs given the occurrence of the 
failure event. 
0.80, 0.85, 1.00, 1.00 
Table 4-5 Consequence probability 
 
Figure 4-6 Consequence probability 
4.4 Summary 
The chapter introduces a new railway safety risk model, which is developed based on 
the bottom-up approach. Four input parameters (FF, CP, CS, WF) to assess the risks 
from the component level to the system level are described. The CP parameter is 
introduced to improve the risk ranking. The risk model allows experts to use numerical 
numbers, fuzzy numbers, or even linguistic terms in the risk assessment. The results 
produced from the proposed risk model are in the format of risk scores and risk 
categories as well as risk contributions, while the conventional techniques can only 
give the risk score, with its meaning being difficult to understand.  A software package 
has been developed based on the proposed model to facilitate risk assessment, which 
will be presented in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER 5: SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT BASED ON 
PROPOSED RAILWAY SAFETY RISK 
MODEL 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to provide a systematic tool for railway safety risk assessment, a software 
based on the proposed risk model is developed. This chapter describes the software 
development based on the proposed safety risk model.  
5.2 Development of the Software 
A railway intelligent safety risk assessment system (RISRAS) has been developed 
based on the proposed risk analysis model. It is designed to aid the railway risk 
assessment process via a user-friendly interface, hence no knowledge of the manner in 
which the data are stored and manipulated is required. The system has been developed 
using Microsoft Visual C++ and operates under Microsoft Windows 2000, NT, XP or 
Vista. The architecture of RISRAS has been designed to ensure that the system is 
adaptable and upgradeable so that customisation of the system can be easily carried out. 
The current system is generic, but it is acknowledged that individuals or corporations 
will prefer specific systems based on the rules in the particular cases. In order to 
minimise system changes and maintain the flexibility and scalability of the system, it is 
designed on the basis of three-layer architecture (Dewire. 1993; An et al, 2008): i.e. 
presentation logic layer, application logic layer and database layer as shown in Figure 
5-1. The presenter can be thought of much like a web-browser that performs many 
functions involving user-interaction at the presentation logic layer, but the bulk of the 
processing work is done behind the scenes; in this case, it is the risk assessment server 
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which consists of a number of modules at application logic and database layers. The 
risk assessment server application controls the data and information flow between the 
presenter and the data stores/sources, which effectively forms the heart of the RISRAS. 
This is particularly useful as using such a three-layer architecture in the system allows 
other modules to be developed and added into the system conveniently. The main 
benefit of using such architecture is that the data and analytical process are completely 
separated from the user. This independence enables modifications to be made to each of 
the modules individually, with little or no impact on others. The roles of each layer are 
discussed in the following sections. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 System architecture 
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5.2.1 Presentation logic layer 
The presentation logic layer provides the user with a user-friendly interface to aid the 
railway risk assessment process. The presenter controls the graphical user interface, 
with which the user can interact in order to perform the risk assessment process. The 
presenter application makes a call to the sever then communicates with other layers 
through several input/output functional modules, i.e. „Risk Tree Module (RTM)‟, 
„Fuzzy Estimation Module (FEM)‟, „Fuzzy Weighting Module (FWM)‟ and „Output 
Module (OM)‟ as shown in Figure 5-1. 
 
As stated earlier in this thesis, the RLs of hazard groups affect the overall RL of a 
railway system, which can be further broken down into sub-hazard groups in order to 
identify all possible hazardous events. The risk assessment can initially be carried out 
from hazardous event level and then progressed up to sub-hazard group level, hazard 
group level and finally to system level. The RTM module allows the user to create a risk 
tree that links by risk nodes. In this case, they are hazardous events, sub-hazard groups 
and hazard groups with relevant information, i.e. belongings and descriptions. 
 
The FEM module consists of four sub-functional modules to process the FRA 
evaluation. The „Project Configuration‟ defines the input risk parameters, i.e. FF, CP 
and CS. The „Input/output configuration‟ defines the output RL in the risk assessment. 
The „MF Configuration‟ defines the MFs to describe risk qualitative descriptors, fuzzy 
rules and fuzzy operations, which can be specified for a particular case. As there could 
be a large amount of risk data involved in the risk analysis, the system provides an 
„Input Template‟ functional module, using which the user can easily input data 
manually or transfer data from an existing Microsoft Excel file to the system. 
 
As stated earlier in this thesis, Fuzzy-AHP is employed to determine the relative 
importance of risk factors in order to synthesise the contributions of risks at hazardous 
event level to hazard group level and finally to a railway system level. The FWM 
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module has four functional modules. The „Estimation Scheme‟ defines the estimation 
scheme as described in Section 4.2.4. It allows users to add or modify MFs to create 
new scheme for a particular case. The „Questionnaire Creation‟ can generate a 
Microsoft Excel file on the basis of selected risk factors from the risk tree and then the 
„Questionnaire Evaluation‟ creates a Fuzzy-AHP comparison matrix automatically by 
the system. The WF of each risk factor can finally be derived from the „Weight 
Evaluation‟ functional module. 
 
The results of FRA and Fuzzy-AHP analysis will finally be synthesised to obtain an 
overall RL of a railway system. There are four functional modules in the OM module, 
which enable the user to view and store the results into the database. The user can use 
the „Select Project‟ functional module to manage risk trees and risk information 
established previously, which enables the user to choose and re-use these risk trees and 
risk information in the future analysis. The user can also determine whether WFs 
should or not be taken into consideration in the assessment process by selecting the 
„Evaluation Configuration‟ functional module. The “Output Result” functional module 
enables the user to display and save the results in a Microsoft Excel file. 
5.2.2 Application logic layer 
The application logic layer consists of four modules to manipulate the data and 
information flow. The FEM is developed based on the proposed risk model using the 
FRA approach to compute the RLs of hazardous events as described in Section 2.3. The 
„Data Collection‟ sub-module takes the input data from a Microsoft Excel file via an 
Open DataBase Connectivity (ODBC) connection to the database (Dewire. 1993; An et 
al, 2008). The „Fuzzy Evaluation‟ sub-module performs the FRA risk estimation. RTM 
manages the risk trees established in the risk analysis. By using the „Risk Tree Design‟ 
sub-module, the user can create a risk tree for a particular case and the „Risk Tree 
Import' sub-module delivers the risk trees to OM. The FWM is designed based on the 
fuzzy-AHP approach proposed in the risk model as described in Section 4.2, which is 
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used to quantify expert judgements and calculate the WFs. The „Questionnaire‟ 
sub-module provides users with a template in an excel format via an ODBC connection. 
Users can easily fill in the expert opinions on the template and then the „FAHP Analysis‟ 
sub-module calculates the WFs and produces a fuzzy-AHP comparison matrix. OM 
manages data flow in the risk assessment process and presents the results. The 
„Synthesis‟ sub-module ensures that the assessment is performed from hazardous event 
level then progressed up to sub-hazard group level, hazard group level and finally to 
railway depot level according to the risk tree established in RTM by synthesising the 
RLs of hazardous events derived from FEM and the WFs from FWM. The „Formatting 
Output‟ sub-module manages the format of the output of the results to a Microsoft 
Excel file via an ODBC connection. 
5.2.3 Database layer 
Data is clearly fundamental to the operation of the RISRAS system. The database stores 
most of data and information that RISRAS uses, such as risk tree, risk parameters, and 
WFs etc. The database chosen for the system is Microsoft Access. This package was 
selected for several reasons, including its popularity as a user-friendly relational 
database within industry, the fact that it is available at a reasonable cost and its easy 
access via an ODBC connection (Dewire. 1993; An et al, 2008). The “Excel Processor” 
module provides the functions to input and output data from or to a Microsoft Excel file. 
The “Project Manager” manipulates project data including the configurations of FRA 
and fuzzy-AHP in the RISRAS system as well the details of the risk trees. 
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5.3  Application of the Software to Railway Safety Risk 
Assessment 
5.3.1 Risk identification 
Risk assessment begins with an identified need. Problem definition involves 
identifying the need for safety, i.e. specific safety requirements. The requirements 
regarding safety should be specified and they may have to be made at different levels, 
e.g. component level, sub-system level and system level in order to identify all 
possible failure events. Users can easily use the proposed RISRAS to build up a risk 
tree at component level, sub-system level and system level via a graphical 
user-friendly interface as described in Section 5.2.1. For example, Figure 5-2 shows a 
risk tree that consists of a number of sub-systems and each sub-system has a number 
of components, which are inside the nodes. In this example, failure events of the 
component “Formation_layer” affect its risk at component level. Risks of 
“Formation_layer” and “Base” affect the risk of “Foundation” at sub-system level and 
risks of “Track_component” and “Foundation” affect the risk of “Track system” at 
system level, hence the risk tree for components, subsystems and the system is 
defined. The actual effects of failure events and risks are dependent on their FF, CP, 
CS and the relative importance of failure events, i.e. WFs. The establishment of a risk 
tree user interface, as shown in Figure 5-2, enables the user to systematically identify 
all potential failure events associated with a railway system at component level and 
subsystem level with a view to assessing their effects at railway system level. 
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Figure 5-2 An example risk tree in RISRAS 
 
 
5.3.2 Risk estimation 
Risk estimation aims to assess the effects of failure events, i.e. RLs, in the railway 
system by taking FF, CP, CS and WF into consideration at component, subsystem and 
system level. The actual effect of the risk of a component failure is dependent on the 
values of FF, CP and CS. Traditionally, numerical values have been used to define the 
characteristics of identified risks, and statistical techniques have been applied to the 
analysis of the risk tree. After that, FRA is applied to perform the mathematical 
quantification of the linguistic variables to determine the RLs of failure events. In this 
case, input parameters FF, CP, CS and the output RL are defined using linguistic 
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variables through RISRAS user interfaces as shown in Figure 5-3(a), (b) and (c). It 
should be noted that the numbers of linguistic variables used to describe these input 
parameters is flexible and depends on particular cases. Once the linguistic variables, 
MFs, and rule base have been established through the RISRAS user interface as 
shown in Figure 5-3(d), the system is ready to process FRA evaluation. 
 
 
Figure 5-3 User interface for design of FF, CS, CP and rulebase 
 
In many cases, there could be a large number of failure events involved at component 
level. The developed system provides an input template file to facilitate the risk 
assessment. The file is customised according to the risk tree determined during the 
 
(a) FF (b) CS 
(c) CP (d) rulebase 
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risk identification. It has been developed from a Microsoft Excel file as shown in 
Figure 5-4, in which each spread sheet contains information of failure events 
identified for one component, including failure event ID (Identification), risk 
parameters (i.e. FF, CP and CS) and descriptions. The input values of risk parameters 
could be either linguistic terms, e.g. “rare”, “infrequent”, and “frequent”, or ranges, 
e.g. “between 0.01 and 0.03”, “between 0.1 and 0.4 most likely between 0.2 and 0.3 ”, 
or crisp values, e.g. “1” or “5e-3”. These input data will be restored in the database. 
 
 
Figure 5-4 Input template Excel file 
 
Because the contribution of each failure event to the overall RL of a railway system is 
different, the weight of the contribution of each failure event should be taken into 
consideration in order to represent its relative contribution to the RL of a railway 
system. The application of Fuzzy-AHP has been employed in determining the relative 
importance of failure events in the decision making process so that risk assessment 
can be progressed from component level to subsystem level, and finally to a railway 
system level. In the developed RISRAS, the relevant importance has been taken into 
account by using Fuzzy-AHP analysis to quantify the expert judgements in order to 
obtain the WF of each component or subsystem. This can be done via user interface as 
shown in Figure 5-5 to develop an estimation scheme, which lists intensity of 
importance using qualitative descriptors. The purpose of the estimation scheme is to 
construct a pairwise comparison matrix. The developed system enables users to either 
input the values of the comparison matrix manually according the estimation scheme 
established or calculate these values on the basis of expert opinions through a 
“questionnaire”, as shown in Figure 5-7. Within the questionnaire, each spread sheet 
contains one expert‟s judgements regarding the risk contributors compared in pairs. 
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Again, the format of the “questionnaire” could be linguistic terms, ranges or crisp 
values. Once the questionnaire is accomplished, a fuzzy-AHP comparison matrix will 
be produced based on the experts‟ judgements with their corresponding weights and 
then the WFs can be calculated by using a geometric mean technique as described in 
Section 4.2.2.3. It should be noted that if components are of equal importance to 
sub-systems that they belong to in some cases, it may not be necessary to perform a 
Fuzzy-AHP analysis. The developed system provides users with options of choosing 
risk analysis depending on the particular case either considering WFs or not 
considering WFs. The outcomes of risk estimation are represented as the risk degrees 
and the defined risk categories of RLs with a belief that a percentage will be used in 
the risk response phase. 
 
 
Figure 5-5 User interface for Fuzzy-AHP evaluation 
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Figure 5-6 User interface for estimation scheme 
 
Figure 5-7 An example of an RISRAS Excel based questionnaire 
5.3.3 Risk response 
The results produced from the risk estimation may be used through the risk response 
phase. The results can be either viewed on the risk tree through the user interface as 
shown in Figure 5-7, or stored in a Microsoft Excel file as shown in Figure 5-9. The 
results can be used to assist risk analysts, engineers and managers in developing 
maintenance and operation policies. The results include risk contributions of 
components and subsystems to a railway system with risk scores as well as 
corresponding risk categories. In this study, the RLs are characterised into four 
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regions, including „High‟, „Substantial‟, „Possible‟ and „Low‟. If risks are high, risk 
reduction measures must be applied or maintenance and operations have to be 
reconsidered to reduce the occurrence probabilities or to control the possible 
consequences. If risks are negligible, no actions are required but the information 
produced needs to be recorded for audit purposes. However, the acceptable and 
unacceptable regions are usually divided by a transition region. Risks that fall in this 
transition region need to be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable. 
 
 
Figure 5-8 User interface for risk estimation 
 
 
Figure 5-9 RISRAS output results in Excel file 
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5.4 Summary 
This chapter describes the development of RISRAS, which provides a novel risk 
assessment tool for railway risk management. RISRAS is written in C++ running on a 
windows platform which has been developed on the basis of the proposed risk model, 
thus it can provide a systematic approach for users to assess risks from component level 
to sub-system level and finally to system level. The input data can be numerical 
numbers, fuzzy numbers, or even words.  The application of Fuzzy-AHP in the 
assessment can solve the problems of risk information lost the risk assessment process. 
The output from the software can be shown on a risk tree or be exported into an excel 
file, which is convenient for users to view the results from risk analysis.   
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CHAPTER 6: RISK-BASED DECISION 
MAKING APPROACH 
6.1 Introduction 
Any constructed facility can be considered as an asset that needs to be maintained to 
ensure its optimal value over its life cycle (Hassanain et al., 2003). The aim of asset 
management is to achieve a desired outcome by maintaining and upgrading assets 
cost-effectively. In the railway industry, asset management is a costly task to ensure the 
network runs successfully while improving safety. According to statistics from the 
Department of Transport, in the period 2005-2009, an average of £5 billion has been 
invested each year into the railway industry for operating and maintaining the rail 
network (DfT, 2005). The challenge is how to use the limited investment while 
improving railway safety effectively and efficiently. Asset management, which usually 
involves maintenance work, is a vital part of railway duty holders, which should be 
included in their safety cases. A safety case covers all aspects of safety and specifies 
how the risks involved are to be minimised. A safety case also needs to include 
sufficient particulars to demonstrate that hazards with the potential to cause major 
accidents have been identified and evaluated, and that measures have been taken to 
reduce them to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) (HSE, 2000). As stated 
earlier in this thesis, if risks are high, risk reduction measures must be applied or 
maintenance work has to be considered to reduce the occurrence probabilities or to 
control the possible consequences. If risks are negligible, no actions are required but the 
information produced needs to be recorded for audit purposes. However, the acceptable 
and unacceptable regions are usually divided by a transition region. Risks that fall in 
this transition region need to be reduced to ALARP. In the other words, “cost-effective” 
measures should be applied. 
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The literature review carried out by the researcher indicates that no formal risk based 
railway maintenance decision making support tools have been developed and applied to 
a stable environment in the railway industry, although some work has been conducted 
in this field. In order to show compliance with safety targets and to make maintenance 
and future investment decisions, a risk based railway maintenance decision-making 
support system for railway maintenance analysis using fuzzy reasoning approach 
(FRA), fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (fuzzy-AHP) and the TOPSIS method has 
been proposed.  
 
The principal safety and maintenance issues in the railway infrastructure have been 
investigated and a risk model (Huang, et al, 2007; An et al, 2006 & 2007), a cost model 
and a risk-cost model have been developed for appraising maintenance schedules and 
also diagnosing risks. This provides an effective tool for getting a better understanding 
of the risks associated with railway systems and for making better maintenance 
decisions at the right time for managing the risks under various conditions. Currently, 
most of the asset management literature is aimed at fixed plant and usually focuses on 
improving business performance (HSL, 2005). TOPSIS (Hwang and Yoon, 1981) 
stands for technique for preference by similarity to the ideal solution, and is a 
multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) technique to aid selection in conditions of 
multiple criteria, which may solve the problem when cost and safety risk are taken into 
account in the decision making process. The proposed risk-based railway maintenance 
decision making system that combines the strengths of FRA and fuzzy-AHP techniques 
would tremendously aid the risk analysis process; especially in the maintenance 
process when significant decisions that affect the safety of railway systems are made. 
TOPSIS can be used to process a risk-cost model to obtain efficient maintenance 
strategies. This chapter presents a risk-cost model by using the TOPSIS method which 
synthesises the risk and cost models to produce the preference degree of each 
maintenance option. Once preference degrees of all maintenance options in hand are 
produced, the best option can be chosen. In this model, both the risk associated with a 
railway asset system and the costs incurred in each maintenance option are mapped 
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onto a utility space and assessed in accordance with the respective constraints. Such a 
decision making model could be an effective method to get a better understanding of 
the risks associated with railway assets and to make better maintenance decisions at the 
right time for managing the risks under various conditions.  
 
The chapter is structured as follows: after the introduction, Section 6.2 describes a risk 
based asset maintenance management framework. Sections 6.3 and 6.4 present a safety 
risk model and cost model, respectively. The TOPSIS method is introduced in Section 
6.5. The proposed risk-cost model developed based on TOPSIS is presented in Section 
6.6, which addresses both the risk associated with a railway asset assessed by a fuzzy 
risk assessment model and the costs incurred in each maintenance option. The 
preference degree of each maintenance option is calculated by using the TOPSIS 
method. Finally, a summary is given in Section 6.8. 
 
6.2 A Risk Based Asset Maintenance Management 
Framework 
The proposed risk-based asset maintenance management framework is shown in Figure 
6-1, which consists of seven sequential processes: safety performance requirement, 
safety performance assessment, maintenance option design, ranking maintenance 
options, implementation, and asset performance review.  
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Figure 6-1 Railway asset maintenance management framework 
 
The performance of a railway asset needs to be identified and justified by the asset 
safety management team. The needs for safety have to be specified, which should be 
done at different levels, e.g. component level, subsystem level and system level. The 
output of the identification of performance of a railway asset is a set of safety 
performance statements in which safety standards have been specified. The following 
typical items may need to be specified in the problem definition (An et al, 2006 & 2007; 
HSE, 2000 & 2005; Huang et al, 2005): 
 
1. Sets of rules and regulations made by the national authorities and classification 
societies, e.g. Health & Safety Executive (HSE), Rail Safety and Standard 
Board (RSSB), London Underground Ltd (LUL), etc. 
2. Deterministic requirements for safety, reliability, availability, maintainability, 
etc. 
3. Criteria referring to the probability of occurrence of serious hazardous events 
and the possible consequences. 
 
Is the option 
Satisfactory?
Yes
No
Safety performance identification
Safety performance assessment of assets
Asset safety 
management 
team
Maintenance option Design
Ranking maintenance options
Implementation
Asset performance review
CHAPTER 6: RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING APPROACH 
 102 
Maintenance option design is a process whereby decisions for maintenance works 
should be made on the basis of the results produced from the safety performance 
assessment. Usually, the asset safety management team can provide a number of 
maintenance options to choose from. The best option can be decided through a 
safety-cost analysis in ranking the maintenance options. 
 
In ranking the maintenance option process, safety and cost need to be studied together 
to form a mathematical risk-cost model in order to attempt to maximise the safety 
benefits and to minimise the safety related cost of a railway asset. Safety and cost are 
two conflicting objectives, with higher safety leading to higher costs. This means that if 
the safety associated with a railway asset is improved, higher costs will usually be 
incurred. The cost incurred for safety improvement associated with a maintenance 
option is usually affected by many factors such as top event-caused cost, repair cost, 
and maintenance review cost. It is generally impossible to have a maintenance option 
that could maximise safety (i.e. minimise risks) and minimise cost such as the life cycle 
cost simultaneously. A compromise is therefore required. The decision as to which 
objective is to be stressed is dependent on the particular situation in hand. The 
appropriate level of safety then becomes dependent on the relative important of the two 
criteria. If the non-dominated maintenance options have to be obtained, it becomes 
feasible to use a MCDM technique to search for efficient or optimal maintenance 
options, where an efficient option is one in which the level of risk is the lowest with 
respect to a certain level of cost, or in which the level of cost is the lowest with respect 
to a certain level of risk. The safety associated with each maintenance option and the 
cost incurred in each maintenance option are then mapped onto the utility space and 
expressed in terms of the utility expressions such as “slightly preferred”, “moderately 
preferred”, “preferred” and “greatly preferred”. Then the safety and cost estimates can 
be synthesised to obtain the preference estimation associated with the maintenance 
options. Obviously, the larger the preference degree is, the more desirable the 
maintenance option. Each preference degree of each maintenance option represents the 
comparison with others. The best maintenance option with the largest preference 
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degree can be selected on the basis of the magnitudes of preference degrees. The detail 
of the proposed risk-cost model is described in the following sections. 
 
Once the best maintenance option is selected, it should be implemented into 
maintenance work. Finally, a safety performance review can be conducted such as to 
review the practical experience gained and lessons learnt and consider possible ways of 
improving the safety management system. 
 
6.3 Safety Risk Model  
The occurrence of a railway system failure could cause serious consequences. The 
safety of a railway system can be improved by reducing the probability of the 
occurrence of system failure events. The occurrence of a system failure is completely 
dependent on the occurrence of the associated minimal failure events. If one failure 
event occurs, then system failure happens. Therefore, a reduction of the probability of 
occurrence of a system failure is a matter of reducing or eliminating the probabilities of 
occurrence of some significant failure events with relatively higher probabilities of 
occurrence, since it is impractical and impossible to reduce or eliminate all the 
associated failure events. 
 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, three parameters, failure frequency (FF), 
consequence probability (CP) and consequence severity (CS) of an event are usually 
used in railway safety risk analysis. The outcomes of safety risk assessment are 
represented in two formats, risk score and risk category with a belief of percentage, 
which provide very useful risk information to railway designers, operators, engineers 
and maintainers for making maintenance decisions. Details of the proposal safety risk 
model are described in Chapter 4, which is summarised as follows. 
 
Suppose there are n identified subsystems of a railway asset system, the overall RL of a 
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railway asset system can be defined by: 
 
1
n
system j j
j
RL RL w

             E.q. 6-1 
 
where RLsystem is the overall RL of a railway asset system, RLj stands for the RL of the 
jth subsystem, and wj is the WF of the jth subsystem. Similarly, assuming there are m 
components of the jth subsystem and each component has k failure modes, the RL of the 
jth subsystem and the ith are defined by: 
 
i
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i
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
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          E.q. 6-2 
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where FLt , CPt and CSt are two input parameters of failure likelihood and consequence 
severity of the tth failure mode associated with the ith component. 
 
The safety of the railway asset system can be improved by minimising the risks. If the 
reduction or elimination of one failure mode does not significantly affect others, the 
risk function can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of occurrence of the 
system failure events and k failure modes considered for reduction or elimination while 
each system failure event is weighted on the basis of the severity of its possible 
consequences. The safety risk model can be defined by: 
 
Min:  


n
j
jjsystem wRLRL
1
          E.q. 6-4 
Subject to: max,min, systemsystemsystem RLRLRL   
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6.4 Cost Model 
Cost is always an important issue in the railway maintenance work process. The 
safety-related life cycle cost of a railway system may be modelled by taking into 
consideration the top failure event caused consequences, repair/renewal cost, 
maintenance cost and performance review cost. The following simplifying assumptions 
are made to implement cost modelling: 
 
- The basic diagram of the system to be analysed is not changed. 
- Manpower and spare parts are sufficient for repairs and maintenance 
activities. 
- All the systems return to their original conditions after full maintenance. 
- Failed components/subsystems are repaired “same as new” and other 
components/subsystems are not affected by the repairs. 
- Cost incurred is expressed as the present value. 
 
A railway system may have several serious top failure events such as derailment, fire 
and explosion, each of which could result in a system breakdown and possibly cause 
serious consequences such as injury or death, damage or loss of property and damage of 
the environment. Therefore, the top failure event caused cost includes costs directly 
caused by the occurrence of the railway system top failure events, lost income due to 
the system being not in normal service, and repair costs caused by the occurrence of the 
railway system top failure events. Maintenance cost covers cost of labour, cost of parts 
and lost income during periods of maintenance activities. If a major 
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component/subsystem in a railway system fails, the system should be shut down and 
the failed component/subsystem should be replaced or repaired immediately. 
Repair/renew cost includes cost of labour, cost of parts and lost income due to the 
system being not in normal service because of failures of the components/subsystems. 
Since the basic diagram of the system is not changed, a performance review may only 
involve the use of more reliable components or subsystems to reduce or eliminate the 
most significant failure modes associated with the identified system top failure events. 
Obviously, the more investment that is directed at the system for safety improvement, 
the higher the safety level of system, which results in lower probabilities of occurrence 
of railway system top failure events leading to less expenditure in the operation and 
maintenance process. The performance review cost therefore includes the cost of labour, 
cost of parts and lost income during the periods of maintenance activities associated 
with the tth failure mode of the ith component/the jth subsystem failure event. Let Cost 
represent the safety-related cost function. The cost model can be defined by: 
 
Min:   ),()()()( YXCostXCostXCostXCostCost PMRT    E.q. 6-5 
Subject to: minmax CostCostCost   
 
where Cost is the total cost, TCost  is the cost caused top failure event of a railway 
system, RCost  is repair/renew cost, MCost  is maintenance cost, PCost  is 
performance review cost after the repair/renew or maintenance works, X stands for the 
variables of costs caused by a system top failure event, maintenance cost, 
repair/renewal cost and maintenance cost, and Y stands for system performance review 
cost after the repair/renewal and maintenance work. 
 
The first three terms of the cost model deal with the maintenance policies and the last 
term takes into account both the maintenance polices and performance review actions. 
This model implies that the maintenance policies and the performance review actions 
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should be implemented to minimise the safety-related cost. 
 
6.5 TOPSIS Methodology 
The TOPSIS stands for technique for preference by similarity to the ideal solution, 
which was initially introduced by Hwang and Yoon in 1981. It is a multiple criteria 
method for identifying solutions from a finite set of alternatives. The basic principle is 
that the choice of alternative should have the shortest distance from the positive ideal 
solution to the farthest distance from the negative ideal solution (Abo-Sinna & Amer, 
2005; Shih, Shyur, & Stanley Lee, 2007). A relative advantage of TOPSIS is the ability 
to quickly identify the best alternative (Parkan and Wu, 1997). Currently, it has been 
adapted into a number of applications, such as in financial investment, manufacturing 
processes, etc (Agrawal et al., 1991; Chau and Parkan, 1995). The procedure of 
TOPSIS can be described in 6 steps (Jahanshahloo et al., 2006; Olson, 2004; Yang & 
Hung, 2007): 
 
Step 1: Calculate the normalised decision matrix. The normalised value of the i-th 
alternative under the j-th criterion 
jix ,  is calculated as 
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where jia , is the original value of the i-th alternative under the j-th criterion. 
 
Step 2: Calculate the weighted normalised decision matrix. The weighted normalised 
value of the i-th alternative under the j-th criterion jiy ,  is calculated as 
 
CHAPTER 6: RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING APPROACH 
 108 
njmixwy jijji ,...,2,1,,...,2,1,,,             E.q. 6-7 
 
Where jw is the weight of the j-th criterion and 


n
nj
jw 1. 
Step 3: Determine the positive ideal solution A and negative ideal solution A  
 
   nj yyyyA ,...,,...,, 21                                     E.q. 6-8 
   nj yyyyA ,...,,...,, 21           E.q. 6-9 
 
Where 

jy and 

jy  are positive ideal and negative ideal value under the j-th criterion. 
 
Step 4: Calculate the separation measures, using the n-dimensional Euclidean distance. 
The separation of each alternative from the positive ideal solution is given as 
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Similarly, the separation from the negative ideal solution is given as 
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Step 5: Calculate the relative closeness to the ideal solution. The relative closeness of 
the alternative iA  with respect to 
A  is defined as 
mi
DD
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Since 0iD  and 0

iD , then, clearly,  1,0iC  
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Step 6: Rank the preference order. The basic principle of the TOPSIS method is that the 
chosen alternative should have the „„shortest distance” from the positive ideal solution 
and the „„farthest distance” from the negative ideal solution. 
 
6.6 Risk-Cost Model 
Facing various maintenance options, railway engineers, managers and risk analysts are 
often confronted with conflicting objectives, i.e. minimising cost and maximising 
safety performance, in other words, minimising risk. A risk-cost model is proposed 
based on the TOPSIS method which combines the safety model with the cost model to 
calculate the preference degree of maintenance options.  
 
For example, if just maintenance cost should be taken into consideration in the cost 
model, the cost model is simplified as: 
 
Min:  )()()()( iOiEiMiLi ACostACostACostACostCost    E.q. 6-13 
 
The risk model is defined by: 
 
Min:  )( isystemi ARLRL             E.q. 6-14 
 
where iCost  is the total cost associated with the i-th maintenance option ( iA ), LCost  
is the labour cost, MCost  is the cost of materials and parts, ECost  is the cost caused 
by using equipment and OCost  stands for other costs, such as loss of income in the 
period of the maintenance activities, fuel cost, review cost and management cost; iRL  
is the total system risk level after the i-th maintenance option ( iA ). 
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However, all maintenance options must satisfy constraints in relation to safety 
requirements set up by national authorities and classification societies, e.g. Health & 
Safety Executive, Rail Safety and Standard Board, London Underground Ltd etc. The 
objective of the cost model is to minimise the maintenance cost. At some point, some 
constraints should be satisfied, for example the limited maintenance budget. Thus, 
finite maintenance options are always available in practice.  
 
Subject to:  mi AAAA ,...,, 21          E.q. 6-15 
 
As described earlier in this chapter, cost and risk are two competing objectives. The 
purpose of the development of a risk-based maintenance decision making model is to 
evolve a compromise for maintenance solutions by balancing and effectively utilising 
resources so that these two objectives can be simultaneously attained as closely as 
possible. Figure 6-2 shows the relationship between risk and cost. As can be seen, the 
more investment is put into at the system for safety improvement, the higher the safety 
level of system can be received, which results in lower probabilities of occurrence of 
railway system top failure events and also leads to less expenditure in the operation and 
maintenance process. However, with the cost increasing rapidly, risk reduction 
decreases in contrast. In this situation, cost-effective principles should be applied, i.e. 
ALARP. Therefore, the optimal operation and maintenance solution should be selected 
to minimise the risks and improve the safety of the system and simultaneously 
minimise the cost.  
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Figure 6-2 Risk vs Cost 
 
The proposed risk-cost model based on TOPSIS is shown in Figure 6-3. In accordance 
with the results of risk assessment, various possible maintenance options may be 
designed for selection. Each option regarding risk and cost information should be 
collected and analysed by using the safety risk model and cost model, respectively, in 
order to assess the corresponding risk reduction and cost estimation. 
 
Cost 
Risk 
0 
 
Optimal curve 
Ideal option     
CHAPTER 6: RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING APPROACH 
 112 
 
Figure 6-3 An overview of the process of maintenance option selection 
 
Then, preference evaluation should be applied to produce the preference degree of each 
maintenance option. According to the TOPSIS method, the procedure of preference 
evaluation can be described as the following steps: 
 
Step 1: calculate normalised cost and risk value respectively. The normalised cost 
tix cos,  and risk RLix , values of the i-th maintenance option are calculated as 
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CHAPTER 6: RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING APPROACH 
 113 
.,...,2,1,
1
2
, mi
RL
RL
x
m
i
i
i
RLi 


         E.q. 6-17 
 
Where iCost  
and iRL  
are the values derived from the cost model and the risk model 
respectively, and associated with the ith maintenance option.  
 
Step 2: Calculate the weight normalised cost and risk value respectively. The weighted 
normalised cost tiy cos,  
and risk RLiy ,  
values of the i-th maintenance option are 
calculated as 
 
.,...,2,1,cos,coscos, mixwy titti           E.q. 6-18 
.,...,2,1,,, mixwy RLiRLRLi            E.q. 6-19 
 where twcos  and RLw  are the weights of cost and risk criterion. In the case, if risk and cost 
are equal importance, then 5.0cos  RLt ww . 
 
Step 3: Determine the best A  and worst 
A  scenario options based on those 
weighted normalised cost and risk values.  
 
 







 
  
m
i
m
i
RLitiRLt yyyyA
1 1
,cos,cos ,,         E.q. 6-20 
 








 
m
i
RLi
m
i
tiRLt yyyyA
1
,
1
cos,cos ,,         E.q. 6-21 
 
Step 4: Calculate the separation distances. The separation of the i-th maintenance 
option from the best scenario option 

iD  is given as  
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    .,...,2,1,2,
2
coscos, miyyyyD RLRLittii 

      E.q. 6-22 
 
Similarly, the separation of the i-th maintenance option from the worst scenario option 

iD  is given as 
 
    .,...,2,1,2,
2
coscos, miyyyyD RLRLittii 

     E.q. 6-23 
 
Step 5: Calculate the preference degree based on those separations. The preference 
degree of the i-th maintenance option iP  is calculated as 
 
mi
DD
D
P
ii
i
i ,...,2,1, 




          E.q. 6-24 
 
Step 6: Rank the maintenance options based on preference degrees in decreasing order.  
 
Obviously, the larger the preference degree is, the more desirable the maintenance 
option. Each preference degree of each maintenance option represents its comparison 
with others. Once all preference degrees of all maintenance options in hand are 
produced, the best maintenance option can be selected, which has the largest preference 
degree. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presents a risk-based maintenance decision making model by using the 
TOPSIS method, which incorporates safety risk and cost into the railway maintenance 
process to make maintenance decisions for railway systems. The proposed risk-based 
maintenance decision making model provides railway engineers, operators, managers 
and maintainers with a useful method and tool to make full use of the information 
produced in a safety risk and cost analysis and to take into consideration maintenance 
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aspects simultaneously. A case study to demonstrate the application of the proposed 
risk based maintenance decision making model is presented in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7: CASE STUDY ON RISK 
ASSESSMENT OF SHUNTING AT 
HAMMERSMITH DEPOT 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, an illustrated case example on risk assessment of shunting at Hammersmith 
depot is used to demonstrate the proposed risk assessment methodology. The case materials 
have been collected from industry (Metronet, 2005). The input parameters are FF, CP and CS 
of hazardous events. The outputs of risk assessment are RLs of hazardous events, hazard 
groups, and the overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot with risk scores located from 0 
to 10 and risk categorised as ‘Low’, ‘Possible’, ‘Substantial’ and ‘High’ with a percentage 
belief. In the FRA risk estimation phase, the RLs of hazard groups are calculated using the 
FRA based on the aggregation results of each hazardous event belonging to the particular 
hazard group. In the Fuzzy-AHP estimation phase, the overall RL of shunting at 
Hammersmith depot is obtained on the basis of the aggregation of the RLs of each hazard 
group contribution weighted by using fuzzy-AHP method.  
 
7.2 Hazard Risk Identification at Hammersmith Depot 
Hammersmith depot is one of the largest depots in London Underground. Historical data of 
accidents and incidents have been recorded over the past ten years. In this case, the historical 
accident and incident databases have been reviewed in Hammersmith depot. Seven hazard 
groups and 17 sub-hazard groups have been identified and defined, and each sub-hazard 
group consists of a number of hazardous events (Metronet, 2005), which are described as 
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follows: 
 
1) The derailment hazard group (DHG) includes two sub-hazard groups i.e. typical outcome 
(minor injury) and worst-case scenario (major injury), which have been identified based on 
the previous accidents and incidents. Like Waterloo depot, here derailment scenarios are 
not considered to infringe other running lines. Due to low speed and configuration of the 
track, the most likely scenario is that the train will drop off the track, injuring only the 
driver. Both sub-hazard groups consist of six hazardous events such as: track related faults, 
including mechanical failure of track e.g. broken rail and fishplates; signalling related 
faults, including mechanical failure of signals and points; rolling stock faults, including 
mechanical failure of rolling stock e.g. brakes, axles and bogies; structure failure including 
collapsed drain or civil structure beneath the track leading to derailment; object from train 
including object falls from train (e.g. motor) leading to derailment (like the Chancery Lane 
incident); and human errors, including human error causing derailment e.g. overspending, 
incorrect routing. 
 
2) The collision hazard group (CHG) consists of four sub-hazard groups i.e. collision between 
trains in a worst case scenario (fatality), collision between trains with a typical outcome 
(multiple minor injuries), collision hazard of worst case scenario (fatality) and collision 
hazard of typical outcome (minor injury). Collision between trains involves three scenarios. 
For example, when MR train is moving out over infrastructure from OZ18, LU train is 
moving out from platform 3 due to train or signal failure. Collision hazards include two 
hazardous events, for example, collision with an object on the track, collision with a 
terminal e.g. over running into a buffer stop on road 24 due to excessive speed, brake 
failure or human error. 
 
3) The train fire hazard group (TfHG) only has one sub-hazard group, i.e. train fire typical 
outcome, which covers minor injury, as it is believed that a train would not catch fire fast 
enough to endanger a driver more than through smoke inhalation. There are two hazardous 
events which could result in the train fire, including arcing from the conductor rail causing 
a train fire, and electrical, oil or hydraulic failure leading to train fire. 
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4) The electrocution hazard group (EHG) has two sub-hazard groups, typical outcome 
(fatality) and best case scenario (major injury), which cover a number of hazardous events, 
for example, contact with the conductor rail whilst entering/leaving the cab, contact with 
the conductor rail whilst walking to the train and plugging in gap jumper leads if the train 
has stalled/gapped. Due to the high voltage direct current, fatality is the most likely 
consequence. Even if the injury is not fatal, it will still be serious. 
 
5) The slips/trips hazard group (SHG) includes three sub-hazard groups, i.e. minor injury, 
major injury and fatality. The hazardous events include, for example, instances when MR 
shunter is required to leave the train, risks to a ground shunter and instances when a person 
is required to approach a train when it is stalled/gapped. Slips / trips are acknowledged as 
high frequency, low consequence events. The majority of slips and trips are agreed as 
minor injuries; fatalities are very unlikely. There is a chance of broken bones if a person 
slips or trips badly. 
 
6) The falls from height hazard group (FHG) consists of three sub-hazard groups, i.e. minor 
injury, major injury and fatality which cover falls from height such as when a shunter 
leaves the train cab. A fall from height is much more likely than a slip / trip to result in 
major injury. 
 
7) The train strikes person hazard group (TsHG) has been identified based on the record in the 
past 10 years into two sub-hazard groups – major injury and fatality. The hazardous events 
in these two sub-hazard groups include a train striking an authorized person, including 
other depot workers (e.g. ground shunter) or track side staff, and a train striking an 
unauthorized person, e.g. trespassers etc. A side swipe collision is considered non-fatal but 
still serious. Collision head-on is considered fatal. 
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Figure 7-1 Hazard identification at different levels for Hammersmith depot 
 
As described in Section 4.2.2.1, a risk tree has been developed for risk analysis of shunting at 
Hammersmith depot, as shown in Figure 7-1. Risk assessment is initially carried out from 
hazardous events and then progressed up to sub-hazard group level, hazard group level and 
finally to depot level. The qualitative descriptors of FF, CS, CP and RL have been developed 
for the analysis of shunting at Hammersmith depot and the FRA is employed to estimate the 
RL of each hazardous event in terms of FF, CS and CP. The definition of FF defines the 
number of times an event occurs over a specified period, e.g. number of events/year. The 
qualitative descriptors of FF are defined as “Remote”, “Rare”, “Infrequent”, “Occasional”, 
“Frequent”, “Regular” and “Common” and their meanings are presented in Table 7-1. 
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Rank Qualitative descriptors  Description Approximate 
numerical value 
(event/yr) 
Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
1 Remote < 1 in 175 years 0.002 0, 0, 2E-3, 6E-3 
2 Rare 1 in 35 years to 1 in 175 years 0.01 2E-3, 6E-3, 1.5E-2, 
4E-2 
3 Infrequent 1 in 7 years to 1 in 35 years 0.05 1.5E-2, 4E-2, 8E-2, 
2E-1 
4 Occasional 1 in 1 ¼ years to 1 in 7 years 0.25 8E-2, 2E-1, 5E-1, 1.25 
5 Frequent 1 in 3 months to 1 in 1 ¼ years 1.25 5E-1, 1.25, 2.25, 5.25 
6 Regular 1 in 20 days to 1 in 3 months 6.25 2.25, 5.25, 10.25, 31.25 
7 Common 1 in 4 days to 1 in 20 days 31.25 10.25, 31.25, 100, 100 
Table 7-1 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of FF 
 
CS describes the magnitude of the possible consequence in terms of the number of fatalities, 
major and minor injuries resulting from the occurrence of a particular hazardous event. The 
qualitative descriptors of CS are defined as “Negligible”, “Marginal”, “Moderate”, “Critical”, 
and “Catastrophic” and their meanings are shown in Table 7-2, where major and minor 
injuries are calculated in terms of equivalent fatalities. Ten major injuries or 200 minor 
injuries are considered equal to one equivalent fatality (TLL, 2004; Metronet, 2005). For 
example, qualitative descriptor ‘Marginal’ is defined to describe the consequence level of 
minor injury with an approximate numerical value of 0.005. 
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Rank Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description Numerical value 
(event/yr) 
Parameters of 
MFs (trapezoid) 
1 Negligible No injury and/or negligible damage to 
the system 
0–0.1 0, 0, 9E-3, 2E-2 
2 Marginal Minor system damage and/or minor 
injury 
0.1–2 9E-3, 2E-2, 
1E-1, 2E-2 
3 Moderate Failure causes some operational 
dissatisfaction and/or major injury 
2–5 1E-1, 2E-1, 
4E-1, 5E-1 
4 Critical Major system damage and/or severe 
injury 
5–10 4E-1, 5E-1, 
9E-1, 2 
5 Catastrophic System loss and/or fatality >10 9E-1, 2, 5, 5 
Table 7-2 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of CS 
 
CP defines the FF that failure effects that will happen given the occurrence of the failure. One 
may often use such qualitative descriptors as “Highly unlikely”, “Unlikely”, “Reasonably 
unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably likely”, “Highly likely” and “Definite”. Table 7-3 shows the 
evaluation criteria of CP and the corresponding qualitative descriptors. 
 
Rank Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description 
Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
1 Highly unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is highly unlikely. 0.00, 0.00, 0.15, 0.20 
2 Unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is unlikely but 
possible given the occurrence of the failure event. 
0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30 
3 Reasonably 
unlikely 
The occurrence likelihood of accident is between likely 
and unlikely. 
0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.425 
4 Likely The occurrence likelihood of accident is likely. 0.35, 0.425, 0.575,0. 65 
5 Reasonably likely  The occurrence likelihood of accident is between likely 
and highly likely. 
0.575, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75 
6 Highly likely  The occurrence likelihood of accident is very likely 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85 
7 Definite The accident occurs given the occurrence of the failure 
event. 
0.80, 0.85, 1.00, 1.00 
Table 7-3 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of CP 
 
The qualitative descriptors of RL are defined as “Low”, “Possible”, “Substantial”, and “High”. 
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Their definitions, which are generally similar to those described in EN50126, EN50129, and 
GE/GN8561 (Railway Safety, 2002), are listed in Table 7-4. The risk score is defined in a 
manner that the lowest score is 0, whereas the highest score is 10. For example, qualitative 
descriptor, ‘Low’, is defined on the basis of the risk score ranging from 0 to 2. Similar to the 
input qualitative descriptors of FF, CS and CP, the trapezoidal MFs are used to describe the 
RL. The results of RLs can be expressed either as a risk score located in the range from 0 to 
10 or as risk category with a belief of percentage. 
 
Rank Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
1 Low Risk is acceptable 0, 0, 1, 2       
2 Possible Risk is tolerable but should be further 
reduced if it is cost-effective to do so 
1, 2, 4, 5       
3 Substantial Risk must be reduced if it is reasonably 
practicable to do so 
4, 5, 7, 8     
4 High Risk must be reduced to safe in 
exceptional circumstances 
7, 8, 10, 10   
Table 7-4 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of RL 
 
Because three parameters, FF, CP, and CS are used to determine the RLs of hazardous events, 
the rule base consists of 245 if-then rules for this study. Figure 7-2 shows five rule matrices. It 
can be seen that each matrix consists of 49 rules with a particular qualitative descriptor of CS. 
For example, the rule at the top left of the matrix of CS = Negligible would be expressed as 
follows: 
 
IF FF is Remote and CP is Highly unlikely and CS is Negligible, THEN RL is Low. 
 
The RISRAS provides the user with a design panel as described in Section 5.3.2 to develop 
the rule bases, which enables the user to easily update or modify rules depending on particular 
cases. 
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Figure 7-2 Fuzzy rule base matrices 
 
In this case, five experts with high qualifications regarding this subject are involved in the risk 
assessment group. EIs are allocated to experts by E.q. 4-1 on the basis of their background 
and experience as shown in Table 7-5. For example, expert E5 has less experience, therefore 
he has the lowest EI =0.16. 
 
Experts Yeare of Experience EIs 
E1 10 years experience 0.21 
E2 10 years experience 0.24 
E3 10 years experience 0.21 
E4 8 years experience 0.18 
E5 5 years experience 0.16 
Table 7-5 EIs for five experts 
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7.3 FRA Risk Estimation 
As the data of FF, CP and CS in this case are directly related to sub-hazard group, the 
assessment is carried out from sub-hazard group level, then up to hazard group level and finally 
to depot level. The risk data of sub-hazard groups are then processed following the procedures 
described in Section 4. 2.3.  
 
Step 1: Input FFs, CSs, and CPs. 
As the data obtained are in numerical format, these crisp values of FF, CP and CS of sub-hazard 
groups are directly inputted into the RISRAS through the input template file. For example, the 
FF, CP and CS of the sub-hazard group “derailment (typical outcome)” are „3.33E-2‟, „99%‟, 
and „0.005‟ respectively, as shown in Table 7-9.  
 
Step 2: Convert inputs into UFNs. 
These crisp values are converted into corresponding UFNs according to Table 4-1. The 
converted UFNs ,  and FF CP CSA A A of the FF, CP and CS of the sub-hazard group “derailment 
(typical outcome)” are: 
 
 
 
3.33 2,3.33 2,3.33 2,3.33 2
0.99,0.99,0.99,0.99
0.005,0.005,0.005,0.005
FF
CP
CS
A E E E E
A
A
    


 
 
Step 3: Aggregate UFNs. 
As the data are obtained from the historical record, there is no need to aggregate experts‟ 
judgements, and the process directly moves to step 4. 
 
Step 4: Transfer UFNs into fuzzy sets. 
UFNs are then transferred into fuzzy sets according to E.q. 4-2, 4-4, 4-5, 4-6. The fuzzy sets
,  and FF CP CSA A A of the FF, CP and CS of the sub-hazard group “derailment (typical outcome)” 
are: 
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      
      
      
1 3.33 2
, | 0,100 ,
0
1 0.99
, | 0,1 ,
0
1 0.005
, | 0,5 ,
0
FF FF
CP CP
CS CS
FF A A
CP A A
CS A A
u E
A u u u u
otherwise
v
A v v v v
otherwise
w
A w w w w
otherwise
 
 
 
    
    
  
   
    
  
   
    
  
 
 
Step 5: Fuzzy inference process. 
There are 245 rules in the rulebase, as described in Section 7.2. They are subjectively defined 
based on expert experience and engineering judgment. The fire strength of each rule with input 
fuzzy sets can be calculated by E.q.4-8. Then, the fuzzy implication is applied to obtain the 
conclusion fuzzy sets of fired rules. The truncated MF of the conclusion fuzzy set of each rule 
can be obtained by E.q.4-9. Finally, all of the conclusion fuzzy sets are aggregated by Eq.4-10 
to form a single fuzzy set which represents the fuzzy output of RL. For example, the fuzzy sets
FFA , CPA and CSA  are the input fuzzy sets and are fired with all of the rules in the rulebase. 
However, there are only two rules with non-zero fire strength: 
 
R28: IF FF=Rare and CP= Definite and CS=Negligible, THEN RL=Possible. 
R29: IF FF=Infrequent and CP= Definite and CS=Negligible, THEN RL=Possible. 
 
When input fuzzy sets are fired with Rule 28, the MFs of qualitative descriptors of Rule 28 are 
obtained according to E.q.4-2 and 4- 7: 
 
( 0.002) / 0.004, [0.002,0.006],
1, [0.006,0.015],
( )
( 0.04) / 0.025, [0.015,0.04],
0,
RareB
u u
u
u
u u
otherwise

   
  
  
  
 
 
( 0.8) / 0.05, [0.8,0.85],
( ) 1, [0.85,1],
0,
DefiniteB
v v
v v
otherwise

   
 
  
 

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1, [0,0.009],
( ) ( 0.02) / 0.011, [0.009,0.02],
0, .
NegligibleB
w
w w w
otherwise

  
 
   
 

 
1, [1,2],
1, [2,4],
( )
5 , [4,5],
0,
PossibleB
x x
x
x
x x
otherwise

   
  
  
  
 
.     
 
The fire strength of Rule 28 28 is calculated by E.q.4-8: 
 
              28 min max ,max ,maxFF CP CSRare Definite NegligibleA A AB B Bu u v v w w            
 min 0.25,1,1 0.25  . 
 
The MF conclusion fuzzy set of Rule 28 28 ( )
RLB
x is calculated by E.q.4-9: 
 
 28 28
1, [1,2],
0.25, [2,4],
( )
5 , [4,5],
0,
RL PossibleB B
x x
x
x x
x x
otherwise
  
   
  
     
  
 
. 
 
The MF conclusion fuzzy set of Rule 29 29 ( )
RLB
x is also calculated: 
 29 29 29
1, [1,2],
0.75, [2,4],
( ) , 0.75
5 , [4,5],
0,
RL PossibleB B
x x
x
x x
x x
otherwise
   
   
  
     
  
 
. 
 
The MF of final output RL is obtained by E.q.4-10: 
    1 2 28 29 245
245
1
V ,..., ,...,i
RL RL RL RL RL RL RL
B B B B B B Bi
x x      

               
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28 29
1, [1,2],
0.75, [2,4],
5 , [4,5],
0,
RL RLB B
x x
x
x x
otherwise
 
   
  
     
  
 
. 
 
Step 6: Defuzzification. 
The crisp value of RL can be defuzzified from the fuzzy set of the output RL by E.q.4-11. The 
RL of the sub-hazard group “derailment (typical outcome)” is finally obtained: 
 
 
 
10
1
10
1
0.75 2 0.75 3 0.75 4
3
0.75 0.75 0.75
RL
RL
B j j
j
B j
j
x x
RL
x




 
    
  
 



, 
 
where the number of quantisation levels is set to 10, which is appropriate to defuzzify the output 
fuzzy set. 
 
By following the six steps above, all of the RLs of sub-hazard groups are calculated and the 
result is shown in Table 7-9. As the sub-hazard groups are of equal importance to their hazard 
groups, there is no need to perform Fuzzy-AHP analysis to obtain the RL of hazard groups, so 
the RLs of hazard groups are obtained by aggregating fuzzy sets of the RLs of the sub-hazard 
groups and then performing a defuzzification operation based on the aggregated fuzzy sets. The 
results of RLs for hazard groups are listed in Table 7-10 Risk ranking from Metronet method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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7.4 Fuzzy-AHP Risk Estimation 
In order to assess the RL at railway depot level, the relative importance of hazard groups‟ 
contribution to the RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot is considered and estimated by 
Fuzzy-AHP using RISRAS, which is quantified as WFs in the developed risk model. Thus, the 
WFs of hazard groups in this phase are calculated firstly and then synthesised with the RLs of 
hazard groups to finally determine the RL at railway depot level. The process is demonstrated 
as follows: 
 
Step 1: Establish estimation scheme. 
The judgments were made on the basis of the estimation scheme, which all the experts agreed 
with. The estimation scheme used in the case is shown in Table 3-1.  
 
Step 2: Pair-wise compare factors in risk tree. 
Experts‟ judgments about relative importance between hazard groups are shown in Table 7-6. 
Thanks to improved Fuzzy-AHP, there are only 6 comparisons that have been made. Experts 
can use linguistic terms, numerical numbers, ranges and fuzzy numbers to present their 
opinions. For example, in comparison 1 in Table 7-6, experts agree that DHG is more important 
than CHG. However, they have different opinions on the degree of importance, and E1, E2, E3, 
E4 and E5 chose “WI”, “BWS”, “4, 6”, “4, 5” and “BWS” respectively. The judgements can be 
easily collected by using the questionnaires provided by RISRAS, as described in Section 5.3.2.  
 
Step 3: Convert inputs into UFNs. 
The judgements are then converted into UFNs according to Table 4-1, and the converted UFNs 
are listed in Table 7-6. 
 
Step 4: Aggregate UFNs. 
The converted UFNs are then aggregated with respect to EIs in Table 7-5 by Eq. 4-3. For 
example, the aggregated UFN 1,2A  
of comparison 1 in Table 7-6 is obtained by Eq.4- 3: 
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 
5 5 5 5
1 1 1 1
1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 5 5 5 5
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
k k k k k k k k
k k k k
k k k k
k k k k
a EI b EI c EI d EI
A a b c d
EI EI EI EI
   
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
   
 
1 0.21 3 0.24 ... 3 0.16 2 0.21 5 0.24 ... 5 0.16
,...,
0.21 0.24 ... 0.16 0.21 0.24 ... 0.16
            
  
      
 2.94,4,4,5  
 
where , ,  and k k k ka b c d are the four parameters in a converted UFN. All the aggregated UNFs 
are shown inError! Reference source not found.. 
 
Step 5: Calculate fuzzy WFs from comparison matrix. 
Then, following steps 1 to 4 in Section 3.4.2.2, the entire comparison matrix for the hazard 
group can be developed. The comparison matrix M is then established with these aggregated 
UNFs according to Eq. 4-12. 
 
1,1 1,2 1,7
2,1 2,2 2,7
,
7,1 7,2 7,7
, , 1, 2, ,7i j
A A A
A A A
M A i j
A A A
 
 
       
 
 
 
1,2 1,7
2,1 2,7
7,1 7,2
1,1,1,1
1,1,1,1
1,1,1,1
A A
A A
A A
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
By using propositions 3 and 4 as described in Section 3.4.2.2, the entire comparison matrix 
can be obtained, as shown in Table 7-7. However, for example, value 1,6A  is not in the 
interval [1/9,9], the following transformation functions must be applied according to Eq. 
3-20 . 
 
897.12 897.12 897.12 897.12
9 9 9 91/log 1/log 1/log 1/log( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( )a a b b c c d df x x f x x f x x f x x     
 
Table 7-8 lists the transferred entries that are used as the completed comparison matrix M for 
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the Fuzzy-AHP process.  
 
The UFN geometric mean iA of the ith row in the comparison matrix is calculated by Eq. 4-13: 
 
 
7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7
1 1 1 1 1 1, 1, 1, 1,
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,j j j j
j j j j
A a b c d a b c d
   
  
   
  
     
   7 71 1.41 ... 1.95,..., 1 1.68 ... 5.51 1.894,2.394,2.394,3.254         
2 {1.305,1.529,1.529,1.982}A   
3 {0.940,1.052,1.052,1.329}A   
4 {0.854,1.052,1.052,1.170}A   
5 {0.571,0.704,0.704,0.804}A   
6 {0.355,0.449,0.449,0.537}A   
7 {0.590,0.781,0.781,0.973}A   
 
Then fuzzy WFs iW  
of hazard groups are calculated with iA  
by Eq.4-14. 
 
  1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 7 7 7 7
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
i i i i
i i i i
a b c d
W a b c d
d c b a
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
 
1.305 1.982
,..., 0.190,0.301,0.301,0.500
1.305 0.940 ... 0.590 1.982 1.329 ... 0.973
 
  
      
 
 2 0.130,0.192,0.192,0.305W   
 3 0.094,0.132,0.132,0.204W    
 4 0.085,0.132,0.132,0.180W   
 5 0.057,0.088,0.088,0.124W   
 6 0.035,0.056,0.056,0.082W   
 7 0.059,0.098,0.098,0.150W   
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Step 6: Defuzzification and normalisation. 
The crisp value iwof fuzzy WF iW can be calculated by Eq. 4-15. 
 
   1 1 1 1
1
2 0.190 2 0.301 0.301 0.5
 0.315
6 6
a b c d
w
      
     
2 0.201w   
3 0.138w   
4 0.132w   
5 0.090w   
6 0.057w   
7 0.100w         
 
The final WF of hazardous groups iWF is obtained by Eq. 4-16: 
 
1
1 7
1
1
0.315
0.31
0.315 0.201 ... 0.100
i
w
WF
w


  
  

 
2 0.19WF   
3 0.13WF   
4 0.13WF   
5 0.09WF   
6 0.06WF   
7 0.10WF   
 
Step7: RLs and WFs synthesis. 
Once the WFs of hazard groups are obtained, the RL at railway depot level DepotRL  
can be 
derived from the synthesis of the hazard groups' WFs and RLs using Eq. 4-17. 
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7
1
2.31 0.31 3.30 0.19 ... 3.54 0.10 2.99Depot i i
i
RL RL WF

           
 
which indicates that the overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot is 2.99 belonging to 
“Possible” with a belief of 100 percent. 
 
All these steps described in the risk estimation phases are coded into RISRAS. Users are 
generally required to complete an excel file based questionnaire for the analysis of WFs and 
then to input the data of FF, CP and CS into the system via an excel file based input template file 
and click the “Run” button to achieve the final results, which can be exported into an excel file 
by clicking the “Save” button. The overall procedures are demonstrated in Figure 7-3. 
 
Comparison 
E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 Aggregated 
UFNs 
Judgment UFNs Judgment UFNs Judgment UFNs Judgment UFNs Judgment 
UFNs 
DHG vs. 
CHG (A1,2) 
WI 1,1,1,2 BWS 3,4,4,5 4, 6 4,5,5,6 4, 5 
4,4.5,4.
5,6 
BWS 3,4,4,5 
2.94,4.00,4.0
0,5.00 
CHG vs. 
TfHG (A2,3) 
WI 2,3,3,4 BWS 3,4,4,5 BWS 3,4,4,5 SI 4,5,5,6 BWS 
3,4,4,5 2.38,3.18,3.1
8,3.99 
TfHG vs. 
EHG (A3,4) 
EQ 1,1,1,2 EQ 1,1,1,2 EQ 1,1,1,2 EQ 1,1,1,2 EQ 
1,1,1,2 1.00,1.00,1.0
0,2.00 
EHG vs. 
SHG (A4,5) 
BWS 3,4,4,5 BWS 3,4,4,5 WI 2,3,3,4 BWS 3,4,4,5 BEW 
1,2,2,3 2.47,3.47,3.4
7,4.47 
SHG vs. 
FHG (A5,6) 
BWS 3,4,4,5 BWS 3,4,4,5 SI 4,5,5,6 WI 2,3,3,4 BWS 
3,4,4,5 3.03,4.03,4.0
3,5.03 
TsHG vs. 
FHG (A7,6) 
BSV 5,6,6,7 SI 4,5,5,6 BSV 5,6,6,7 BSV 5,6,6,7 SI 
4,5,5,6 4.55,5.56,5.5
6,6.67 
Table 7-6 Expert judgements 
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Table 7-7 Pairwise comparison matrix M established for Hammersmith depot 
 
Table 7-8 Final Pairwise comparison matrix M established for Hammersmith depot 
 
Ai,j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
2.94,4.00,4.00,
5.00 
7.00,12.72,12.7
2,19.95 
7.00,12.72,12.7
2,39.90 
17.28,44.14,44.
14,178.35 
52.37,177.88,1
77.88,897.12 
7.85,32.00,32.0
0,197.19 
2 0.20,0.25,0.25,
0.34 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
2.38,3.18,3.18,
3.99 
2.38,3.18,3.18,
7.98 
5.88,11.03,11.0
3,35.67 
17.81,44.47,44.
47,179.42 
2.67,8.00,8.00,
39.44 
3 0.05,0.08,0.08,
0.14 
0.25,0.31,0.31,
0.42 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
1,1,1,2 2.47,3.47,3.47,
8.94 
7.48,13.98,13.9
9,44.97 
1.12,2.52,2.52,
9.88 
4 0.03,0.08,0.08,
0.14 
0.13,0.31,0.31,
0.42 
0.50, 1.00,1.00, 
1.00 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
2.47,3.47,3.47,
4.47 
7.48,13.98,13.9
8,22.48 
1.12,2.52,2.52,
4.94 
5 0.01,0.02,0.02,
0.06 
0.03,0.09,0.09,
0.17 
0.11,0.29,0.29,
0.40 
0.22,0.29,0.29,
0.40 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
3.03,4.03,4.03,
5.03 
0.45,0.72,0.72,
1.11 
6 1.11e-3,5.62e-
3,5.62e-3,0.02 
5.57e-3,0.02,0.
02,0.06 
0.02,0.07,0.07,
0.13 
0.04,0.07,0.07,
0.13 
0.20,0.25,0.25,
0.33 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
0.15,0.18,0.18,
0.22 
7 5.07e-3,0.03,0
.03,0.13 
0.03,0.12,0.12,
0.37 
0.10,0.40,0.40,
0.89 
0.20,0.40,0.40,
0.89 
0.90,1.38,1.38,
2.20 
4.55,5.56,5.56,
6.67 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
Ai,j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
1.42,1.57,1.57,
1.68 
1.88,2.27,2.27,
2.63 
1.88,2.27,2.27,
3.29 
2.51,3.40,3.40,
5.34 
3.59,5.34,5.34,
9.00 
1.95,3.06,3.06,
5.52 
2 0.59,0.64,0.64,
0.71 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
1.32,1.45,1.45,
1.56 
1.32,1.45,1.45,
1.96 
1.77,2.17,2.17,
3.17 
2.54,3.41,3.41,
5.35 
1.37,1.96,1.96,
3.28 
3 0.38,0.44,0.44,
0.53 
0.64,0.69,0.69,
0.76 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.25 
1.34,1.49,1.49,
2.03 
1.92,2.35,2.35,
3.42 
1.04,1.35,1.35,
2.10 
4 0.30,0.44,0.44,
0.53 
0.51,0.69,0.69,
0.76 
0.80,1.00,1.00,
1.00, 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
1.34,1.49,1.49,
1.62 
1.92,2.35,2.35,
2.73 
1.04,1.35,1.35,
1.68 
5 0.19,0.29,0.29,
0.40 
0.32,0.46,0.46,
0.56 
0.49,0.67,0.67,
0.75 
0.62,0.67,0.67,
0.75 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
1.43,1.57,1.57,
1.69 
0.77,0.90,0.90,
1.03 
6 0.11,0.19,0.19,
0.28 
0.19,0.29,0.29,
0.39 
0.29,0.43,0.43,
0.52 
0.37,0.43,0.43,
0.52 
0.59,0.64,0.64,
0.70 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
0.54,0.57,0.57,
0.61 
7 0.18,0.33,0.33,
0.51 
0.30,0.51,0.51,
0.73 
0.48,0.74,0.74,
0.96 
0.60,0.74,0.74,
0.96 
0.97,1.11,1.11,
1.29 
1.63,1.74,1.74,
1.85 
1.00,1.00,1.00,
1.00 
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Figure 7-3 Using RISRAS in the assessment 
7.5 Risk Response Phase 
The overall RL of shunting at Hammersmith depot is 2.99, belonging to the risk category 
“Possible” with a belief of 100%. This requires risk reduction measures to reduce the overall 
RL of depot to ALARP. Seven hazard groups effect the overall RL estimation at the 
Hammersmith depot. It should be noted that each hazard group contributes a different weight 
value to the overall RL of the depot. It can be seen from Table 7-12 that the major 
contributions are from the hazard groups “Derailment”, “Collision” and “Electrocution”, 
which contributed 24%, 21% and 19% respectively to the overall RL of shunting at 
Hammersmith depot. Each hazard group consists of a number of hazardous events. For 
example, in this case, there are six main hazardous events in the “Derailment” hazard group, 
which are track related faults, signal related faults, rolling stock faults, structural failures, 
falling objects from trains, and human errors, which result in derailment. Based on the 
accident and incident reports and statistics, the majority of derailment risk (92%) is put down 
Fuzzy AHP user interface 
Questionnaire 
Input template file 
Output file 
RISRAS evaluation user interface 
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to human errors such as overspending and incorrect routing. Therefore, in order to reduce the 
RLs of derailment, staff training should be provided to shunters, signallers and drivers; at the 
same time speed should be limited at the depot, liaison between Metronet Rail shunters and 
signallers should be improved, and reference manual procedures should be provided. The 
other potential control measures to reduce derailment risks include track maintenance and 
inspection training of track staff to reduce track related faults; signal/points maintenance and 
inspection of engineering controls, e.g. interlocking, training and competence of signal 
maintenance staff to reduce signalling related faults; fleet maintenance and inspection training 
and competence of fleet staff and brake testing before moving to reduce rolling stock related 
faults; civil maintenance and inspection training and competence of civil staff to reduce 
structural failures; fleet maintenance and inspection training and competence of fleet staff to 
reduce the objects from trains risk.  
 
The hazard groups “Train fire”, “Train strikes person”, “Slips/trips” and “Falls from height” 
contribute less than the above hazard groups with 13%, 11%, 7% and 4%, respectively. 
Although these hazard groups have relatively a minor contribution to the overall RL of 
shunting at Hammersmith depot, the control measures are still carried out to reduce those 
hazardous events whose RLs fall in the transition region, i.e. “Possible” and “Substantial”. 
For example, the hazard group of “Train fire” contributes 10% to the overall RL of depot. As 
the major fire related hazardous events lead to system failure or personal injury and health 
hazards include arcing and mechanical failure, the suggested control measures are to provide 
maintenance and inspection of fleet and track assets regularly. In addition, fire extinguishers 
installed in the cab could mitigate the consequences and reduce the chance of severe 
outcomes. 
 
the results using the method proposed herein were compared with earlier method developed 
by Huang (reference) and Metronet, as shown in Table 7-10, the risk ranking from the 
proposed model is slightly different. For example, within the “Slips/trips” sub-hazard group, 
“Slips/trips (major)” and “Slip/trip (fatality)” rank higher than “Slips/trip (minor injury)” in 
the results from Metronet Rail assessment, whereas in Huang‟s assessment those sub-hazard 
groups are classified in the same risk category, but from the proposed risk model, “Slips/trip 
(minor injury)” and “Slip/trip (fatality)” rank higher than “Slips/trips (major)”. After further 
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investigation of the data, the results from the proposed model are more conversable, as the 
consequence of “Slips/trip (minor injury)” is low but with a higher probability of occurrence, 
and such an event should be highlighted in the assessment. The results from the proposed 
model indicate that “Collision (typical outcome)” is of high risk due to its higher consequence 
probability, which should not be ignored. However, the results from these two methods both 
agree that “Electrocution (typical outcome)” and “Train strikes person (fatality)” are of higher 
risk than others.  
 
Furthermore, the outcomes of the assessment from the proposed model are represented by risk 
degrees and the defined risk categories of RLs with a belief of percentage. The Metronet 
method cannot provide a belief percentage in the corresponding risk category for each 
sub-hazard group. Compared with the method applied by Metronet, the proposed model can 
provide an extra risk ranking at hazard group level. The overall system risk level can also be 
obtained. With the application of Fuzzy-AHP, even the societal risk created by the operation 
can be taken into account. According to the results, different contributions of hazard groups to 
the failure of the system operation could be easily identified. In Huang‟s method, as FRA and 
Fuzzy-AHP have been applied in the assessment, it can also provide risk information in the 
format of risk score, risk category and risk contribution. However, it cannot provide 
satisfactory risk ranking as CP is not considered in the assessment, which can be obtained 
from expert judgements. In summary, the proposed model can provide much more useful risk 
information than the Metronet method and Dr Huang‟s method. It facilitates decision makers 
to identify hazard groups in a high risk level and reduce risk more effectively and efficiently.     
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Table 7-9 Shunting at Hammersmith depot 
Proposed model 
Operation Hazard Groups Index Sub-hazard Groups Failure 
Frequency 
Consequence 
Probability 
Consequence 
Severity 
Risk 
Score 
Risk Category 
 
S
h
u
n
tin
g
 a
t H
a
m
m
er
sm
ith
 d
ep
o
t 
 Derailment 1 Derailment (typical outcome) 3.33E-02 99% 0.005 3.00 Possible: 100% 
2 Derailment (worst case scenario) 3.33E-02 1% 0.125 0.81 Low: 100% 
Collision 3 Collision between trains 
(worst case scenario) 
3.00E-02 20% 0.625 2.52 Possible: 100% 
4 Collision between trains 
(typical outcome) 
3.00E-02 80% 0.025 3.00 Possible: 100% 
5 Collision hazard 
(typical outcome) 
1.20E-01 99% 0.005 4.04 Possible: 96%    
Substantial: 4% 
6 Collision hazard 
(worst case scenario) 
1.20E-01 1% 0.125 0.82 Low: 100% 
Train fire 7 Train fire (typical outcome) 1.50E-02 100% 0.005 3.00 Possible: 100% 
Electrocution 8 Electrocution (typical outcome) 5.71E-02 75% 0.625 6.00 Substantial: 
100% 
9 Electrocution (best case 
scenario) 
5.71E-02 25% 0.125 0.80 Low: 100% 
Slips/trips 10 Slips / trips (minor injury) 2.00E-01 80% 0.005 3.00 Possible: 100% 
11 Slips / trips (major injury) 2.00E-01 15% 0.125 0.80 Low: 100% 
12 Slips / trips (fatality) 2.00E-01 5% 0.625 3.00 Possible: 100% 
Falls from height 13 Falls from height (minor injury) 1.43E-02 15% 0.005 0.75 Low: 100% 
14 Falls from height (major injury) 1.43E-02 80% 0.125 3.00 Possible: 100% 
15 Falls from height (fatality) 1.43E-02 5% 0.625 0.75 Low: 100% 
Train strikes 
person 
16 Train strikes person (major 
injury) 
1.00E-01 50% 0.125 3.00 Possible: 100% 
17 Train strikes person (fatality) 1.00E-01 50% 0.625 3.54 Possible: 100% 
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 Metronet method Huang’s method Proposed methodl 
Sub-hazard 
groups 
Risk 
rankings 
Indicate 
risk 
ranking 
Risk Score Risk 
Category 
Risk 
Score 
Risk Category 
Electrocution 
(typical 
outcome) 
7 Medium 7.42 Substantial: 
100% 
6.00 Substantial: 
100% 
Train strikes 
person (fatality) 
7 Medium 8.00 Substantial: 
100% 
3.54 Possible: 100% 
Collision 
between trains 
(worst case 
scenario) 
6 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
2.52 Possible: 100% 
Slips / trips 
(major injury) 
6 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
0.80 Low: 100% 
Slips / trips 
(fatality) 
6 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Train strikes 
person (major 
injury) 
6 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Train fire 
(typical 
outcome) 
5 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Electrocution 
(best case 
scenario) 
5 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
0.80 Low: 100% 
Slips / trips 
(minor injury) 
5 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Falls from 
height (major 
injury) 
5 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Falls from 
height (fatality) 
4 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
0.75 Low: 100% 
Derailment 
(worst case 
scenario) 
4 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
0.81 Low: 100% 
Collision 
between trains 
(typical 
outcome) 
4 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Collision 
hazard 
(worst case 
scenario)  
4 Low 5.00 Possible: 
100% 
0.82 Low: 100% 
Derailment 
(typical 
outcome) 
4 Low 4.48 Possible: 
100% 
3.00 Possible: 100% 
Collision 
hazard 
(typical 
outcome) 
3 Low 3.34 Low: 66% 
Possible: 
34% 
4.04 Possible: 96%    
Substantial: 4% 
Falls from 
height (minor 
injury) 
2 Low 2.76 Low: 100% 0.75 Low: 100% 
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Table 7-10 Risk ranking from Metronet method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operation Index Hazard groups Risk Score Risk Category 
 
 
Shunting at 
Hammersmith 
depot (3.29, 
Possible: 100% 
1 Derailment 2.31 Possible: 100% 
2 Collision 3.3 Possible: 100% 
3 Train fire 3 Possible: 100% 
4 Electrocution 4.47 Possible: 53% 
Substantial: 47% 
5 Slips/trips 2.4 Possible: 100% 
6 Falls from height 2.17 Possible: 100% 
7 Train strikes person 3.54 Possible: 100% 
Table 7-11 RLs of hazard group in Hammersmith depot 
 
Operation Index Hazard groups WF Contribution 
 
 
Shunting at 
Hammersmith 
Depot 
1 Derailment  0.31 24% 
2 Collision 0.19 21% 
4 Electrocution 0.13 19% 
3 Train fire 0.13 13% 
7 Train strikes person 0.10 11% 
5 Slips/trips 0.09 7% 
6 Falls from height 0.06 4% 
Table 7-12 Hazard groups’ risk contribution ranking for Hammersmith depot 
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7.6 Summary  
Traditionally, risk assessment techniques currently used in the railway industry have 
adopted a probabilistic approach, which heavily rely on the availability and accuracy 
of data; sometimes they are unable to deal adequately with incomplete or uncertain 
data. This chapter presents a case study on risk assessment of shunting at 
Hammersmith depot using the proposed risk assessment model based on FRA and 
improved Fuzzy-AHP. The outcomes of risk assessment are the RLs of hazardous 
events, hazard groups and a railway system and corresponding risk categories as well 
as risk contributions. It will provide railway risk analysts, managers and engineers 
with useful information to improve safety management and set safety standards. Some 
screen shots of the proposed railway risk assessment system are shown in Figure 7-3. 
This system consists of a user-friendly interface that controls the risk assessment 
process including a project manager, an excel processor and a database management 
system, which is easy to use and update. Compared with the conventional methods, 
the advantages of the proposed risk assessment system can be summarised as: 
 
(1) it can handle expert knowledge, engineering judgments and historical risk 
data for the railway risk assessment in a consistent manner;  
(2) it can use imprecise, ambiguous and uncertainty information in the 
assessment;  
(3) the risk can be evaluated directly using linguistic expressions which are 
employed in the risk assessment; 
(4) the risk can be assessed effectively on the basis of the knowledge base built 
by transforming information from various sources; 
(5) it provides a more flexible structure for combining failure frequency, 
consequences and consequence probability in risk analysis. 
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CHAPTER 8: APPLICATION OF RISK 
BASED MAINTENANCE DECISION 
MAKING MODEL TO A RAILWAY 
TRACK SYSTEM 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an illustrative example of a track system risk assessment that is 
used to demonstrate the application of the proposed risk-based decision making method. 
The risk assessment will be performed to assess current risks at component level, 
subsystem level and system level. The RLs of the track system are calculated based on 
the risk model. Next, the cost model is used to calculate the relevant cost of each 
proposed maintenance option. Then, each maintenance option is assessed by using 
TOPHSIS method to obtain its preference degree. Finally, the maintenance decision 
can be made based on the preference degrees of maintenance options.  
8.2 Risk Assessment of a Track System 
 A track system can be divided into three levels, i.e. system level, subsystem level and 
component level, as shown in Figure 8-1. At subsystem level, two subsystems, namely, 
“Track component” subsystem and “Subgrade” subsystem, can be identified. “Track 
component” subsystem, which supports and distributes train loads, includes six main 
components. They are “Rail”, “Fishplate”, “Fastening”, “Pad”, “Ballast” and 
“Sleeper”. “Subgrade” subsystem, on which the train loads, after adequate distribution 
in the “track component” subsystem, are transferred. It covers two components, i.e. 
“Formation layer” and “Base”. Each component consists of a number of failure modes 
that are described below.  
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 “Rail” covers four failure modes. i.e. “Rail defect”, “Rail fatigue”, “Poor support” 
and “Damaged by powered wheel”. All failures are potentially catastrophic and 
may possibly result in a derailment.  
 “Fishplate” includes failure mode “Inadequate rail joint support” which is the 
main cause of cracked fishplates. The failure of “Fishplate” may lead to the 
wheelsets falling in between the rails and rail deformation. 
 “Fastening” consists of two failure modes, “Clip wear” and “Screw loose”. The 
failure of individual fastenings does not present any significant threat to the safety 
of trains, but there is a possibility that the failed fastening could transfer 
additional loading onto adjacent fastenings which could result in a rapid 
escalation of failures.  
 “Pad” includes “Pad degradation” causing a pad split or thinned and failing to 
assist in keeping the rail fastenings tight.   
 “Ballast” has one failure mode, “Load related failure”. Due to repeated dynamic 
loading, the size and shape of the ballast is damaged gradually, and then ballast is 
no longer able to support the track both laterally and vertically.  
 “Sleeper” consists of two failure modes, “Load damage” and “Maintenance 
damage”. The failed sleepers may be incapable of supporting the track and/or 
retaining the rails to gauge. 
 “Formation layer” and “Base” are two components of the “Subgrade” subsystem. 
Both of them have three failure modes, i.e. “Load related failure”, “Soil related 
failure” and “Environment related failure”. The failure of the above two 
components may lead to poor performance in supporting the railway track under 
traffic loads. 
 
According to bottom up assessment approach as stated in Section 2.3.3.2, risk 
assessment is carried out from component level to assess failure modes. On the basis of 
the proposed safety risk model, the input parameters are failure frequency (FF), 
consequence probability (CP) and consequence severity (CS) of failure modes. FRA is 
applied to assess the risk levels (RLs) of failure modes. Based on the RLs of failure 
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modes, the RL of the corresponding component can be obtained by the fuzzy 
aggregation operation of FRA. The RL of the subsystem is derived by synthesizing the 
RLs of components and corresponding weights which are produced by fuzzy-AHP., 
Finally, the track system RL can be obtained. The outputs of the track system risk 
assessment are RLs of failure modes, components, subsystems and the overall RL of 
the track system with risk scores located from 0 to 10 and risk categories as “Low”, 
“Possible”, “Substantial” and “High” with a percentage belief.  
 
 
Figure 8-1 The risk tree for track system risk analysis 
8.2.1 Risk assessment at component level 
The risk parameters of FF, CP and CS, the output RL and their related rulebase for this 
risk analysis are defined as described as follows. Those parameters are all characterised 
by numbers of trapezoidal MFs. Six qualitative descriptors, such as “Very low”, “Low”, 
“Reasonably low”, “Average”, “Frequent” and “Highly frequent” are used to describe 
FF, as shown in Table 8-1. For example, qualitative descriptor “low” is characterised by 
a trapezoidal MF whose vertex values are 0.5, 1, 2, and 4. Five qualitative descriptors 
“Negligible”, “Marginal”, “Moderate”, “Critical” and “Catastrophic” are used to 
describe CS, in which, for example, the qualitative descriptor “Catastrophic” is 
characterised by a trapezoidal MF whose vertex values are 6, 7, 8, and 9, as shown in 
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Table 8-2. Seven qualitative descriptors, such as “Highly unlikely”, “Unlikely”, 
“Reasonably unlikely”, “Likely”, “Reasonably likely”, “Highly likely” and “Definite” 
are used to describe CP, in which, for example, the qualitative descriptor “Definite” is 
characterised by a trapezoidal MF whose vertex values are 0.8, 0.85, 1, and 1 as shown 
in Table 8-3. The output RL is characterised as “Low”, “Possible”, “Substantial” and 
“High” as shown in Table 8-4. For example, qualitative descriptor “Low” is defined by 
a trapezoidal MF that four parameters of the MF are 0, 0, 2, and 3.  
 
An FRA rulebase is developed and determined by experienced experts, as shown in 
Figure 8-2 . In this case, there are 210 rules defined in the rulebase. For example, the 
rule at the top left of the matrix of CS = Negligible would be expressed as follows: 
 
IF FF is Remote and CP is Highly unlikely and CS = Negligible, THEN RL is Low 
 
Index Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description Numerical value 
(events/ 10 million 
tons) 
Parametres of MFs 
(trapezoid ) 
1 Very low Failure is unlikely <1.0 0.00,0.00,0.50,1.00 
2 Low Relatively few failures 1.1-3.0 0.50,1.00,2.00,4.00 
3 Reasonably low Between low and average 3.1-8.0 2.00,4.00,5.00,9.00 
4 Average Occasional failures 8.1-15.0 5.00,9.00,11.00,16.00 
5 Frequent Repeated failures 15.1-25.0 11.00,16.00,19.00,25.00 
6 Highly frequent Failure is almost 
inevitable 
>25.1 19.00,25.00,32.00,32.00 
Table 8-1 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of FF for track system 
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Index Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description Numerical 
ranking 
Parametres of MFs 
(trapezoid ) 
1 Negligible Involving no injury and 
negligible damage to the 
system 
0,1 0.00,0.00,1.00,2.00 
2 Marginal Involving minor system 
damage and/or minor injury 
2,3 1.00,2.00,3.00,4.00 
3 Moderate Involving failure causes some 
operational dissatisfaction 
4,5,6 3.00,4.00,5.00,7.00 
4 Critical Involving major system 
damages and/or sever injury  
7,8 5.00,7.00,8.00,9.00 
5 Catastrophic Involving system loss and/or 
death.  
9,10 8.00,9.00,10.00,10.00 
Table 8-2 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of CS for track system 
 
Rank Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description 
Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
1 Highly unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is highly unlikely. 0.00, 0.00, 0.15, 0.20 
2 Unlikely The occurrence likelihood of accident is unlikely but 
possible given the occurrence of the failure event. 
0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30 
3 Reasonably 
unlikely 
The occurrence likelihood of accident is between likely 
and unlikely. 
0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.425 
4 Likely The occurrence likelihood of accident is likely. 0.35, 0.425, 0.575,0. 65 
5 Reasonably likely  The occurrence likelihood of accident is between likely 
and highly likely. 
0.575, 0.65, 0.70, 0.75 
6 Highly likely  The occurrence likelihood of accident is very likely 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85 
7 Definite The accident occurs given the occurrence of the failure 
event. 
0.80, 0.85, 1.00, 1.00 
Table 8-3 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of CP for track system 
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Rank Qualitative 
descriptors 
Description Parameters of MFs 
(trapezoid) 
1 Low Risk is acceptable 0, 0, 1, 2       
2 Possible Risk is tolerable but should be further 
reduced if it is cost-effective to do so 
1, 2, 4, 5       
3 Substantial Risk must be reduced if it is reasonably 
practicable to do so 
4, 5, 7, 8     
4 High Risk must be reduced to safe in 
exceptional circumstances 
7, 8, 10, 10   
Table 8-4 Definitions of qualitative descriptors of RL for track system 
 
 
Figure 8-2 Fuzzy rule base matrices 
 
The assessment is carried out from component level, then up to subsystem level and 
finally to system level. The risk data of failure modes of each component are then 
processed following the procedures described in Section 4. 2.3.  
Step 1: Input FFs, CSs, and CPs. 
As the data obtained are in numerical format, these crisp values of FF, CP and CS of 
failure modes are directly input into the RISRAS through the input template file. For 
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example, the FF, CP and CS of failure mode “Defect” of “Rail” component are „2.0‟, 
„Reasonably likely‟, and „8.0‟ respectively.  
Step 2: Convert inputs into UFNs. 
These crisp values are converted into corresponding UFNs according to Table 4-1. The 
converted UFNs ,  ,FF CPA A  
and CSA  of the FF, CP and CS of failure mode “Defect” 
of “Rail” component are: 
 
 
 
 
2.0,2.0,2.0,2.0
0.575,0.65,0.70,0.75
8.0,8.0,8.0,8.0
FF
CP
CS
A
A
A



 
 
Step 3: Aggregate UFNs. 
As the data are obtained from one expert judgement, there is no need to aggregate 
experts‟ judgements and the process moves directly to step 4. 
 
Step 4: Transfer UFNs into fuzzy sets. 
UFNs are then transferred into fuzzy sets according to Eq. 4-2, 4-4, 4-5 and 4-6. The 
fuzzy sets ,  ,FF CPA A  
and 
CSA  of the FF, CP and CS of failure mode “Defect” of 
“Rail” component are: 
      
      
 
   
     
1 2.0
, | 0,100 ,
0
1 0.65,0.7
0
, | 0,1 , 0.575 / (0.65 0.575), 0.575,0.65
0.75 / 0.7 0.75 , 0.7,0.75
FF FF
CP CP
FF A A
CP A A
CS
u
A u u u u
otherwise
v
otherwise
A v v v v v v
v v
A
 
 
   
    
  
  
  
  
  
       
  
    
    
      
1 8.0
, | 0,5 ,
0CS CS
A A
w
w w w w
otherwise
 
   
    
  
 
Step 5: Fuzzy inference process. 
There are 210 rules in the rulebase as described earlier in this chapter. They are 
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subjectively defined based on expert experience and engineering judgment. The fire 
strength of each rule with input fuzzy sets can be calculated by Eq.4-8. Then, the fuzzy 
implication is applied to obtain the conclusion fuzzy sets of fired rules. The truncated 
MF of the conclusion fuzzy set of each rule can be obtained by Eq.4-9. Finally, all of the 
conclusion fuzzy sets are aggregated by Eq.4-10 to form a single fuzzy set which 
represents the fuzzy output of RL of failure mode. For example, the fuzzy sets FFA , CPA  
and CSA  are the input fuzzy sets and are fired with all of the rules in the rulebase. 
However, there are only three rules with non-zero fire strength: 
 
R48: IF FF=Low and CP= Reasonably likely and CS=Critical, THEN RL=Substantial. 
R49: IF FF= Low and CP= Highly likely and CS= Critical, THEN RL=Substantial. 
R50: IF FF= Low and CP=Likely and CS= Critical, THEN RL=Possible. 
 
When input fuzzy sets are fired with Rule 48, the MFs of qualitative descriptors of Rule 
48 are obtained according to Eqs.4-2 and 4- 7: 
( 0.5) / (1 0.5), [0.5,1],
1, [1,2],
( )
( 4) / (2 4), [2,4],
0,
LowB
u u
u
u
u u
otherwise

    
  
  
   
 
 
Reasonabliy likely
( 0.575) / (0.65 0.575), [0.575,0.65],
1, [0.65,0.7],
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0,
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v v
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Substantial
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x x
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.     
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The fire strength of Rule 48 48 is calculated by Eq.4-8: 
 
              
Resaonably likely
48 min max ,max ,maxFF CP CSLow CriticalA A AB B B
u u v v w w          
  
 min 1,1,1 1  . 
 
The MF conclusion fuzzy set of Rule 48 28 ( )
RLB
x is calculated by Eq.4-9: 
 
 48
Substantial
48
4, [4,5],
1, [5,7],
( )
8 , [7,8],
0,
RLB B
x x
x
x x
x x
otherwise
  
   
  
     
  
 
. 
 
The MF conclusion fuzzy set of Rule 49 49 ( )
RLB
x  can be also calculated by Eq.4-9: 
 
 49
Substantial
49 49
4, [4,5],
0.5, [5,7],
( ) , 0.5
8 , [7,8],
0,
RLB B
x x
x
x x
x x
otherwise
   
   
  
     
  
 
. 
 
The MF conclusion fuzzy set of Rule 50 49 ( )
RLB
x
 
is calculated by Eq.4-9: 
 
 50 50 50
1, [1,2],
0.5, [2,4],
( ) , 0.5
5 , [4,5],
0,
RL PossibleB B
x x
x
x x
x x
otherwise
   
   
  
     
  
 
. 
 
The MF of final output RL is obtained by Eq.4-10: 
 
    1 2 48 49 210
210
1
V ,..., ,...,i
RL RL RL RL RL RL RL
B B B B B B Bi
x x      

               
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48 49 50
1, [1,2],
0.5, [2,4.5],
( 4.5) / 5.5, [4.5,5]
1, [5,7],
8 , [7,8],
0,
RL RL RLB B B
x x
x
x x
x
x x
otherwise
  
   
  
  
       
 
  
 
 
. 
 
Step 6: Defuzzification. 
The crisp value of RL can be defuzzified from the fuzzy set of the output RL by Eq. 
4-11. The RL of failure mode “Defect” of “Rail” component is finally obtained: 
 
 
10
1
10
1
0.5 2 0.5 3 0.5 4 1 5 1 6 1 7
5
0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 1
RL
RL
B j j
j
B j
j
x x
RL
x




 
          
  
    



 
where the number of quantization levels is set to 10 which is appropriate to defuzzify 
the output fuzzy set as RL ranges from 0 to 10. 
 
Similarly, all of the RLs of failure modes can be calculated and the result is shown in 
Table 8-5. As the failure modes are of equal importance to their components, the RLs of 
components are obtained by aggregating fuzzy sets of the RLs of the failure modes and 
then performing a defuzzification operation based on the aggregated fuzzy sets. The 
results of the RLs of components are listed in Table 8-11. 
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Index Components Failure 
mode 
FF CP CS Risk 
Score 
Risk 
Categories 
1 Rail Defect 2.0 Reasonably 
likely 
8.0 
5 
 Possible: 
100% 
  Fatigue 2.5 Unlikely 8.5 
5.5 
 Possible: 50%  
Substantial: 
50% 
  Poor support 2.0 Highly 
unlikely 
Moderate 
3.58 
 Possible: 
100% 
  Damaged by 
powered 
wheel 
0.9 Highly 
unlikely 
5-8 
3.8 
 Possible: 
100% 
2 Fishplate Inadequately 
maintained 
rail joint 
support 
2.8 Unlikely 4.7 
4 
 Possible: 
100% 
      
4 
 Possible: 
100% 
3 Fastening Clip wear 4.7 Likely 1.8 
4 
 Possible: 
100% 
  Screw loose 8.3 Likely 2.2 
4 
 Possible: 
100% 
      
3.67 
 Possible: 
100% 
4 Pad Pad 
degradation 
10.7 Reasonably 
unlikely 
2.2 
5.08 
 Possible: 92%  
Substantial: 8% 
      
3.1 
 Possible: 
100% 
5 Ballast Performance 
deterioration 
2 Unlikely 3.7 
3.26 
 Possible: 
100% 
      
2.77 
 Low: 23%  
Possible: 77% 
6 Sleeper Load damage 3.5 Likely 5.7 1.75  Low: 100% 
  Maintenance 
damage 
0.6 Unlikely Moderate 
3.75 
 Possible: 
100% 
7 Formation 
layer 
Load related 
failure 
0.07 Unlikely Moderate 
2.77 
 Low: 23%  
Possible: 77% 
  Soil related 
failure 
0.27 Unlikely 5.5 
1.75  Low: 100% 
  Environment 
related failure 
0.04 Unlikely 4-5 
4.65 
 Possible: 
100% 
8 Base Load related 
failure 
0.05 Unlikely 6-9 
5.5 
 Possible: 50%  
Substantial: 
50% 
  Soil related 
failure 
0.01 Unlikely 5.5 
3.58 
 Possible: 
100% 
  Environment 
related failure 
0.02 Highly 
unlikely 
4.5 
3.8 
 Possible: 
100% 
Table 8-5 RLs of failure modes 
8.2.2 Risk assessment at overall system level 
In this case study, fuzzy-AHP analysis is employed and performed at component level 
and subsystem level to obtain the WFs of each component and subsystem. Expert 
judgment will be employed to construct pairwise comparisons at component level and 
subsystem level, according to the estimation scheme, as shown in Table 3-1. The 
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process of calculating the WFs of components belonging to “Track components” 
subsystem is demonstrated as follows: 
 
Step 1: Establishing estimation scheme. 
The judgments were made on the basis of the estimation scheme, which all of the 
experts agreed. The estimation scheme used in the case is shown in Table 3-1.  
Step 2: Construct Pair-wise comparison factors in risk tree. 
Expert judgments about the relative importance between components within the “Track 
components” subsystem are shown in Table 8-6. There are 5 comparisons that have 
been made by each expert.  Similarly, experts can use linguistic terms, numerical 
numbers, ranges and fuzzy numbers to present their opinions. For example, in 
comparison 1 in Table 8-6, experts agree that “Rail” is more important than “Fishplate”, 
but they have different opinions on the importance degree. E1, E2, E3, E4 and E5 chose 
“VI”, “7,8,9”, “6,7,8”, “VI” and “6-8” respectively. These judgements are collected by 
using the questionnaires provided by RISRAS, as described in Section 5.3.2.  
Step 3: Converting inputs into UFNs. 
The judgements are then converted into UFNs according to Table 4-1, and the 
converted UFNs are listed in Table 8-6. 
Step 4: Aggregate UFNs. 
The converted UFNs are then aggregated with respect to EIs in Table 8-6 by Eq. 4-3. 
For example, the aggregated UFN 1,2A  
of comparison 1 in Table 8-6 is obtained by 
Eq.4- 3: 
 
5 5 5 5
1 1 1 1
1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,2 5 5 5 5
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
k k k k k k k k
k k k k
k k k k
k k k k
a EI b EI c EI d EI
A a b c d
EI EI EI EI
   
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
   
 
6 0.25 7 0.22 ... 6 0.15 8 0.25 9 0.22 ... 8 0.15
,...,
0.25 0.22 ... 0.15 0.25 0.22 ... 0.15
            
  
      
 6.22,7.22,7.22,8.22  
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where ,  ,  k k ka b c  
and kd  are the four parameters in a converted UFN. All the 
aggregated UNFs are shown in Table 8-6. 
 
Step 5: Calculating fuzzy WFs from comparison matrix. 
Then, following steps 1 to 4 as described in Section 3.4.2.2, the entire comparison 
matrix for the hazard group can be developed. The comparison matrix M  is then 
established with these aggregated UNFs according to Eq. 4-12. 
 
1,1 1,2 1,7
2,1 2,2 2,7
,
7,1 7,2 7,7
, , 1, 2, ,7i j
A A A
A A A
M A i j
A A A
 
 
       
 
 
 
1,2 1,7
2,1 2,7
7,1 7,2
1,1,1,1
1,1,1,1
1,1,1,1
A A
A A
A A
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
By using propositions 3 and 4 as stated in Section 3.4.2.2, the entire comparison 
matrix can be obtained as shown in Table 8-7. For example, value 1,4A  is not in the 
interval [1/9,9], the following transformation functions must be applied: 
 
108.11 108.11 108.11 108.11
9 9 9 91/log 1/log 1/log 1/log( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( )a a b b c c d df x x f x x f x x f x x     
 
Table 8-8 lists transferred entries that are used as the completed comparison matrix 
M . 
 
The UFN geometric mean iA  
of the i-th row in the comparison matrix is calculated by 
Eq. 4-13: 
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 
6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6
1 1 1 1 1 1, 1, 1, 1,
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,j j j j
j j j j
A a b c d a b c d
   
  
   
  
     
   6 61 2.36 ... 1.01,..., 1 2.69 ... 3.92 1.992,2.778,2.778,3.633         
 
Similarly, 
 
2 {0.827,1.099,1.099,1.382}A   
3 {0.452,0.575,0.575,0.707}A   
4 {0.356,0.443,0.443,0.558}A   
5 {0.790,1.018,1.018,1.317}A   
6 {0.927,1.264,1.264,1.976}A   
 
Then fuzzy WFs iW  
of hazard groups are calculated by Eq. 4-14. 
 
  1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6
1 1 1 1
, , , , , ,
i i i i
i i i i
a b c d
W a b c d
d c b a
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
 
 
1.992 3.633
,..., 0.208,0.387,0.387,0.680
1.992 1.099 ... 0.927 3.633 1.382 ... 1.976
 
  
        
Similarly, 
 
 2 0.086,0.153,0.153,0.259W   
 3 0.047,0.080,0.080,0.132W    
 4 0.037,0.062,0.062,0.104W   
 5 0.083,0.142,0.142,0.247W   
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 6 0.097,0.176,0.176,0.370W   
 
Step 6: Defuzzification and normalisation. 
The crisp value iw  
of fuzzy WF iW  
can be calculated by Eq. 4-15. 
   1 1 1 1
1
2 0.208 2 0.387 0.387 0.680
 0.406
6 6
a b c d
w
      
     
 
Similarly, 
 
2 0.160w   
3 0.083w   
4 0.065w   
5 0.149w   
6 0.195w         
 
The final WFs of hazardous groups iWF  
 can be obtained by Eq. 4-16: 
 
1
1 6
1
1
0.406
0.48
0.406 0.160 ... 0.195
i
w
WF
w


  
  

 
 
Similarly, 
 
2 0.10WF   
3 0.05WF   
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4 0.03WF   
5 0.13WF   
6 0.21WF   
 
Step7: RLs and WFs synthesis. 
Once the WFs of components are obtained, the RL of the “Track components” 
subsystem TrackcomponentsRL  
can be derived from the synthesis of component WFs and 
using Eq. 4-17. 
 
6
1
4.65 0.48 4.00 0.10 ... 4.22 0.21 4.31Trackcomponents i i
i
RL RL WF

           
 
Similarly, on the basis of expert judgements on components of the “Foundation” 
subsystem, as shown in Table 8-9, and on subsystems of the “Track system”, as shown 
in Table 8-10, the RL of the “Foundation” subsystem FoundationRL  
can be derived from 
the synthesis of component WFs and by using Eqs. 6-1 and 6-2. 
 
2.98 0.65 3.28 0.35 3.08
Foundation Formation Formation Formation FormationRL RL WF RL WF   
    
 
3.08 0.17 4.31 0.83 4.11
Tracksystem Foundation Foundation Trackcomponent TrackcomponentRL RL WF RL WF   
    
 
 
which indicates that the overall RL of “Track system” is 4.11 belonging to “Possible” 
with a belief of 100 percent. 
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Comparison 
E1-(0.25) E2-(0.22) E3-(0.21) E4-(0.17) E5-(0.15) Aggregated 
UFNs 
Judgment UFNs Judgment UFNs Judgment UFNs Judgment UFNs Judgment 
UFNs 
Rail vs. 
Fishplate 
(A1,2) 
VI 6,7,7,8 7,8,9 7,8,8,9 6,7,8 6,7,7,8 VI 6,7,7,8 6-8 6,6,8,8 
6.22,7.22,7.
22,8.22 
Fishplate 
vs.Fastening 
TfHG (A2,3) 
WI 2,3,3,4 4,5,6 4,5,5,6 4,5 4,4,5,5 WI 2,3,3,4 4,5 4,4,5,5 
3.16,3.98,3.
98,4.80 
Fastening vs. 
Pad (A3,4) 
BEW&
WI 
1.5,2.5,
2.5,3.5 
EQ 1,1,1,2 1,2,3 1,2,2,3 
BEW&
WI 
1.5,2.5,
2.5,3.5 
1,2,4 1,2,2,4 
1.00,1.74,1.
74,2.74 
Ballast vs. 
Pad(A5,4) 
SI 4,5,5,6 5,6,7 5,6,6,7 6,7,8 6,7,7,8 
BSV&V
I 
5.5,6.5,
6.5,7.5 
5,6,7,8 5,6,7,8 
4.76,5.88,5.
88,7.14 
Sleeper vs. 
Ballast (A6,5) 
BEW&
WI 
1.5,2.5,
2.5,3.5 
2,3,4 2,3,3,4 1,1,2 1,1,1,2 EQ 1,1,1,2 2,3,4 2,3,3,4 
1.23,1.59,1.
59,2.70 
Table 8-6 Expert judgements for components of “Track Component” subsystem 
 
Table 8-7 Pairwise comparison matrix M established for track components 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ai,j 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
6.22,7.22,7.
22,8.22 
19.66,28.74,
28.74,39.46 
19.66,50. 
00,50.00,108.11 
2.75,8.50,8.
50,22.70 
1.02,5.35,5.
35,18.39 
2 0.12,0.14,0.
14,0.16 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
3.16,3.98,3.
98,4.80 
3.16,6.93,6.93,1
3.15 
0.44,1.18,1.
18,2.76 
0.16,0.74,0.
74,2.24 
3 0.025,0.03,
0.03,0.05 
0.20,0.25,0.
25,0.32 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
1.00,1.74,1.74,2.
74 
0.14,0.30,0.
30,0.58 
0.05,0.19,0.
19,0.47 
4 9.25e-3,0.0
2,0.02,0.05 
0.08,0.14,0.
14,0.32 
0.36,0.57,0.
57,1.00 
1.00,1.00,1.00,1.
00 
0.14,0.17,0.
17,0.21 
0.05,0.11,0.
11,0.17 
5 0.04,0.12,0.
12,0.36 
0.36,0.85,0.
85,2.26 
1.74,3.38,3.
38,7.14 
4.76,5.88,5.88,7.
14 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
0.37,0.63,0.
63,0.81 
6 0.05,0.19,0.
19,0.98 
0.45,1.35,1.
35,6.11 
2.15,5.37,5.
37,19.30 
5.88,9.34,9.34,1
9.31 
1.23,1.59,1.
59,2.70 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
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Table 8-8 Pairwise comparison matrix M established for track components 
 
Compare Formation layer Base 
Formation 
layer 
1,1,1,1 BEW 
Base  1,1,1,1 
Table 8-9 Foundation comparison matrix 
 
Compare Track  
Component 
Foundation 
Track  
Component 
1,1,1,1 BEW 
Foundation  1,1,1,1 
Table 8-10 Subsystem comparison matrix 
8.3 Maintenance Option Decision Making 
The input parameters are the FF, CP and CS of each failure mode. The RL of each 
failure mode is then assessed by using the FRA safety risk model. On the basis of the 
results of RLs of failure modes, the RLs of corresponding components are obtained by 
using a fuzzy aggregation operation as described in Section 6.3. The RLs of subsystems 
can then be derived by synthesizing the RLs of components and their corresponding 
weights. Finally, the RL of the track system can be obtained by Eq. 6-1. Table 8-11 
shows the RLs of failure modes, components, subsystems and the overall RL of the 
Ai,j 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
2.36,2.53,2.
53,2.69 
4.04,4.83,4.
83,5.60 
4.04,6.27,6.27,9.
00 
1.61,2.73,2.
73,4.33 
1.01,2.20,2.
20,3.92 
2 0.37,0.40,0.
40,0.42 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
1.73,1.91,1.
91,2.09 
1.72,2.48,2.48,3.
35 
0.68,1.08,1.
08,1.61 
0.43,0.87,0.
87,1.46 
3 0.18,0.20,0.
20,0.25 
0.48,0.52,0.
52,0.58 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
1.00,1.30,1.30,1.
60 
0.40,0.56,0.
56,0.77 
0.25,0.45,0.
45,0.70 
4 0.11,0.16,0.
16,0.25 
0.30,0.40,0.
40,0.58 
0.62,0.77,0.
77,1.00 
1.00,1.00,1.00,1.
00 
0.40,0.44,0.
44,0.48 
0.25,0.35,0.
35,0.44 
5 0.23,0.37,0.
37,0.62 
0.62,0.93,0.
93,1.47 
1.30,1.77,1.
77,2.52 
2.08,2.30,2.30,2.
52 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
0.63,0.81,0.
81,0.91 
6 0.26,0.46,0.
46,0.99 
0.69,1.15,1.
15,2.34 
1.43,2.20,2.
20,4.01 
2.30,2.85,2.852,
4.01 
1.10,1.24,1.
24,1.59 
1.00,1.00,1.
00,1.00 
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track system with risk scores located from 0 to 10 and the defined risk categories of 
“Low”, “Possible”, “Substantial” and “High” with a belief of percentage. Table 8-11 
also shows the percentages of risk contribution percentage (RC) of each component to 
subsystem and subsystem to the overall RL of the track system. 
 
System Subsystem RL RC Component RL RC Failure mode RL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Track 
system 
(RL:4.11) 
Track  
component 
4.31 83% Rail 4.65 52% Defect 5 
 Fatigue 5.50 
 Poor support 3.58 
 Damaged by powered 
wheel 
3.80 
 Fishplate 4.00 9% Inadequately 
maintained rail joint 
support 
4.00 
 Fastening 4.00 5% Clip wear 4.00 
  Screw loose 4.00 
 Pad 4.00 3% Pad degradation 4.00 
 Ballast 3.67 11% Performance 
deterioration 
3.67 
 Sleeper 4.22 20% Load damage 5.08 
  Maintenance damage 3.10 
Subgrade 3.08 17% Formation 
layer 
2.98 63% Load related failure 3.26 
  Soil related failure 2.77 
  Environment related 
failure 
1.75 
 Base 3.28 37% Load related failure 3.75 
  Soil related failure 2.75 
  Environment related 
failure 
1.75 
Table 8-11 Results of risk assessment of track system 
 
The RL of the overall system is 4.11. The RLs of the “Track component” subsystem and 
“Subgrade” subsystem are 4.31 and 3.08, respectively. It can be seen from Table 8-11 
that the “Track component” subsystem is the major risk contributor that contributes 83% 
to the overall system RL, while the "Subgrade" subsystem contributes 17%. Within the 
“Track component” subsystem, the main risk contributions come from rail failures 
which contribute 52% to the RL of the subsystem. The “Rail”, “Sleeper”, “Ballast”, 
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“Fishplate”, “Fastening” and “Pad” contribute 20%, 11%, 9%, 5% and 3% to the RL of 
the “Track component” subsystem, respectively.  
 
Because the overall RL of the system is 4.11 belonging to the “Possible” category 
which falls in the transition region (e.g. “Possible” and “Substantial”). As described 
earlier in this thesis, if risks are in the transition region, they need to be reduced As Low 
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Therefore, maintenance actions must be carried 
out to reduce RL of such a track system. Assume the safety requirement is that the 
overall RL of the system is no more than 3.00. The total maintenance budget is 
£750,000 and the detailed costs are shown in Table 8-12, which covers labour cost, 
equipment cost, materials and parts cost, and any other relevant costs. Suppose there 
are four maintenance options in hand. They are: 
 
Option 1: Eliminating failure modes of “Rail”, “Fastening”, “Pad” and “Ballast” 
components by repair/renewal maintenance work. 
Option 2: Eliminating failure modes of “Rail”, “Fastening” and “Ballast” 
components by repair/renewal maintenance work. 
Option 3: Eliminating failure modes of “Rail” and “Ballast” components by 
repair/renewal maintenance work. 
Option 4: Eliminating failure modes of “Rail”, “Fishplate”, “Fastening”, “Pad” and 
“Sleeper” by repair/renewal maintenance work. 
 
System Subsystems Components RL Repair/Renewal 
Cost (10
5
 pounds) 
 
 
Track 
system 
 
 
Track  
component 
Rail 4.65 3.50 
Fishplate 4.00 2.00 
Fastening 4.00 0.07 
Pad 4.00 0.40 
Ballast 3.67 3.00 
Sleeper 4.22 1.10 
Subgrade Formation layer 2.98 2.00 
Base 3.28 2.50 
Table 8-12 Maintenance costs 
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Table 8-13 shows the cost of each maintenance option. The expected overall system RL 
after implementation of the corresponding maintenance option is re-assessed by using 
the proposed safety risk model as described in Section 3. As can be seen from Table 
8-13, the RL of the overall track system has been reduced significantly, but the cost 
invested into each option is different. The proposed risk based maintenance decision 
making model can take into account risk and cost together to obtain the utility function 
associated with each option for ranking the maintenance options in hand; once all 
preference degrees of all maintenance options in hand are produced, the best option can 
be chosen. In this case, the best maintenance option can be determined by following the 
steps as described in Section 6.6. 
 
Option Cost (10
5
 pounds) System RL 
Option 1 7.20 1.59 
Option 2 6.70 1.69 
Option 3 6.50 1.86 
Option 4 5.60 2.35 
Table 8-13 Costs of maintenance options and corresponding overall RL of the system 
 
Based on the proposed cost-risk model, cost and risk values of these four options, 
derived from the risk model and the cost model are normalised and weighted.  
 
By using Eqs. 6-16 and 6-17, the normalised cost of option 1 is calculated as 
 
       
5517.0
106.5105.6107.6102.7
102.7
25252525
5
4
1
2
1
1
cos,1 
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


i
t
Cost
Cost
x  
and normalised system RL of option 1 is calculated as 
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As risk and cost are equally important in this case, the weighted normalised cost of 
option 1 is calculated as 
 
2758.05517.05.0cos,1coscos,1  ttt xwy  
 
and the weighted normalised system RL of option 1 is calculated as 
 
2097.04195.05.0,1,1  RLRLRL xwy  
 
Similarly, weighted normalised cost and system RL of the other options can be 
calculated as shown in Table 8-14 . According to Eqs. 6- 20 and 6-21, the best and worst 
scenario options can be defined as 
 
 2097.0,2145.0A  
 
and the worst scenario option is defined as 
 
 3100.0,2758.0A  
 
By using these scenario options, according to Eqs. 6- 22, 6- 23 and 6-24, the preference 
degree of option 1 is calculated 
 
        0613.02097.02097.02145.02758.0 222,1
2
coscos,11 

RLRLtt yyyyD  
        1103.03100.02097.02758.02758.0 222,1
2
coscos,11 

RLRLtt yyyyD  
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6207.0
1103.00613.0
1103.0
11
1
1 






DD
D
P  
 
Option 
tix cos,  tiy cos,  RLix ,  RLiy ,  

iD  

iD  iP  
Rank 
Option 1 0.5517 0.2758 0.4195 0.2097 0.0613 0.1103 0.6207 2 
Option 2 0.5134 0.2567 0.4459 0.2229 0.0442 0.0892 0.6688 1 
Option 3 0.4980 0.2490 0.4907 0.2454 0.0496 0.0699 0.5849 3 
Option 4 0.4291 0.2145 0.6200 0.3100 0.1003 0.0613 0.3793 4 
Table 8-14 Results of preference evolution at each step 
8.4 Results and Discussions  
Obviously, option 2 is the best maintenance option because it has the highest preference 
degree with 66.88%. The results can also be demonstrated in Figure 8-3. Option 1 is the 
best safety maintenance option, but the cost appears too high. Option 4 is a low cost 
maintenance option, but the system risk appears too high. As can be seen from Figure 
8-3, cost is increased with significant risk reduction from point 4 to point 1, which 
indicates that options 1, 2 and 3 are the potential “cost effective” options. Based on the 
proposed risk-cost model, the best option is the one with highest preference degree, 
which also indicates that it is the closest to the best scenario. Therefore, option 2 is the 
best maintenance option. If the maintenance work can be carried out based on option 2, 
the RL of the overall track system can be reduced from 4.11 (possible 100%) to 1.69 
(low 100%), and cost would be £0.67 million which is within the budget. 
8.4.1 Sensitive Analysis 
A sensitive analysis has been carried out based on varying the repair/renewal cost of 
each component. Table 8-15 shows maintenance costs of components increased by 10% 
and 20%. Based on these variances, the cost of each maintenance option is calculated as 
shown in Table 8-16 and the calculated preference ranking of these maintenance 
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options are summarised in Table 8-17.  
Components RL Repair/Renewal 
Cost (10
5
 pounds) 
Repair/Renewal 
Cost (10
5
 pounds) 
+10% 
Repair/Renewal 
Cost (10
5
 pounds) 
+20% 
Rail 4.65 3.50 3.85 4.2 
Fishplate 4.00 2.00 2.2 2.4 
Fastening 4.00 0.07 0.077 0.084 
Pad 4.00 0.40 0.44 0.48 
Ballast 3.67 3.00 3.3 3.6 
Sleeper 4.22 1.10 1.21 1.32 
Formation layer 2.98 2.00 2.2 2.4 
Base 3.28 2.50 2.75 3 
Table 8-15 Maintenance cost increased by 10% and 20% for each component. 
Option Original Cost (10
5
 
pounds) 
Cost (10
5
 pounds) 
+10% 
Cost (10
5
 
pounds) 
+20% 
System RL 
Option 1 7.20 7.92 8.64 1.59 
Option 2 6.70 7.37 8.04 1.69 
Option 3 6.50 7.15 7.8 1.86 
Option 4 5.60 6.16 6.72 2.35 
Table 8-16 Costs of maintenance options and corresponding overall RL of the system 
according to component cost variances by 10% and 20% 
Option Original  Cost +10%  Cost +20%  Rank 
Option 1 0.6207 0.6207 0.6207 2 
Option 2 0.6688 0.6688 0.6688 1 
Option 3 0.5849 0.5849 0.5849 3 
Option 4 0.3793 0.3793 0.3793 4 
Table 8-17 Preference ranking based on varying maintenance costs. 
The results show that the proposed cost-risk model is not sensitive to the variance of the 
cost of each component as it will not affect the preference degrees of maintenance 
options. However, it is obviously very sensitive to risk contributions of risk 
contributions of components and subsystems as shown in Table 8-11, as the RL of 
iP iP iP
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overall system will be significantly reduced when high risk contributors are eliminated. 
As the inputs of risk-cost model are the combinations of maintenance options, the 
combination of each option will also significantly affect the results.  
 
From this case, it is obvious that the proposed risk based decision making model can 
assist the asset management team in understanding the problem and making an 
effective decision as to what risk reduction measures should be taken.  
 
 
Figure 8-3 Four maintenance options 
 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter presents a case study on the risk assessment of a track system using the 
proposed risk-based maintenance decision making model, which incorporates safety 
risk and cost into the railway maintenance process to make maintenance decisions for 
railway systems. The proposed risk-based maintenance decision making system 
provides railway engineers, operators, managers and maintainers with a useful method 
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and tool to make full use of the information produced from safety risk and cost analysis 
and to take into consideration maintenance aspects simultaneously. Great benefits may 
be received by using the proposed risk-cost modelling methodology into the railway 
maintenance process, so that maintenance work can be made more economically while 
system safety is improved. The proposed risk-based maintenance decision making 
system can also be used to assist engineers and risk analysts in understanding the 
interaction between safety and cost considerations, so as to balance the best utilisation 
of resources for maintaining railway systems. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
9.1 Conclusions 
The research has achieved its main goal of improving railway safety by developing 
safety risk models and tools using FRA and AHP techniques for railway safety risk 
assessment processes. The research has proved that the proposed risk model can 
successfully help rail vehicles, infrastructure operators, track & civil engineering 
designers and maintainers, and health & safety advisors to improve railway safety 
through design, diagnosis and maintenance of railway systems. The achievements of 
this research can be summarised as follows: 
 
 The objective of investigation of railway safety risk assessment tools as used in 
practice and in research literature worldwide has been achieved. This has been 
accomplished through conducting an extensive literature review of railway safety 
risk assessment techniques which highlights railway safety concepts and discusses 
the implementations and applications of current risk assessment techniques in 
railways. It was found that current techniques applied in railway safety risk 
assessment may not be appropriate when there is a high level of uncertainty 
involved in the risk data and information. The application of FRA and Fuzzy-AHP 
in the risk model may solve such a problem.  This research also introduces a new 
parameter of 'consequence probability' in the risk assessment process, which 
enhances the risk analysis.  
 The objective of development of railway safety risk models and tools to facilitate 
railway safety risk analysis has been achieved. Safety risk models based on FRA 
combined with improved Fuzzy-AHP technique have been established for 
processing safety risk assessment efficiently and effectively. By introducing the 
parameter of 'consequence probability', it distinguishes a hazard event with a higher 
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 169 
probability of consequence to cause fatalities. This will affect the overall risk 
ranking and finally affect the decision making of potential safety measures or 
maintenance strategies. Also by the application of improved Fuzzy-AHP, the 
required number of expert judgements is reduced from          to     
when conducting pairwise comparison. It is a significant advantage to compare 
with the traditional method when the number of involved alternatives   is high. 
The other advantage of applying improved fuzzy-AHP is that the comparison 
matrix derived from expert judgements is always consistent, while the consistency 
test is needed in traditional fuzzy-AHP. Therefore, the proposed model can produce 
much more reliable results than other risk assessment techniques.     
 The objective of validation of the proposed railway safety risk system via case 
studies with the industrial partners has been achieved. The case studies on risk 
assessment of shunting at Hammersmith and a track system are used to validate the 
proposed models, and relevant papers have been published. The proposed model 
can provide detailed results, which include risk contributions arising at system level, 
sub-system level as well as component level, and also include RLs in the format of 
risk score and risk categories with a degree of confidence.  
 The objective of developing advanced risk-cost model to assist maintenance 
decision making process has been achieved. TOPSIS, one of the multi-objective 
decision-making techniques, has been employed to select the best solution for 
railway maintenance decision making. This model combines a risk model with a 
cost model to be developed into a cost benefit based risk decision making tool. It 
can provide decision makers with a ranking of maintenance options or strategies in 
terms of preference degrees. A relevant paper has been accepted and will be 
published soon.          
 The objective of application of the proposed methodology and tool to railway 
maintenance decision making has been achieved. The developed software based on 
the proposed risk models, namely RISRAS, has been delivered to railway industry 
with the user manual, and workshops have been organised to deliver research 
results to the industry.  
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Innovative features of this research are emphasised as follows: 
 
Innovation 1: 
The proposed railway safety risk model is developed based on FRA and fuzzy-AHP 
approaches, where the potential risk to railway operations is assessed in terms of four 
parameters, i.e. FF, CP, CS and WF. It is quite appropriate for the circumstance where 
some risk events frequently happen and may possibly lead to serious consequences 
depending on the existing risk control measures. It is worth noting that by using four 
parameters could help risk analysts with likelihood analysis and even with risk control 
measures that are designed to reduce the likelihood aspect of risk, since the CP is 
introduced in the assessment. More risk information, such as frequency and probability, 
which can be derived either from expert judgements or past records, can be directly 
used in the risk estimation. Finally, this will affect the overall risk ranking, so that the 
hazard event with very high occurrence frequency but very low consequence 
probability or with very low occurrence frequency but very high consequence 
probability can be identified. 
 
Innovation 2 
In any cases, if no existing risk data and information available, subjective estimations 
can be used in the proposed risk analysis modules. The proposed railway safety risk 
model allows vague and imprecise descriptors such as “likely” and “impossible” to be 
used directly to capture expert judgements and it also provides a flexible method of 
combining the opinions of experts with various experiences from different 
backgrounds.  
  
Innovation 3 
Improved Fuzzy- AHP is employed for the risk assessment, which only requires few 
judgements from experts without any consistency test. This will reduce the complexity 
of the application of Fuzzy-AHP.    
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Innovation 4 
The development of software based on the proposed risk model is designed especially 
for railways. Compared to other tools, the advantages of the developed software can be 
summarised as follows: 
 It can combine expert knowledge and engineering judgments with other risk 
historical data for the railway safety and risk assessment in a consistent manner;  
 It can deal with imprecise, ambiguous, incomplete and uncertain information in the 
assessment;  
 It can apply linguistic expressions directly to the risk assessment;  
 It can provide a flexible structure for risk analysis. 
 
Innovation 5 
The risk-based decision making module that combines the proposed safety risk model 
and a cost model, has been developed for maintenance option decision making. By 
using this model, preference degrees of maintenance options can be determined in 
which risk reduction and cost are taken into consideration. The results from the system 
can demonstrate that the maintenance option with the highest preference degree can 
reduce the RL of the system as low as reasonably practicable.    
  
9.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
Every research study has its own intrinsic limitations and weaknesses. Some future 
work can be anticipated and is summarised on the basis of current research. Firstly, as 
the third parametre CP has been introduced in the current risk model, the rulebase of the 
model has become bigger. It may be difficult to design the rulebase when parametres 
have many linguistic terms, and experts may need to input and design hundreds of rules . 
Hence, it is still worth carrying out further study to identify effective solution, such as 
an additional software, to facilitate the design of rulebase. 
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Secondly, the software based on the proposed model has already been developed. 
However, it still needs to be further improved based on the feedback from industrial 
users, so that the assessment process can be facilitated. 
 
Finally, risk-based decision making model has been developed, and it should be 
integrated with the developed software (RISRAS) in the future, and more case studies 
should be conducted based on the application of the developed software.  
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